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ABSTRACT 
 
THEFT AND LOSSES IN TURKISH ELECTRICITY SECTOR: EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TARIFF DESIGN 
 
 
 
Since the 1980s, electricity industries in many countries have been undergoing 
privatization and liberalization in order to generate improvements in efficiency and 
quality.  Liberalization and privatization can only be successful if privatized utilities can 
be financially viable on their own and not rely on government subsidies except for those 
that are designed for social objectives such as universal service. In the case of Turkey, 
an important impediment to privatization and liberalization are thefts and losses that 
generate large asymmetries in costs across different regions. In international 
comparisons these costs are exceptionally high and they threaten the economic and 
political feasibility of reform.  
This master thesis undertakes an econometric analysis to identify factors that 
cause such large variances in electricity theft-losses across different regions of Turkey. 
Once these factors are identified, empirical results are then used to derive implications 
for both privatizations as well as principles that should guide tariff design, including 
possible subsidy mechanisms. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK ELEKTRİK SEKTÖRÜNDE KAYIP VE KAÇAKLAR: AMPİRİK ANALİZ 
VE TARİFE TASARIMINA ETKİSİ 
 
 
1980’lerden bu yana elektrik sektörü bir çok ülkede verimlilik ve gelişim 
sağlamak için özelleştirme ve liberalleşme sürecine girmiştir. Liberalleşme ve 
özelleştirme ancak özelleştirilmiş kurumlar merkezi hükümetten herhangi bir finansal 
destek almadan kendi ayakları üzerinde durabildiği zaman başarılı olabilir. Bunun tek 
istisnası sadece evrensel servis gibi sosyal amaçlar olabilir. Türkiye için elektrik 
sektöründeki serbestleşme ve özelleştirme karşısındaki en önemli engellerden biri 
bölgeler arasında büyük maliyet asimetrileri yaratan kayıp ve kaçaklardır. Diğer dünya 
devletlerine göre kayıp kaçak maliyetleri aşırı yüksektir ve bu da yapılmak istenen 
reformun ekonomik ve siyasi olabilirliğini tehdit etmektedir. 
Bu yükseklisans tezinde bölgeler arasıdaki muazzam kayıp ve kaçak farklılıklarına 
neden olan faktörlerin tanımlanması için ekonometrik bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu 
faktörler tanımlandıktan sonra, ampirik çalışma sonuçlarının özelleştirme ve tarife 
tasarımına iması subvansiyon mekhanizması dahil olmak üzere değerlendirilmiştir.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
THEFT AND LOSSES IN TURKISH ELECTRICITY SECTOR: EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TARIFF DESIGN 
 
 
 
Since the 1980s, electricity industries in many countries have been undergoing 
privatization and liberalization in order to generate improvements in efficiency and 
quality.  Liberalization and privatization can only be successful if privatized utilities can 
be financially viable on their own and not rely on government subsidies except for those 
that are designed for social objectives such as universal service. In the case of Turkey, 
an important impediment to privatization and liberalization are thefts and losses that 
generate large asymmetries in costs across different regions. In international 
comparisons these costs are exceptionally high and they threaten the economic and 
political feasibility of reform.  
This master thesis undertakes an econometric analysis to identify factors that 
cause such large variances in electricity theft-losses across different regions of Turkey. 
Once these factors are identified, empirical results are then used to derive implications 
for both privatizations as well as principles that should guide tariff design, including 
possible subsidy mechanisms. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK ELEKTRİK SEKTÖRÜNDE KAYIP VE KAÇAKLAR: AMPİRİK ANALİZ 
VE TARİFE TASARIMINA ETKİSİ 
 
 
1980’lerden bu yana elektrik sektörü bir çok ülkede verimlilik ve gelişim 
sağlamak için özelleştirme ve liberalleşme sürecine girmiştir. Liberalleşme ve 
özelleştirme ancak özelleştirilmiş kurumlar merkezi hükümetten herhangi bir finansal 
destek almadan kendi ayakları üzerinde durabildiği zaman başarılı olabilir. Bunun tek 
istisnası sadece evrensel servis gibi sosyal amaçlar olabilir. Türkiye için elektrik 
sektöründeki serbestleşme ve özelleştirme karşısındaki en önemli engellerden biri 
bölgeler arasında büyük maliyet asimetrileri yaratan kayıp ve kaçaklardır. Diğer dünya 
devletlerine göre kayıp kaçak maliyetleri aşırı yüksektir ve bu da yapılmak istenen 
reformun ekonomik ve siyasi olabilirliğini tehdit etmektedir. 
Bu yükseklisans tezinde bölgeler arasıdaki muazzam kayıp ve kaçak farklılıklarına 
neden olan faktörlerin tanımlanması için ekonometrik bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu 
faktörler tanımlandıktan sonra, ampirik çalışma sonuçlarının özelleştirme ve tarife 
tasarımına iması subvansiyon mekhanizması dahil olmak üzere değerlendirilmiştir.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
 
Until the last decades, natural monopolies all over the world have been tightly 
regulated. One of the most vital sectors which has been operating as a natural monopoly 
is the electricity industry. Nevertheless, the natural monopoly property of electricity 
sector has been diminishing especially in generation and distribution-retail segment due 
to technological and methodological improvements leading to the liberalization of these 
segments.1 
Turkey had also tried to adapt to this trend of liberalization although the process 
started a bit late relative to developed countries. However, there are some problems in 
the different segments of the electricity sector that can act as serious barriers to the 
implementation of the liberalization and privatization process. Stranded costs of power 
plants are among such problems in generation segment, whereas high theft and losses 
are serious barriers to private participation in the distribution and retail segments.2 
Because such asymmetric costs can harm competition and breaks down the financial 
viability of the system, they should be considered as primary concerns in transition to 
liberalization in the electricity sector.  
Having mentioned two different segments, generation and distribution, the focus 
of this thesis will be on the distribution-retail segments since it is buyer side of the 
electricity sector. If this segment cannot reach competition and financial viability, none 
of the liberalization objectives will be achieved. The aim of this thesis is to identify 
factors that cause theft and losses and make policy suggestions. 
                                                 
1  Despite all developments in technology and methodology, transmission segment 
of the sector still exhibits properties of natural monopoly. In fact, distribution without 
retailing also shows natural monopoly feature but virtual competition can be created 
between distribution companies via some methods such as Yardstick Competition 
(Shleifer, 1985). Since in the near future distribution companies will also be retailing 
companies, the term “competition in distribution-retail segment” can be used 
conveniently. 
2  Intended meaning of “ theft and losses” is “electricity theft and technical losses” 
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Regarding this aim, the thesis consists of two core parts other than the introduction 
and conclusion. The first core part presents an empirical analysis of theft and losses, 
intended to explain reasons and factors that cause huge variability in time dimension 
and especially across cross sections (among provinces). The second part uses the results 
of the first part and makes recommendations for privatization and tariff design so as to 
reduce the burden of theft-losses in the privatization process. 
 
   
1.2. Process of Liberalization in the Electricity Sector 
 
 
The liberalization process was initiated in 1984, by the Law No: 3096 which 
abolished the monopoly of Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) and private entities 
participate in generation, transmission and distribution activities. Also, TEK became a 
state owned enterprise. 
By the end of 1980s, Çukurova Electricity Company and Kepez Electricity 
Company which existed before TEK were given rights to do generation, transmission 
distribution and trading of electricity within Adana and Antalya region respectively. 
By the Decree in force Law No.513 and dated 13.8.1993, TEK was slated for 
privatization, without cutting its relations with the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources. As an extension of this arrangement, TEK was divided into two separate 
State Owned Enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Generation Transmission 
Company (TEAŞ) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Company (TEDAŞ) by the Act 
of the Council of Ministers. 3 
The most important step in the restructuring of the energy sector was the 
enactment of the Electricity Market Law No: 4628, (Official Gazette, 3 March, 2001). 
The purpose of the law was the establishment of a stable, transparent and financially 
strong electricity market that works under competitive environment and private law, in 
order to ensure sufficient, high quality, sustainable, environmentally desireable and low 
cost electricity activities. (TEİAŞ web site) 
This Law covers the generation, transmission, distribution, wholesale, retail, 
wholesale service, retail service of electricity and its import-export, together with the 
rights and responsibilities of all real and legal persons related with those services. 
Moreover, the establishment of Energy Market Regulatory Authority and its working 
                                                 
3 Actually, this is Council of Ministers’ decision of the force of law (kanun hükmünde kararname) 
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agenda, principles as well as the procedure for the sector’s privatization are covered in 
the Electricity Market Law. 
By the Decree of Council of Ministers No:2001/2026 and dated 05.02.2001 which 
was issued in the Official Gazette dated  March 2, 2001, TEAŞ was divided to form 3 
state owned public enterprises; Turkish Electricity Generation Company (EÜAŞ) 
Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEİAŞ), and Turkish Electricity Trading 
and Contracting Company (TETAŞ).  
These three companies started to function in October 1, 2001. EUAŞ is 
responsible for operating and maintaining state owned thermal and hydraulic power 
plants and also building new plants, TEİAŞ’ responsibilities are to build and operate the 
transmission facilities to carry out the load dispatch, to install a communication 
infrastructure appropriate for the new market mechanism and to perform the balancing 
and reconciliation activities of the market. As for TETAŞ, it executes wholesale activity 
generally, buys electricity from generators (EUAŞ and others) and sells to distributors 
and free customers. Since our focus is on distribution segment, specific efforts in this 
segment should also be stated. 
 
 
1.3. Private Participation in Distribution 
 
 
Privatization program in the distribution sector had been started by assignment of 
Kayseri and Surroundings Electricity Company for Kayseri and its surroundings and 
also Aktaş Electricity Company for Asia part of Istanbul. Based on the Law No: 3096 
(legislated in 1984), concession contracts were signed with Kayseri and Surroundings 
Electricity Company and Aktaş Electricity Company on March 1, 1990 and September 
1, 1990 respectively. Also, both companies started to run after the physical transferring 
operations at the same year. (DPT, 2001) 
According to the contracts, the following system has been applied for both firms. 
In this system, at the beginning of each year a temporary budget is made and a buying 
price is determined. At the end of the year, all revenues of the firm are summed up as 
income and also expenses for operating the firm (which expenses are necessary and 
which are not are determined by the government) are recorded as expenditures. Planned 
investments and a reasonable dividend are also included in the expenditures. Then, the 
difference between income and expenditures (income minus expenses) is calculated and 
compared to the electricity invoices that are paid by the distribution company to TEAŞ 
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(TETAŞ after 2001). If the difference is greater than the invoices, the difference 
becomes claim of TEAŞ (TETAŞ after 2001) but if it is less, the difference becomes 
claim of the corresponding firm. This is actually a cost plus regulation 
(www.kcetas.com.tr). 
However, the contracts contain no upper bounds on operating and investment 
expenses. Hence, there have been some conflicts between the corresponding sides and 
these conflicts have led to court cases.  
In addition to this, distribution system was divided to 29 mission region by the 
Decree of Council of Ministers which was issued in the Official Gazette dated 
November 24, 1996 and no: 22827 (DPT, 2001). 
The number 29 was increased to 33 (two of them had been already operating by 
Aktas and Kayseri private companies) following a decree in November 2000. (OECD, 
2002) After a tender for transferring operating rights (TOR) for these corresponding 
areas 26 proposals were accepted and for 5 regions no proposal were offered. Among 
the 26 proposals 4 were cancelled by the Council of the State. Of the 22 remaining 
regions, 11 of them were assigned to the corresponding winners of the tender in January 
1998 and franchising contracts were signed in 1999. As for the other 11 regions, 
evaluation and feasibility process continued. On the other hand, all these processes were 
further complicated in January 2000. A new law allowed TORs to be based on private 
law as well as public law. Some companies preferred private law, whereas other, 
remained under public law. After all these, the economic crisis of 2001 prompted the 
Treasury to be unwilling to provide guarantees for contractual obligations of TEAŞ, 
further jeopardizing the TOR process. Finally, transferring process was delayed. 
Actually, no transfer completed yet. (OECD, 2002) 
Besides, Council of State (Daniştay) cancelled the franchising contracts of Aktaş 
Electricity Company on February 16, 2001 claiming absence of public benefits in the 
franchising contract.  
Moreover, on June 12, 2003 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources seized 
Çukurova Electricity Company (ÇEAŞ) and Kepez Electricity Company (Kepez) by 
abolishing the concession agreement. ÇEAŞ and Kepez were not only electricity 
distribution companies but also they were involved in transmission and generation 
activities. In fact, their distribution activities were restricted to just definite industry 
consumers. Therefore, they will not be considered as distribution companies.  
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As for today, the only private electricity distribution company is Kayseri and 
Surroundings Electricity Company that has been operating since 1990 without any 
interruption. Now, except for this special case, all of the rest of electricity distribution 
activities are carried out by the state enterprises. These enterprises are TEDAŞ and its 
joint partnerships. TEDAŞ consists of 64+3 electricity distribution establishments (64 
province establishment + substitution for Aktaş, ÇEAŞ and Kepez). Its joint 
partnerships are Trakya EDAŞ (Electricity Distribution Company), Boğaziçi EDAŞ, 
Körfez EDAŞ, Karaelmas EDAŞ, Meram EDAŞ, Sakarya EDAŞ and Başkent EDAŞ 
(TEDAŞ web site). 
In addition to all these historical background and process, legal structure is 
another important aspect of the problem. Current legal structure of electricity market is 
based on Electricity Market Law 2001. 
 
 
1.4.The Electricity Market Law 
 
 
On 20th February 2001, the Turkish parliament accepted the electricity market law 
(Law no.4628) and it was issued on the Official Gazette dated 3rd March, 2001. The 
first article of the law describes the aim and the scope of the law. The first article states 
the purpose as establishment of financially strong, stable and transparent electricity 
market that operates under competitive environment and private law in order to make 
sure sufficient, high quality, sustainable, low cost and environmentally desiareable 
electricity activities.  
As for scope, the law covers generation, transmission, distribution, wholesale, 
retail sale, retail sale service, import and export of electricity; responsibilities and rights 
of all entities that engage in these activities; installation of Electricity Market 
Regulatory Authority and its working procedure and principles and procedure for 
privatization of electricity entities.  
This law is actually a cornerstone for Turkish electricity sector and it was written 
in the light of developed western countries’ electricity laws. The most important 
innovations introduced by the law are as follows: 
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1.4.1. Vertical Separation 
 
The first unbundling in the sector was in 1993 by separation of TEK into TEAŞ 
and TEDAŞ. By the new law, TEAŞ was also disintegrated to three state enterprises 
EÜAŞ, TEİAŞ and TETAŞ which are responsible for generation, transmission and 
wholesale activities respectively.  
 
 
1.4.2. Licensing 
 
All public and private participants need to obtain licenses in order to engage in 
electricity activities. For each defined activity participants must have separate license. 
Licenses are given by the central regulator, EMRA. In each license, duration of the 
license, price setting mechanism and license canceling conditions are attached to the 
license.  
 
 
1.4.3. Regulatory Authority 
 
In order to protect the sector especially from political influence and to ensure 
transparency, an independent and financially and administratively autonomous 
regulatory authority EMRA (Energy Market Regulatory Authority) has been 
established. (Özkıvrak, forthcoming) 
This regulator is responsible for granting licenses, regulating present franchising 
contracts according to the law, observing the market performance, writing instructions 
for customer services and inspecting their applications, determining pricing principles 
that are mentioned in the law and making necessary adjustments, and maintaining 
application of the law.  
 
 
1.4.4. Competition in the Generation and Retail Segment 
 
The main focus of the law is introducing competition into the electricity sector 
wherever possible. In light of experience of western countries, competition for 
generation and retail sale was proposed. Because of market power concern, some 
limitations were placed on private generation firms. A private company’s total market 
share cannot exceed 20% of total installed capacity in the preceding year in Turkey.  
As for retail sale, in addition to retail sales companies, distribution companies may 
also engage in retail sale by getting a retail license. Nevertheless, although retailers can 
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do retailing in all regions of Turkey, distributors are restricted to do retail sales just 
within a specified region that is identifed in their retail licenses.  
Distribution companies can also engage in generation activities if they have 
generation licenses. However, the electricity they generate cannot exceed 20% of the 
electricity consumption of the previous year for their region.  
TEDAŞ performs both distribution and retail sale activities until the market 
develops. However, TEDAŞ and its affiliates are organized as defined in the new 
market model and keep separate accounts for distribution and retail service activities. 
  
 
1.4.5. Privatization 
 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources offers its opinions and proposals to the 
privatization Authority (OİB) about privatization of TEDAŞ, EÜAŞ, their 
establishments, joint partnerships and units. Privatization procedure is carried out by 
OİB. In the frame of the privatization process, none of participants can have significant 
shares in any of the activities to control the market (Özkıvrak, forthcoming) 
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2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
2.1. Definition of the Problem 
 
 
Private participation in the distribution and retailing of electricity is expected to 
bring substantial improvements to the sector such that investment burden of the 
indebted state will be reduced and inefficiency in the sector will be minimized. 
However, to achieve these aims, the problem of high theft-losses needs to be overcome. 
Up to now, these high ratios and high heterogeneity across provinces have been hidden 
by cross subsidies. That is, people in cities with low theft-losses paid some part of the 
bills of people who live in cities with high theft-losses. However, when private 
participation is realized all distribution firms will have different costs and different 
theft-loss ratios in different regions. Cross subsidy cannot be maintained on anymore 
with private participation. Moreover, if cross subsidy is abolished, due to high 
variability in theft-loss ratios across regions, private distribution firms will have to 
apply very different prices across regions. Certainly, this runs into conflict with social 
objectives of the state. As a result, the cross sectional asymmetry and high ratios in 
theft-losses prevent the establishment of financially viable competitive market in 
electricity distribution. Hence, factors and reasons that drive theft and losses need to be 
determined, it is hoped that understanding these factors will facilitate dealing with them 
by designing proper tariff mechanism. 
In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between losses as theft and technical 
losses as they are likely to be driven by different factors. Technical loss is power lost 
when electricity passes through transformers and lines while electricity is being 
transmitted and distributed. These unavoidable losses can be minimized but never 
eliminated. As for theft, even though they are more than technical losses in volume, 
they are not inevitable. However, in practice 1 or 2 percent of theft is generally seen as 
acceptable. While technical loss is a physical design and construction problem that must 
be alleviated by engineers, theft is a social problem that should be examined by social 
scientists. Technical losses and theft can be summed and defined as theft-loss which is 
unbilled electricity. 
Theft-losses constitute 20% of total cost of electricity in Turkey which reaches 
approximately $2 billion amount annually (roughly 1% of Turkish GDP). 
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2.1.2. Technical Losses 
 
Electricity is a kind of energy and according to the energy conservation law any 
type of energy cannot be destroyed but it can be converted to other types. Actually, this 
law drives the events that occur in generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity.  
In generation, mechanical energy is converted to electricity by means of an 
alternator. However, although the aim is to produce electricity, all mechanical energy 
cannot be totally converted to the electricity. Instead, some of mechanical power heats 
up the environment. That is, it is converted to partially electricity and partially to heat. 
The ratio of these depends on the efficiency of the alternator and it should be noted that 
it is impossible to make a 100% conversion from mechanical power to electrical power. 
Even though the loss due to heating up in generation is a very large amount, this is not 
electricity loss but total energy loss (which is also an enormous waste).4 Thus, this 
component of total losses will not be considered in the technical losses of transporting 
electricity to the consumers. 
Electricity is produced at any location must be transported to the consumers. Like 
all other goods, transportation is costly and it is needed to construct some roads (lines) 
for electricity. However, in addition to the fixed cost of constructing and maintaining 
such roads, electricity does not need carrying activity. It carries itself by nature so it 
may seem to have no variable transportation cost. Actually, it does. While electrons 
flow into the lines they face some resistance in the wire (line). The wire absorbs some 
energy of the electrons and temperature of the wire increases due to the conversion of 
electricity to the heat. The amount of heat which appears or in other words amount of 
electricity loss ∆P depends on number of electrons that flow through the cross-section 
of the line per unit time, cross-section area of the line, length of the line, type of the 
wire and temperature of the line.  
Formally, current (I) is defined as electrical charge quantity that passes through a 
cross-section of the wire per second which is a measure of flowing electrons per unit 
time. As for resistance of the wire (R) at a given temperature, which depends on the 
other variables of effecting power loss, is defined as resistivity of the wire material (ρ) 
times length of the line (l) divided by cross-sectional area of the wire (A). As a result, 
                                                 
4 For example, 1 kg coal has much more energy than electricity generated by 
burning of it. The difference is lost through the increase in the temperature of the 
environment. 
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power loss is equal to resistance multiplied by the squares of the current. ∆P=I²R where 
R= ρl/A  
Resistance at a given temperature is an exogenous variable of the network that 
does not depend on activities of the consumers. It is a characteristic property of the 
physical system. Nevertheless, Current is highly sensitive to the action of network 
agents (consumers). By action of agents, it is meant how much power they are willing to 
consume at a given time. Now, it is needed to introduce a new concept, voltage, which 
is defined as the energy of unit charge. Hence, power is equal to current times voltage, 
P=VI. However, this is valid for direct current. For alternating current a new factor 
called power factor (cosφ) enters the equation and it becomes P=VI cosφ.  
In order to understand what cosφ is, the concept of inductance, capacitance, 
reactance and impedance should be known. In addition to resistive property of the 
devices in the system, there are also two opposing features inductance and capacitance 
of these tools because of alternation of the current. These factors instantaneously 
withdraw some power; they release them to the system just a little time later and this 
process goes on continuously by nature. So they show some reactive property against 
current. This reactive property is called reactance (inductive reactance minus capacitive 
reactance) and it is directionally perpendicular to the resistive property (resistance). 
Finally, directional resultant of these factors is called impedance. Here, φ is the angle 
between impedance and resistance and cosines of this angle is the ratio of resistance to 
impedance.  
 Since voltage is fixed for all consumers, if they wish to withdraw more power 
from the network it is realized by increase in withdrawing of current. Therefore, we can 
write I=P/Vcosφ where V is constant and 220 volt for low voltage consumers. As seen 
in the formula, current I depends on power withdrawal and cosφ therefore reactance of 
the devices of the consumers. When we make necessary substitutions power loss 
equation becomes   ∆P=I²R= (P/Vcosφ)²R= (P/Vcosφ)²ρl/A. 
In conclusion, if we wish to draw more electrical power from a line, power loss 
increase will be quadratic. Everyday, new consumers join the electricity network and 
they increase power load of common lines hence power loss in the lines rises 
quadraticly. Therefore, in order to restrict power loss, new investments should be made 
to construct new lines. In fact, new line construction affects the total power loss of the 
network by two opposite ways. First, since new lines increase the length of the network 
total resistance of the system increases, so does power loss. Second, however, new lines 
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divide the power load of existing lines and thus power loss decreases in quadratic 
motion driven by the equation generated above. Because the first reason of increase is 
linear and the second reason of decrease is quadratic, decrease effect overweighs the 
increase one. As a result, technical losses in the network are highly sensitive to the 
investments.  
In addition to the losses in lines, some other losses also occur when the voltage 
changes. In fact, the aim of changing the voltage is to reduce total electricity losses. 
This is done by transporting electricity in high voltage lines where losses are low5 and 
when electricity is close to the target, its voltage is reduced for consumption. This 
reduction of voltage is also costly in terms of electricity loss, but this loss amount is 
much lower than what it would be if electricity was totally be transported in low voltage 
lines. The voltage reduction process is realized by transformers and some losses occur 
in transformers driven by two effects. Some losses are function of voltage and some 
others are function of current. Because voltage is fixed, only current and therefore 
consumption of consumers affects the power loss in transformers. These transformers 
have some capacity and if power and therefore current drawn increases, their utilization 
increases and power losses rise, too. If power consumption is too high, reaching the 
capacity of transformer, the transformer may break down.6 Such overloads increase 
number of power outages and reduce the quality of electricity such as voltage stability. 
Therefore, transformer utilization ratio may be a good indicator for power losses 
and investments. Since high utilization ratio means insufficiency in setting up required 
transformers, lack of investment reveals itself. 
As a result of all these considerations above, 3 variables which are investments, 
transformer utilization ratio and low voltage line lengths will also be used in regression 
analysis below to capture some of the variability in technical losses. 
 
 
2.1.3. Theft 
 
In addition to the technical losses, another reason for energy loss is theft. This is 
actually selling losses and results from not technical but social reasons. Smith, 2003 
                                                 
5 When voltage is high, current is low since multiplication of current and voltage 
is constant. Therefore, power loss in high voltage lines is less.  
6 Prof. Özay from Middle East Technical University says hundreds of transformers 
are broken down in Istanbul, annually. 
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suggests 4 types of electricity theft that differ in terms of methods used to steal 
electricity.  
Fraud: In this type of theft, consumer tries to cheat the utility. Most general 
version of this is meter tampering. The consumer intervenes in the meter to make it 
show amount consumed less than it actually is. Actually, this is risky when done by 
amateurs. However, in some countries Malaysia for instance, professionals who are the 
managers of electricity utilities do this for a moderate price (New Strait Times, 1999). 
This is an organized crime, actually. When this meter tampering is done by 
organizations professionally, it may cause large amounts of losses.  
Steal: This method can be considered as the most direct method to thieve. In 
contrast to the other 3 methods, the consumer does not pay anything for electricity. The 
consumer does not have any relation with electricity utility in this method. The 
consumer fixes a line to the electricity grid and draws power via this line. This method 
is especially quite common in poor residential areas. In fact illegal lines are easy to 
detect but police force is needed to remove those lines (Smith, 2003). Bribery is also 
another problem with this method that officers may condone stealing electricity when 
they accept bribe. 
Billing irregularities: In some cases, the consumer may pay less or more than he 
consumes because of billing irregularities. The utility may be unable to detect the 
consumption correctly, leading to less or more amounts in billing than correct 
consumption. One of the most general reasons of billing irregularities is bribe. The 
consumer may bribe to pay less and meter reader officer may gain unofficial payment. 
(Smith, 2003) 
Unpaid Bills: Although Smith (2003) suggests this as a type of electricity theft, we 
do not consider unpaid bills as theft. Actually, it is a revenue collection problem rather 
than theft. Nevertheless, it is also some unpaid amount which causes financial weakness 
to the electricity utility and it should be overcome. In our analysis this amount is not 
included in theft amounts. 
After explaining sources of thefts, it is useful to show general picture of theft-
losses in the world. When theft-losses are inspected for years of 1980 and 2000 over 
102 countries using the World Bank data, the results show that except a little decline in 
Western Europe, North America and Australasia, theft-losses have raised dramatically 
(Smith, 2003). Considering the technological improvement which causes reduction of 
technical losses, it can be deduced that theft is the most effective factor driving theft-
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losses to high levels. Hence, electricity theft is getting more dangerous for most of the 
countries and threatening the financial viability of electricity sector. 
 
 
2.1.4. Measuring Theft-losses 
 
As for measuring theft and losses, some different indicators can be used. 
Nevertheless, there is no simple way to decompose theft and losses; what is available as 
data is the sum total of theft and losses which is calculated by subtracting billed 
consumption from total energy given to the grid. Summed amount of theft and losses 
which referred to amount of theft-losses is the first measure used in this analysis to see 
the total cost and size of the problem. However, like gross domestic product (gdp) this 
is not a scaled measure and is highly sensitive to population and consumption level of 
the corresponding region. As division of gdp by population gives more accurate and 
reasonable measure for income level, theft-losses amount can also be scaled by 
population which gives theft-loss per capita TLPC. Moreover, a better scaling factor is 
consumption rather than population since it precisely gives percentage cost of theft-
losses. The resulting measure is called theft-loss ratio TLR. Both TLR and TLPC are 
going to be used in empirical analysis and it will be checked whether factors effecting 
TLR and TLPC significantly are different or not. 
 
 
2.1.5. The Size of the Problem 
 
Now, it could be a good idea to look at total amount of theft-losses. Table 2.1 
shows total amount of electricity in MWh that had been lost or thieved for each 
province between 1994 and 2001 calculated by TEDAŞ Statistics.  
As seen in the table 2.1, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Ankara, Sanliurfa and Mardin are 
the leading five provinces in terms of the absolute level of theft-loss cost to Turkey. 
Also, Istanbul should be underlined since its cost is approximately as much as sum of 
the remaining four top five cities. Hence, to combat with financial costs due to theft, 
primary target should be those cities mentioned and especially Istanbul. If it is assumed 
that price of electricity is approximately $80 per MWh, total cost of Istanbul’s theft-
losses for 8 years is about $2 billion. The cost of total theft-losses to Turkey for the 
same period is about $15 billion. Thus, theft-losses inflict costs to Turkish economy $2 
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billion anually which is %1 of Turkey’s GDP. These numbers actually show how 
serious the problem is. 
 
Table 2.1 Cumulative Amount of Theft-Losses in MWh for 8 years (1994-2001)  
ADANA  2,507,873 EDİRNE 566,474 KÜTAHYA 412,942
ADIYAMAN 649,738 ELAZIĞ 849,018 MALATYA  954,449
AFYON 433,776 ERZİNCAN 159,483 MANİSA 1,070,922
AĞRI 768,084 ERZURUM  1,009,725 MARDİN 4,709,896
AKSARAY 255,397 ESKİŞEHİR 851,402 MUĞLA 1,240,231
AMASYA 434,509 GAZİANTEP 2,410,352 MUŞ 816,520
ANKARA  7,818,051 GİRESUN 341,651 NEVŞEHİR 315,698
ANTALYA  1,721,408 GÜMÜŞHANE 97,548 NİĞDE 336,254
ARDAHAN 222721 HAKKARİ 761574 ORDU 574,519
ARTVİN 275,851 HATAY 1,504,701 OSMANİYE 192374
AYDIN 1,139,976 IĞDIR 390190 RİZE 457,892
BALIKESİR 1,127,914 ISPARTA 354,421 SAKARYA 1,238,976
BARTIN 246,329 İÇEL 2,750,168 SAMSUN  1,618,539
BATMAN 2,334,227 İSTANBUL 24,438,259 SİİRT 896,095
BAYBURT 43,099 İZMİR 4,664,723 SİNOP 253,984
BİLECİK 217,092 K.MARAŞ 1,122,094 SİVAS 468,939
BİNGÖL 265,138 KARABÜK 195,952 ŞANLIURFA 7,458,933
BİTLİS 518,728 KARAMAN 111,366 ŞIRNAK 2512258
BOLU 541,693 KARS  744,793 TEKİRDAĞ 1305751
BURDUR 278,135 KASTAMONU 280,997 TOKAT 488,055
BURSA  3,247,540 KAYSERİ 868,276 TRABZON  860,528
ÇANAKKALE 587,195 KIRIKKALE 303,615 TUNCELİ 119,303
ÇANKIRI 128,000 KIRKLARELİ 776,998 UŞAK 339,853
ÇORUM 415,948 KIRŞEHİR 247,282 VAN 1,994,367
DENİZLİ 916,777 KİLİS 177039 YALOVA 306941
DİYARBAKIR 8,194,247 KOCAELİ 3,070,693 YOZGAT 373,998
DÜZCE 467755 KONYA  1,300,009 ZONGULDAK 921,447
 
Although the absolute level of the amount is important as total cost incurred by the 
whole country, its importance vanishes when the main concern is the effect of theft-
losses on privatization. Because privatized utilities are interested in profits, unit cost of 
theft-loss becomes important so they should control theft-loss ratios in their regions. 
Even though the absolute level of theft-loss amount in a region may be relatively high, 
the corresponding utility may still succeed to run the firm and make a profit if the net 
consumption is so high, too. For instance, Izmir’s theft-loss amount is ranked 6th in 
Turkey and this amount is just slightly less than Mardin’s but Izmir is one of the 
unproblematic cities in terms of electricity theft-losses. The reason is that, despite 
relative high amount in theft-loss of Izmir, its consumption is also huge, making total 
theft-loss cost less than 10% which is near to OECD standards. Therefore, the most 
 15
critical variable is theft-loss ratio TLR (amount of theft loss divided by gross 
consumption which is total electricity drawn from the grid) in terms of the financial 
viability of the private distribution utilities. In order to make the concept of financial 
viability clear, tariffs concept, financial flow and subsidy mechanism in the electricity 
sector also need to be understood. 
         
 
2.2. Current Tariffs and Subsidy Mechanism 
 
 
2.2.1. The Concept of Tariff 
 
Tariff is a regulation of revenue and pricing among consumers, producers and 
other third persons. It regards all parts’ rights. A tariff consists of several components. 
These components are investments, operation expenses, costs due to transferring of 
operating rights, cross subsidies, taxes, insurances, funds, stranded costs and regulator’s 
fees. (Sevaioglu, 2004) The sum of all these components gives the bill price.  
Practically, these components may differ across different regions and different 
types of consumers, leading bill prices to differ. Actually, for purely allocative 
efficiency marginal costs must be borne by the consumer of the corresponding service. 
Nevertheless, sometimes economic and social aims contradict in the design of tariff 
structure for electricity. (Dossani, 2004) Economic efficiency suggests different pricing, 
whereas social aims may require applying a single tariff all over the country. In this 
regard, up to now, there has been a single tariff for every region of Turkey, although 
costs of different regions dramatically differ.7 The reason of these differences is 
especially high variance of thefts and losses among different provinces.  
In fact, different parts of a city also differ in terms of electricity thefts and losses. 
By this logic, continuing the reduction of region size or increasing the number of groups 
that should be charged with different tariffs, eventually leads to the idea that each 
subscriber has own unique cost and so should has own unique bill price. However, even 
logic that takes each subscriber as a separate cost unit, theft costs should not be 
reflected to each consumer separately since theft is not an actual cost caused by the 
corresponding consumer rather it is a weakness of the electricity system. Thus, 
according to this logic as well theft must be reflected to prices uniformly all over the 
                                                 
7 Actually, tariffs are a little lower in provinces which have priority for 
development. 
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country. Hence, as far as reflecting the costs of theft is concerned, considering the 
country as a single unit gives the same result as considering each consumer as a single 
unit. 
Logical constructions aside, it is important to consider practically feasible design 
of tariffs. Firstly, the current situation in Turkey is going to be explained. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Current Financial Flow and Cross Subsidy Mechanism 
 
As mentioned above, Turkey has always applied a uniform national tariff in 
electricity all over the country and is still applying in spite of the articles of Electricity 
Market Law, 2001. This law introduces competition and economic efficiency into the 
electricity sector so it proposes regional tariffs that reflect corresponding costs in the 
distribution of electricity. However, the current government has not implemented 
regional tariffs especially due to political reasons and pressure of southeastern deputies.  
Currently, a national single tariff is in operation. The most striking property of this 
tariff is equality principle. It applies almost same tariffs across regions and consumption 
purposes (residential, agricultural or industrial usage) unlike most developed countries. 
This equalization mechanism is achieved through cross subsidies, meaning that low cost 
consumers subsidize high cost ones causing a single final price. Actually, there are 5 
types of cross subsidies in electricity pricing. These are: 
1. Across subscriber groups (industrial, residential, agricultural usage etc.) 
2. Across regions or provinces  
3. Across vertical activities (distribution, retail, generation, wholesale etc.) 
4. Across institutions of horizontal activities (hydro, wind, natural gas etc. 
usage in generation.) 
5. Across sectors ( e.g. from natural gas to electricity) 
This classification will be helpful in explaining how the current subsidy 
mechanism works. In designing tariffs, one approach is to start with costs and derive the 
retail price as the sum off all costs. This approach gives different prices for different 
cross sections (e.g. provinces) since costs are different for each cross sectional unit. The 
other approach is to start with a final price8 and subtract each cost element, reaching at 
the end a “loss” or “profit” as a residual. All these residuals are then equated to zero by 
                                                 
8 This final single price is selected such that sum of all costs over the whole 
country equal to selected final price times the quantity sold. 
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cross subsidies. If a residual is positive for a region, it means that the region’s total cost 
is lower than the average total cost in whole Turkey and vice versa. Hence, in order to 
equalize different total costs of different regions, positive residuals which result from 
low costs “subsidize” or in another name “neutralize” negative residuals that come from 
high costs. At the end, a single uniform price emerges.  
Concretely, the process works as follows. First a uniform tariff (single price) is 
determined by equalizing all expected revenues to expected costs. Then, each 
distribution company (TEDAŞ, Trakya Edaş, Bedaş, Körfez Edaş, Karaelmas Edaş, 
Meram Edaş, Sakarya Edaş and Başkent Edaş) sells its electricity at this price and 
collects the revenues. From these revenues, they retain the amount equals to their total 
costs plus a profit margin for retailing9. After this step, the remaining residual amount 
becomes the claim of TETAŞ. Hence, actually these residual amounts are the wholesale 
prices at which TETAŞ sells electricity to distribution companies10. TETAŞ makes 
discrimination across joint partnerships and TEDAŞ. The remaining total amount 
should cover financial burdens of TETAŞ. Thus, TETAŞ behaves like a common pool 
and subsidizes distribution companies. This is type 3 subsidy. Moreover, TETAŞ 
purchases electricity from EÜAŞ which has many plants, each having different costs. 
Thus, EÜAŞ covers the costs of corresponding plants by payment of TETAŞ. There is a 
type 4 subsidy here. Low cost hydro plants subsidize high cost natural gas power 
stations. Furthermore, if those revenues of generating electricity cannot cover costs, 
BOTAŞ sells natural gas with price less than the cost of the natural gas or vice versa. 
This is type-5 cross subsidy. The sum of state institutions can be seen as a huge pool 
and it hides inefficiencies. As for type-1 subsidy, it is realized over TETAŞ, too. Since 
TETAŞ applies different prices to different regions high price takers in fact subsidizes 
low price takers. Type-2 subsidy is applied by the result of whole mechanism. If there 
were a free market, industrial customers would probably get cheaper electricity because 
of quantity discounts. Nevertheless, since they are captive, they pay more and subsidize 
residential and agricultural consumption.  
                                                 
9 All these components are different for different distribution companies. 
10 In fact, same procedure is repeated for Tedaş’ provincial distribution 
institutions. Each of them covers their corresponding costs and weighted remaining 
amounts become equal to Tedaş’ buying wholesale price times total quantity sold. Each 
province distribution institution behaves like a joint partnership. 
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Although this cost based and subsidy supported mechanism is in operation, the 
Electricity Market Law of 2001 propose a different mechanism that prohibits cross 
subsidies and sets caps for revenues and prices. 
The first essential property of the Law’s proposal is that it replaces cost plus tariff 
structure with different kinds of structures for each activity and regulated charges as 
seen in the Table-2.2 below. Focusing on distribution and retailing, use of system 
charge tariff for distribution is intended to be under hybrid regulation, whereas retail 
service and average retail prices are intended to be regulated through price caps. These 
cap regulations introduce incentive for cost reduction. Therefore, utility prices cannot 
reflect all costs incurred by the utilities and cannot exceed the caps.  
 
Table-2.2 Methods for Tariff Regulation for Different Electricity Activities and Services 
 
 
* Taken from Electricity Market Implementation Manual, EMRA 2003. 
 
The second important property of the mechanism stipulated by the Law is separation of 
accounts and restriction of cross subsidies. Nevertheless, if necessary, the law suggests 
direct subsidies from the treasury. Yet, this may not be the best solution for 
subsidization of regions with high theft-losses. Actually, burden of the treasury is high 
and treasury is reluctant to accept solutions that will increase its financial burden. In the 
section on tariff design, below, this topic will be discussed extensively. 
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
3.1. The Model 
 
 
The interest of this thesis is the behavior of two variables TLR (theft-loss per 
capita) and TLPC (amount of theft-loss divided by population). Although the primary 
focus is TLR, TLPC will also be examined through same methods. It will be attempted 
to analyze similarities as well as possible differences between the behaviors of these 
two highly correlated variables. As mentioned before, the method that will be used to 
examine the drivers behind these dependent variables is linear regression analysis.  
In regression analysis, the aim is to estimate parameters (coefficients in front of 
explanatory variables); their signs and magnitudes. Moreover, attained significance 
level for each parameter that shows how convenient the parameters estimated is another 
important aim to find out. Now, it is time to explain explanatory variables. 
 
 
3.2. Independent Variables 
 
 
Factors that explain the variability in indicators of theft and losses are captured 
through a number of independent variables. These variables can be divided into 6 
general categories.  
• Economic Variables 
• Variables Reflecting the Enforcement Capacity and the Reach of the State 
• The State and Authority Related Variables 
• Distribution Utility’s Managerial Variables 
• Physical Variables  
• Dummy Variables 
Here, it should be noted that there is no any structural model that tells which 
variables should enter the regression equation; rather, the regression model below is an 
ad-hoc reduced form equation model. The selection of variables is based on intuition 
rather than theory.  
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3.2.1. Economic Variables 
 
These variables are a priori thought as most effective on theft-loss ratio since it is 
a general idea that usually poor economic conditions push people to theft.11 Economic 
variables consist of income per capita GDPC, agricultural gdp ratio AGRGDPR, 
residential electricity consumption ratio RESECR, industrial electricity consumption 
ratio INDECR and bank deposit ratio DEPOSITR. 
GDPC is used to measure income. However, when panel regression is done, 
GDPC can mislead the results since its time effect and cross sectional effect are two 
different components so it is better to use gdp per capita ratio GDPCR, which is 
calculated as the gdpc of a province divided by the maximum gdpc of all provinces for 
each year. It is thought that one of the reason for theft is unsatisfied needs of people 
who cannot afford to buy their needs and alternatively thieve. Therefore, a negative 
relation between theft-losses and GDPCR is expected.   
AGRGDPR measures share of agricultural income over all income of a city. If it is 
high for a province, people in that province are generally farmers and rural population 
prevails. Hence, it can be thought that with high AGRGDPR, technical losses can be 
high and inspection is difficult to detect theft so theft-losses can be expected to increase 
with AGRGDPR. 
Other two economical variables are RESECR electricity consumption of 
residences divided by total consumption and INDECR electricity consumption of 
industries divided by total consumption. These two variables are similar and seem 
complement of each other. But, correlation coefficient between them is 0.78 which is 
generally acceptable and they can be used together in regressions without fear of 
multicollinearity.12 Additionally, Belsley, Kuh & Welsch test is going to be performed 
later to ensure that multicollinearity is not severe.13 Actually, the effects of these 
variables on dependent variables (TLR, TLPC) are a-priori unclear. If residential 
                                                 
11 Although a simple electricity theft model with concave utility function says that 
the poor thieves less by only considering risk aversion, the actual mechanism is 
intuitionally more complex. People generally expect that the poor thieve more than the 
rich due to financial impossibilities. 
12 Correlation coefficient of two regressors more than 0.8-0.9 causes severe 
collinearity. In such a situation, collinearity should be handled via some methods such 
as ridge regression, principal components regression etc. or one of the collinear 
variables must be dropped.  
13 More information about multicollinearity will be given in subsection 3.5.2.1. 
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consumers thieve more than industrial and commercial consumers, positive effect of 
RESECR on theft is expected or vice versa. In addition to this, because industrial 
consumers get electricity directly from medium voltage lines without using low voltage 
lines, which cause most of technical losses, high INDECR may reduce technical losses. 
Unlike INDECR, high RESECR ratios may cause higher technical losses due to intense 
usage of low voltage lines. 
Finally, DEPOSITR bank deposit ratio is total amount of money that is deposited 
in banks for a province divided by gdp of that province and INSUREDWPC insured 
workers per capita is number of insured worker over population. Those two variables 
are good indicators of the degree to which economic relations are formalized. Highly 
formalized economies are expected to thieve less electricity. 
 
 
3.2.2. Social and Cultural Variables 
 
Another important theft characteristic is determined by social and cultural factors. 
People in a region can see electricity as a public good or bribery may be widespread and 
be considered as a natural event. Moreover, people in some provinces may not respect 
the authority. Ethnic differences can also affect the behavior of people. With respect to 
these factors, the first variable of this category is the vote ratio of political parties Hadep 
and Dep, DEPR. Actually, this is an indicator of political thought of people and how 
they view the state.14 As for this variable’s effect on the dependent variables, 
expectation is clearly positive since this variable is a strong indicator of opposition to 
the current state. Actually, simple descriptive data supports this expectation, too. 
Data for some variables in this category exist only for the year 2000. These are 
rural population ratio RURALPOPR which is total population of villages over all 
population of the province and professional technical schooling ratio PTHSCHR. The 
expectation about the effect of RURALPOPR on dependent variables is positive 
because technical losses are higher for villages than urban and controlling for theft is 
                                                 
14 Actually, other political parties’ vote ratios have been also considered but only 
Hadep-Dep vote ratio succeeded to be highly significant. Correlation coefficients 
between vote ratio and theft-loss ratio for all provinces for 1995 general election are on 
the first row and total vote ratios for the corresponding political parties in Turkey are on 
the second row. 
                          
RP ANAP DYP DSP CHP MHP HADEP YDH MP YDP İP YP 
-0.05 -0.25 -0.19 -0.43 -0.34 -0.30 0.84 0.55 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.36 
21.3 19.7 19.2 14.7 10.7 8.2 4.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 
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difficult in villages. In contrast, PTHSCHR is anticipated to have negative effect on 
theft-losses because PTHSCHR gives positive measure for both income distribution and 
education level in the corresponding province. If PTHSCHR is higher in a province, it 
probably shows that people in that province have a higher human capital for economic 
activities meaning that income is shared among large variety people rather than a small 
minority. Other than this economic meaning, PTHSCHR can also be an indicator for 
education level and educated people naturally thieve less since they now the 
consequences of action of theft. As a result, it is expected that PTHSCHR is negatively 
correlated with theft-losses. 
 
 
3.2.3. Variables Reflecting the Enforcement Capacity and the Reach of the State 
 
Variables in this category capture the rule of law and esteem of the state for the 
corresponding province. The most important variable of this category is public 
investment expenditures per capita PIE. This variable shows clearly how much the 
government cares for the province. The effect of PIE on theft-losses is anticipated to be 
negative since more investment means that the State heeds the corresponding province 
more and effective in that province. Hence, in such provinces theft-losses may be 
controlled easily. 
 Another variable is tax realization-revenue ratio TRRR that indicates the power of 
the government to collect taxes so this variable is expected to have a negative relation 
with the dependent variables. Also, tax revenue over gdp TRPGDP is another good 
indicator to measure willingness of people to pay their obligations without hiding their 
income and strength of the state to enforce people not to deceive the government. Thus, 
expectation of this variable’s effect on theft is negative, too.  
In addition to those variables mentioned above, there are also some other 
variables, which are available only for year 2000. ASPHRR asphalted village road ratio, 
which is percentage of asphalted village roads within the corresponding province and 
DRINKVR drinkable water village ratio that percentage of villages, which have 
drinkable water within the province. These variables are good measures for service level 
of the state and physical conditions in provinces so negative relation with dependent 
variables TLR and TLPC is expected. Finally, in this category public order variables 
have been employed in regressions that cover only year 2000. Public order variables are 
MURDERPC murders per capita, INJPC injuries per capita, KIDNPC kidnappings per 
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capita, ROBBPC robberies (gasp-soygun) per capita, THEFTPC general thefts 
(hirsizlik) per capita and THEFTPA auto thefts per auto within a year for a province for 
each public order variable. When these variables are high, one might conclude either 
that the propensity to break the law is higher in that province (for whatever reason), or 
that the capacity to maintain public security is weak, or both.  In either case, one would 
expect a positive relation between these variables and electricity theft. 
 
3.2.4. Distribution Utility’s Managerial variables 
 
In fact, left hand side dependent variables TLR and TLPC already fall in this 
category. Investment expenditures per subscriber IEPS, average personnel expenditure 
APE and personnel numbers per subscriber PNPS can be good measures of effort level 
and efficiency of the utilities. One may predict decrease in theft-loss ratio with 
increasing investment and personnel expenditures also with personnel number up to 
some degree. Nevertheless, after some point, high value of these variables indicates 
inefficiency and unnecessary expenses. Average price collected from consumers 
AEPRICEGET is another measure to determine effectiveness in collecting revenues. 
This variable is energy sales revenues divided by total net consumption for each 
province. Since prices are almost equal across provinces, this variable shows 
approximately collection ratio or billed consumption. However, data for all those 
mentioned variables except PNPS are not available for joint partnership provinces. 
Therefore, as mentioned at the end the section, on the data set (section 3.3) only PNPS 
was used in regressions. 
In addition to PNPS, dummy variable DUMJP can also be considered in this 
category even though it is a dummy variable, too. DUMJP dummy joint partnership 
means 1 if a utility in a province is managed by a joint partnership of TEDAŞ and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
3.2.5. Physical Variables 
 
These variables are considered to capture some variability of the technical losses 
and they all are related to the physical properties of the distribution grid. The first one is 
transformer utilization ratio TUR which is calculated by division of average power to 
total power capacity of all transformers within the corresponding province. Average 
power is total electricity drawn from the grid over a year divided by total number of 
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hours in a year (24*365=8760). High utilization ratio is expected to result in higher 
technical losses.  
Low voltage line length per residential subscriber LWLPS is another measure that 
affects technical losses since most of the losses occur on the low voltage line. As 
described in the technical losses section, its effect depends on geometrical structure of 
the grid. It raises technical losses since the path that electrons pass through gets longer, 
whereas it decreases losses since dividing common lines reduce the current of the line. 
Second effect is quadratic so it may be thought that LWLPS has a negative effect on 
technical losses. Nevertheless, this direct conclusion may be misleading. If line 
formation is assumed nearly optimal across all provinces, then LWLPS will have 
positive effects on technical losses.   
 
3.2.6. Dummy Variables 
 
Putting dummy variables into the regression model is useful most of the times and 
they can capture some variability that other variables are unable to do so. Hence, 
standard errors are reduced and more efficient results can be obtained. With respect to 
these, some dummy variables were added in some of the methods. The first variable in 
this category is DUMJP dummy joint partnership (it is also a managerial variable). 
Another dummy variable is DUMX where X is referred to year from 1994 to 2001. If 
the data belongs to that year, the variable is equal to 1, otherwise 0. These year 
dummies control for factors that change over time but which have identical effects on 
all provinces (for example, changes in macroeconomic conditions). 
 
 
3.3. The Data Set 
 
 
The first intention was to use panel data for regression analysis since it bestows 
the analysis both time and cross section dimensions. Each dimension gives extra 
information that the other does not give. Hence, panel data analysis is the perfect 
method to extract information and to make inference if necessary data is available in 
both dimensions. At this point, there were some difficulties with the availability of data 
for both province and time dimension. Even though independent variables explained 
above will be used in the model, some of them are not available for all the years. The 
variables, their explanation, years for which they are available and their sources are 
listed below: 
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1. Tlr: Theft-loss ratio (amount of theft loss divided by gross consumption which is 
total electricity drawn from the grid) [data range1994-2001] ¹ 
2. Tlpc (MWh): Theft-loss per capita  (amount of theft loss divided by population) 
[data range1994-2001] ¹* 
3. Gdp (TL): Gross domestic product in 1987 prices [data range1994-2001] ² 
4. Gdpc (TL): Gross domestic product per capita in 1987 prices [data range1994-
2001] ² 
5. Pop: Population (it is calculated by division of gdp to gdpc) [data range1994-
2001] ²* 
6. Pie (billion TL): Public investment expenditures per capita in 2001 prices [data 
range1994-2001] ² 
7. Agrgdpr: Agricultural gdp ratio. ( division of agricultural gdp by total gdp of a 
province) [data range1994-2001] †* 
8. Resecr: Residential electricity consumption ratio (electricity consumption of 
residents divided by total consumption) [data range1994-2001] ¹* 
9. Indecr: Industrial electricity consumption ratio (electricity consumption of 
industry divided by total consumption) [data range1994-2001] ¹* 
10. Lwlps (km): Low voltage line length per residential subscriber [data range1994-
2001] ¹* 
11. Tur: Transformer utilization ratio (gross consumption per hour divided by total 
power capacity of transformers [data range1994-2001] ¹* 
12. Ape(TL): Average personnel expenditures converted to 1994 prices by wholesale 
price index (division of total electricity personnel expenditures to total personnel 
number- can be considered as average wages) [data range1994-2001]  ¹* ª 
13. Aepriceget(TL):  Average electricity price converted to 1994 prices by 
wholesale price index (total revenue from electricity sales divided by net 
electricity consumption) [data range1994-2001] ¹*ª 
14. Pnps: Personnel number per subscriber [data range1994-2001] ¹* 
15. Ieps: Investments expenditures per subscriber corrected by investment deflators 
[data range1994-2001] ¹* ª 
16. Depr: Hadep-dehap vote ratio [data range 1995,1999, 2002] ³ 
17. Trrr: Tax realization-revenue ratio (revenue from taxes divided by total amount 
of tax that recorded to be paid) [data range1994-2001]  º 
18. Trpgdp: Tax revenue per gdp [data range1994-2001]  º* 
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19. Depositr: Deposit ratio with 2001 prices (amount of bank deposits divided by 
gdp) [data range 1995-2000] ²* 
20. Gdpcr: Gross domestic product per capita ratio (gdpc divided by max gdpc for 
that year) [data range 1994 2001] ²* 
21. Pthschr: Professional technical schooling ratio [data range 2001] ² 
22. Asphrr: Asphalt road ratio (length of asphalted village roads divided by total 
village roads) [data range 2000] ² 
23. Ruralpopr: Rural population ratio (rural population divided by total population) 
[data range 2000] ²* 
24. Drinkvr: Drink water village ratio (number of villages that have enough drink 
water divided by total number of villages) [data range 2000]  ² 
25. Insuredwpc: Insured workers per capita (number of insured-recorded workers 
divided by population) [data range 2000] ²* 
26. Murderpc: Murdered people per capita (number of murdered over total 
population) [data range 2000] ٭* 
27. Injpc: Injured people per capita (number of injured people over total population) 
[data range 2000] ٭* 
28. Kidnpc: Kidnapped people per capita (number of kidnapped people over total 
population) [data range 2000] ٭* 
29. Robbpc: Robbery per capita (number of robbery over total population) [data 
range 2000] ٭* 
30. Theftpc: Theft per capita (number of thefts over total population) [data range 
2000] ٭* 
31. Theftpa: Auto theft per auto (number of auto thefts over total number of auto) 
[data range 2000] ٭* 
32. Dumjp: Dummy variable for joint partnership ( 1 if the utility is joint 
partnership, 0 otherwise)  
33. Dumx: Dummy variable for the corresponding year (1for the year x, 0 
otherwise) 
Sources: 
º http://www.muhasebat.gov.tr/mbulten/ 
¹ Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım ve Tüketim İstatistikleri. TEDAŞ, 1994, 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. 
² http://www.dpt.gov.tr/bgyu/ 
 27
³ http://www.frekans.com.tr/html/4tr_istatistikler.asp 
 ٭http://www.egm.gov.tr/asayis/istatistik.asp 
† Obtained from Dr. Alpay Filiztekin, source:DIE 
* Data was not directly taken (some calculations have been made to reach the 
data) 
ª No data available for joint partnerships 
As seen above there are lots of variables that do not have observations for the full 
sample period. Hence, they could not be used in panel regression. However, DEPR data 
is available for just three years 1995 1999 and 2002 because elections were done in 
those years. It was tried to overcome this restriction by using 1995 DEPR data for 1994, 
1995 and 1996; 1999 DEPR data for 1997, 1998 and 1999; finally 2002 DEPR data for 
2000 and 2001. For DEPR data, we made another assumption that Dep, Hadep and 
Dehap are successive political parties that substitute for each other and so Hadep’s 
1995, 1999 votes and Dehap’s 2002 votes are considered to be Dep vote ratios. 
Consistency of these votes confirms our assumption. Another variable that poses 
problems in the time dimension is DEPOSITR. 1994 and 2001 data are missing so 1995 
data was used for 1994 and 2000 used for 2001. In addition to these, there are some 
variables for which we have data for only one year (2000) where interpolation and other 
methods to generate data do not make sense because these variables are expected to 
exhibit variability over time. Therefore, besides panel and between regressions it would 
be a good idea to make a regression with just year 2000 data with largest variable set. In 
this regression almost all variables mentioned above enter the equation and can give an 
idea about effect of variables with just one year data.  
In addition to time availability problems of data, there are also some cross 
sectional data problems. First of all, the number of provinces number has increased in 
Turkey continuously. Hence, for some provinces there is no data especially for the 
earlier years because these provinces not exist at those years. Second, some utility 
specific variables are not available for joint partnerships. This is true for financial 
variables AEPRICEGET, IEPS and APE. Therefore, a choice needs to be made about 
whether to drop joint partnership cities or drop these variables. The choice has been 
made in favor of including provinces that are managed by joint partnerships. Hence, 
those three variables have been dropped from the regressions. 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Before starting econometric analysis, it would be better to characterize panel data 
for theft-losses and independent variables. Some descriptive statistics and figures have 
been given in this subsection to describe the structure of both dependent and 
independent variables. Firstly, it should be noted that panel data covers 8 years from 
1994 to 2001 and all of the 81 provinces of Turkey. Nevertheless, as explained before in 
the data set subsection, some data for some variables are not available.  
 
 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables  
 
Regarding dependent variables TLR and TLPC, average value of theft-loss ratio 
over 8 years across 81 provinces is 21% as seen on Table 3.1 below. As for average 
theft-loss amount per capita, it is about 0.2 MWh per year. Another important point is 
variability in the data. Standard deviations are really high for both variables at 0.15 for 
TLR and 0.18 for TLPC. A striking point, which should not be skipped, is that between 
standard deviations are very close to overall ones. This means that nearly all variability 
comes from cross sectional variation and there is persistency with respect to time 
variation.  
The minimum value of TLR is 3% for overall sample and about 5% for cross 
sectional averages. The maximum value of TLR is 73% for whole sample and 64% for 
cross sectional averages. 
As for TLPC, the minimum value is 0.027 MWh for the overall sample and 0.054 
MWh for cross sectional average. The maximum value is 1.2 MWh for overall sample 
and 0.92 MWh for cross sectional average. These high ranges in both TLR and TLPC 
support indication of high standard deviations in the samples. 
For cross sectional averages (in order of magnitudes) 
-min tlr belongs to Bilecik, Karaman ,Karabük, İzmir and Isparta 
-max tlr belongs to Diyarbakır, Şırnak, Mardin, Batman and Hakkari 
-min tlpc belongs to Bayburt, Osmaniye, Karaman, Çankırı and Adıyaman 
-max tlpc belongs to Şırnak, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Batman and Şanlıurfa  
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for the Whole Sample 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
tlr      overall |  .2104448   .1522602   .0320768    .734864 |     N =     623 
         between |             .1514224   .0483968   .6374072 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0342432  -.0734199   .3858107 | T-bar = 7.69136 
                 |                                            | 
tlpc     overall |  .2003203   .1838197   .0268913   1.205617 |     N =     621 
         between |             .1731812   .0543927   .9205064 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0750385  -.2816675   .6629007 | T-bar = 7.66667                         
 
Another comment on dependent variables is that variance of TLPC is higher than 
TLR. The reason is that TLPC is the product of TLR and GCPC (gross consumption per 
capita). Thus, any additional variation in GCPC causes TLPC to fluctuate more than 
variation of TLR. Because of this GCPC, TLPC also have more deviation in time 
dimension than TLR. We can conclude that Persistence in TLR is stronger. However, 
TLPC has considerable persistence, too. Therefore, persistence must be considered in 
econometric panel data analysis.  
In addition to the statistical results described above, histograms can be used to 
depict the theft-loss data. When the histogram of TLR is drawn as in Figure 3.1, it is 
clearly seen its distribution is highly asymmetric, with a large number of extreme values 
that beyond 30%. When similar histogram is drawn for TLPC (Figure 3.2), a similar 
structure can be observed, perhaps a bit less pronounced than the case of TLR. From 
these observations, it is suspected that different reasons drive theft-losses in provinces 
which have TLR more than 30%. Actually, when those provinces are dropped from the 
observations, the distribution becomes nearly normal as on Figure 3.3. It may be a good 
idea to divide provinces as group-1 provinces which have TLR less than 30% and 
group-2 provinces which have TLR more than 30%. The regressions will be made for 
both all provinces (whole sample) and for just group-1 provinces (shrunk sample) to 
check whether drivers for theft-losses are different for different groups of provinces.  
However, before that, descriptive statistics of shrunk sample have been compared 
to whole sample for both dependent and independent variables. For dependent variables, 
these statistics can be seen on Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for the Shrunk Sample 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
tlr      overall |  .1416109   .0511398   .0320768   .2933584 |     N =     496 
         between |             .0452013   .0483968   .2679338 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0239915   .0309913    .223076 | T-bar =    7.75 
                 |                                            | 
tlpc     overall |  .1452056   .0756168   .0268913   .5675827 |     N =     494 
         between |             .0643527   .0543927   .3266907 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0408581  -.0101001   .4098693 | T-bar = 7.71875 
 
 30
Actually, when group-2 provinces were omitted, mean of TLR decreases to two 
third of previous value (for whole sample case) 0.14. More significantly, standard 
deviation drops to one third of previous value which is 0.05. Also variation from time 
dimension does not decrease very much and since cross sectional standard deviation 
decreases appreciably, amount of variations get closer to each other. Hence, it can be 
said that although number of group-2 provinces is only 17, they are very effective in 
exploding overall and cross sectional variation of TLR. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Histogram of TLR 
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Figure 3.2 Histogram of TLPC 
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Figure 3.3 Histogram of TLR for the Shrunk Sample 
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Regarding TLPC, overall mean value also drops to 0.14 levels which is nearly two 
third of previous value. There is also a large reduction in standard deviations and 
variances along the time and cross sectional dimensions approach each other. It is clear 
that group-2 provinces cause a similar explosion in the variation of TLPC values. 
 
3.4.2. Independent Variables  
 
After describing data for dependent variables, a similar exercise can be undertaken 
for independent variables as well. Table 3.3 below presents, descriptive statistics of 
independent variables for the whole sample is seen. Overall standard deviations of 
DEPR, PIE, TRPGDP and DUMJP are greater than their means meaning they have 
huge variances. Like dependent variables, independent variables also show great 
variability across provinces but limited variation in time. Only PIE has more variation 
in time than along the cross sectional dimension.  This is actually an indicator that 
Turkey has considerable heterogeneity across regions for almost every variable.  
However, comparing these statistics with shrunk sample makes clear whether 
group-2 provinces are significantly effective in this heterogeneity. Descriptive statistics 
of independent variables for the shrunk sample can be seen in Table 3.4. If standard 
deviations and especially cross sectional ones drop appreciably when group-2 provinces 
with excessive TLR are dropped from the sample then effect of group-2 provinces seem 
significant in heterogeneity not only for theft-losses but also for other variables. To 
check equality of variances for different samples, F-tests can be performed. Stata 
outputs for these tests have been displayed in Appendix-B. According to the results of 
those tests INDECR, DEPR, TRPGDP, PNPS and TUR seem to be the variables that 
have unequal variances for whole and shrunk samples. Also results indicate that 
variances without group-2 provinces are smaller. Hence it can be concluded, group-2 
provinces increase the variability of these variables.  
In addition to variance of the independent variables, their means are also 
(probably more) important. Hence, mean of whole and shrunk samples should also be 
compared in terms of independent variables. These comparisons can be made by t-tests 
for testing equality of means. In Appendix-B, Stata outputs of these tests were given. 
According to results of these tests, GDPCR, RESECR, DEPOSITR, INDECR, DEPR, 
PNPS and TUR seem to have unequal means for both whole and shrunk sample. Hence, 
if regressions for different samples (whole and shrunk) yield different significance 
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results for these variables, then these results can be supported by the t-test outcomes for 
equality of means.  
For example, if GDPCR emerges significant in regression of TLR using whole 
sample and looses its significance when shrunk sample is used, then t-test results above 
supports that GDPCR is not effective on TLR for group-1 provinces with TLR less than 
30% since it has different average for those provinces. The mechanism driving theft-
losses in different group of provinces comes out different in this case since at least 
GDPCR is not in the mechanism for group-1 provinces. 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables for the Whole Sample 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
gdpcr    overall |  .3270467   .1847133    .061433          1 |     N =     633 
         between |             .1852758   .0708847          1 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0300942   .2110456   .5724163 | T-bar = 7.81481 
                 |                                            | 
resecr   overall |  .2770285    .117311   .0366215     .63564 |     N =     622 
         between |             .1141237   .0479714   .5471413 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0347868   .0766016   .4653661 | T-bar = 7.67901 
                 |                                            | 
indecr   overall |  .4095809   .2229451   .0033907   .9272245 |     N =     623 
         between |             .2163452   .0222447   .9026276 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0603771   .0375119   .7805004 | T-bar = 7.69136 
                 |                                            | 
depositr overall |  .2373885   .1678877   .0384503   1.462523 |     N =     633 
         between |             .1590311   .0530789   1.128755 |     n =      81 
         within  |              .052868  -.1150662   .5744534 | T-bar = 7.81481 
                 |                                            | 
depr     overall |  .0709599   .1167723   .0059654   .5618247 |     N =     639 
         between |             .1119027   .0079838   .4897597 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0333908  -.0395355   .2518827 | T-bar = 7.88889 
                 |                                            | 
pie      overall |  46.61494   91.32175   1.218713   1215.024 |     N =     633 
         between |             63.90466   3.431421   454.1926 |     n =      81 
         within  |             64.96172  -388.5084   807.4462 | T-bar = 7.81481 
                 |                                            | 
trrr     overall |  86.18518   7.143266   33.19602   98.31088 |     N =     637 
         between |             6.506297   44.98229   97.10757 |     n =      81 
         within  |             4.960446   49.53958   105.1992 | T-bar =  7.8642 
                 |                                            | 
trpgdp   overall |  .5363982   .8584433   .0249441   7.759699 |     N =     633 
         between |             .8409096   .0305306   6.357936 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .1547182  -.6274974   1.938162 | T-bar = 7.81481 
                 |                                            | 
pnps     overall |  .0022886   .0011537   .0005431   .0115326 |     N =     615 
         between |             .0011247   .0008445    .008267 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0003407   .0005273   .0055543 | T-bar = 7.59259 
                 |                                            | 
tur      overall |  .1560958   .0646537   .0531109   .5940764 |     N =     623 
         between |             .0607414    .065924   .4873433 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0306017   .0328441   .4328995 | T-bar = 7.69136 
                 |                                            | 
lwlps    overall |  .0289822   .0158343   .0002506   .1174106 |     N =     616 
         between |             .0138782   .0067925   .0732776 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0078492  -.0110259   .0934744 | T-bar = 7.60494 
                 |                                            | 
agrgdpr  overall |   .270021   .1354616   .0048363   .7664663 |     N =     633 
         between |             .1281327   .0077775   .6018348 |     n =      81 
         within  |             .0450371   .0504121   .5105903 | T-bar = 7.81481 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables for the Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
gdpcr    overall |  .3707648   .1775416   .1215043          1 |     N =     499 
         between |             .1784956   .1351234          1 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0331285   .2547637   .6161343 | T-bar = 7.79688 
                 |                                            | 
resecr   overall |  .2626214   .1083964   .0366215     .63564 |     N =     495 
         between |             .1047167   .0479714   .5324337 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0312289   .0621945    .450959 | T-bar = 7.73438 
                 |                                            | 
indecr   overall |  .4640149    .200309   .0247347   .9272245 |     N =     496 
         between |             .1922344   .0455199   .9026276 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0580847   .1071647   .6999962 | T-bar =    7.75 
                 |                                            | 
depositr overall |  .2672277   .1742697   .0698684   1.462523 |     N =     499 
         between |             .1640803   .0754597   1.128755 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0575136   -.085227   .6042926 | T-bar = 7.79688 
                 |                                            | 
depr     overall |  .0250174   .0368706   .0059654   .3256298 |     N =     503 
         between |             .0304138   .0079838    .195234 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0207829   -.085478   .2059402 | T-bar = 7.85938 
                 |                                            | 
pie      overall |  47.84753   97.17572   2.063434   1215.024 |     N =     499 
         between |              65.3359   7.036826   454.1926 |     n =      64 
         within  |             71.70294  -387.2758   808.6788 | T-bar = 7.79688 
                 |                                            | 
trrr     overall |  85.75747    7.60711   33.19602   98.31088 |     N =     502 
         between |             7.056325   44.98229   97.10757 |     n =      64 
         within  |             5.273607   49.11187   104.7715 | T-bar = 7.84375 
                 |                                            | 
trpgdp   overall |  .4961545   .5969844   .0249441    4.25117 |     N =     499 
         between |              .582587   .0305306     3.3791 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .1243475  -.4062187   1.597422 | T-bar = 7.79688 
                 |                                            | 
pnps     overall |  .0020166   .0008471   .0005431   .0054727 |     N =     488 
         between |             .0008021   .0008445   .0049209 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0002871   .0012245   .0028975 | T-bar =   7.625 
                 |                                            | 
tur      overall |  .1447589   .0547423   .0531109   .4834648 |     N =     496 
         between |             .0456214    .065924    .269945 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0300842      .0405   .4215626 | T-bar =    7.75 
                 |                                            | 
lwlps    overall |  .0279732   .0150637   .0002506   .1174106 |     N =     493 
         between |             .0128147   .0067925   .0628898 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0079781   -.012035   .0924653 | T-bar = 7.70313 
                 |                                            | 
agrgdpr  overall |  .2401481    .117478   .0048363   .6026575 |     N =     499 
         between |             .1128509   .0077775   .5464927 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0347364   .1197192   .4077039 | T-bar = 7.79688 
 
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
 
 
The first software package that was used for regression analysis was E-views. 
Nevertheless, since it is designed especially for time series analysis and it is insufficient 
for complex panel analysis, it has been replaced by Stata which is most widely used 
econometrics package. Via Stata-8 several methods and trials have been employed.  
Firstly, due to availability of extra data for year 2000, a regression against just year 
2000 explanatory variables have been done. By this regression, effects of some 
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variables that are not available for each year were searched roughly. Certainly, lack of 
degrees of freedom for these regressions causes lack of precision in results.  
After these, panel data analysis which forms the core of the empirical study of this 
thesis was employed. Given that data is available in panel form, there are several 
approaches that can be used to estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
indicators of theft and losses.  Several of these approaches are tried and their suitability 
to the problem at hand is discussed taking into consideration the fact that most of the 
variation in the dependent variables is across provinces (that is, cross-sectional) rather 
than across time.   
The first method is the between estimator, which involves deriving averages of all 
variables across time for each province, and running ordinary least squares (OLS) on 
those averages.  This allows us to focus on the main dimension of variability but of 
course results in a very large loss of degrees of freedom. In addition, there is a loss of 
efficiency because no use at all is made of variability of the data across time.  
 The second method is the fixed effect (or least square dummy variable) method, 
which controls for cross-sectional heterogeneity effectively through dummy variables 
for each province. The advantage of the fixed effect method is that it is not necessary to 
assume that the unobservable effects are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term.  
The disadvantage is that the fixed effects remove most of the cross-sectional variability 
that we would actually like to explain:  The fixed effect approach is analogous to doing 
OLS on transformed variables whereby each variable is expressed as deviations from 
their time-averages; hence in effect the fixed approach focuses on variability across 
time rather than cross-sectional variability.  In addition, the fixed effect approach does 
not allow the use of explanatory variables (such as ownership structure of distribution 
facilities) that do not change across time. 
The third method, the random effects approach, gets around these problems by 
assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity or the individual effects are random.   The 
problem with this approach is that if the individual effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, the estimated coefficients are not consistent.   
In the fourth method feasible generalized least squares (FGLS); it is assumed that 
heterogeneity is in the error term rather than the intercepts.  FGLS estimation allows 
very general error structures; here it is assumed that error variances differ across each 
province and that there is autocorrelation which is uniform across provinces.  The fifth 
method also uses FGLS but now includes lagged dependent variable in the explanatory 
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variables to capture persistence.  It turns out that persistence is very important.  Because 
the FGLS approach resolves difficulties associated with both the fixed effects and 
random effects methods, we think they produce the most reliable results. 
For the sake of completeness, we try one last approach, namely the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel data model. This method has also been developed to allow for 
persistence, that is, for the inclusion of lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable in a model that also allows for individual effects.  The model is estimated in 
first-differences, which removes the individual effects.  However, the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable creates correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
error term, and such correlation would cause coefficient estimates to be inconsistent if 
OLS is used.  Arellano and Bond tackle this by developing a generalized method of 
moments (GMM), which is an instrumental variable estimator that uses lagged values of 
the dependent and pre-determined variables as instruments.  While this approach is 
useful because it captures persistence, it has the same shortcoming as the fixed effect 
model: as a result of first differencing, most of the cross-sectional variability that we 
would actually like to explain is removed from the data.  Because of this reason, we 
treat results obtained through FGLS as the most reliable and useful results. 
 After performing these methods for the complete sample of provinces, it also 
seems interesting to examine whether the mechanism driving theft-losses in provinces 
with very high theft-loss ratios is different from that governing theft-losses in provinces 
with lower ratios. Considering this aim, all panel methods described above is going to 
be done for provinces with theft-loss ratio less than 30%.  
It is also tried to see whether the effect of the independent variables differs across 
two indicators of theft- losses TLR and TLPC. Empirical analysis starts with year 2000 
regression. 
 
 
3.5.1. Year 2000 regression 
 
Due to availability of more data for year 2000, it is decided to regress dependent 
variables against existing variables plus year 2000 available data. Additional available 
data consists of data for PTHSCHR, ASPHRR, RLPV, RURALPOPR, DRINKVR, 
INSURWPC, DUMJP, MURDERPC, INJPC, KIDNPC, ROBBPC, THEFTPC and 
THEFTPA variables.  
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When the dependent variable TLR is regressed against all these regressors using 
robust option which calculate robust variance estimators against heteroskedasticity 
problems, DEPR, PIE, THEFTPA, TUR appear significant with positive signs and 
INDECR, PTHSCHR, INSUREDWPC, INJPC with negative signs at 10% significance 
level.15 Summary of year 2000 regression results are seen on Table 3.5 above.  
 
Table 3.5 Summary Results for Year 2000 Regressions 
  tlr   tlpc   
gdpcr 0.047369   0.070821   
agrgdpr -0.04039   -0.37914 *  
depositr 0.041686   0.036602   
resecr -0.06007   -1.10386 * *
indecr -0.1805 *  -0.63679 * *
depr 0.750367 * * 0.85004 * *
pie 9.96E-05 * * 0.000119   
trrr 0.001232   0.00168   
trpgdp -0.00438   -0.01518   
pnps -11.8321   -45.2569 *  
tur 0.350263 *  1.19604 * *
lwlps -0.6731   -1.41393   
dumjp 0.011129   0.02292   
pthschr -0.39398 * * -0.27577   
asphrr 0.000263   -0.00014   
ruralpopr 0.133016   0.211076   
drinkvr 0.000159   0.001821   
insuredwpc -0.00048 *  -0.00062   
murderpc 0.485317   1.273766   
injpc -0.11794 *  -0.1398   
kidnpc 0.337132   0.51238   
robbpc -0.7954   -1.95084   
theftpc 0.015393   0.022626   
theftpa 0.01686 * * 0.02096   
_cons 0.112357   0.435536   
Observ. # 80   80   
 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
 
 
Since multicollinearity may be a problem causing inflated significance levels, 
variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated. As seen on Table-3.6 below, highest 
                                                 
15 Since, there is no reduced structural model, 10% significance level can be 
thought acceptable. Unless stated otherwise, 10% percent significance level is going to 
be used for whole paper. 
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variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 6.25 belongs to INDECR. Thus, it is concluded that 
multicollinearity is not severe since all VIFs are less than 10.16 (Stata, 2003) 
In regression of TLPC, some variables which were significant in the regression for 
TLR became insignificant, and others which were insignificant become significant. 
AGRGDPCR, RESECR and PNPS emerge significant with negative signs, whereas 
PIE, THEFTPA, PTHSCHR, INSUREDWPC and INJPC loose significance. Only, 
INDECR, DEPR and TUR are consistently significant in both regressions. These three 
variables seem to have important effects on theft-losses and if they also emerge 
important in panel regressions they shall be taken into considerations in both tariff 
design and privatization concerns.  
After this inspection with cross section data, it is time to put time variation in this 
study that is; it is going to be employed panel data analysis. 
 
Table 3.6 Variance Inflation Factors for Year 2000 Independent Variables 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      indecr |      6.25    0.159954 
     pthschr |      5.72    0.174798 
        depr |      5.54    0.180381 
      resecr |      5.23    0.191301 
  insuredwpc |      5.12    0.195142 
       gdpcr |      4.10    0.243886 
     agrgdpr |      4.07    0.245446 
      asphrr |      3.54    0.282292 
     theftpc |      3.46    0.289114 
     theftpa |      3.20    0.312182 
   ruralpopr |      3.17    0.315507 
         tur |      3.16    0.316602 
        pnps |      3.15    0.317598 
    depositr |      2.75    0.363193 
       injpc |      2.62    0.381688 
    murderpc |      2.57    0.388500 
     drinkvr |      2.56    0.391128 
      robbpc |      2.53    0.394707 
       dumjp |      2.03    0.491473 
      kidnpc |      2.01    0.496621 
      trpgdp |      1.92    0.521974 
       lwlps |      1.81    0.551765 
         pie |      1.72    0.580257 
        trrr |      1.33    0.750638 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.32 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 VIF cannot be used for panel regression. Hence, correlation matrix will be used 
for panel data to comment on collinearity. 
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3.5.2 Panel Data Analysis 
As mentioned before, some data is not available for some time dimension and for 
some cross section dimension. Hence, it is not possible to use balanced sample for the 
analysis but fortunately Stata can handle unbalanced data. 
In this section, four groups of regressions have been made with several panel data 
analysis methods mentioned before. First group regression is regressing TLR against 
independent variables for whole sample. In the second group regressions sample is 
shrunk and provinces with more than 30% TLR were dropped from the sample. Third 
group regression has been done with whole sample but where dependent variable is 
TLPC instead of TLR. Finally for group four, this dependent variable is regressed with 
shrunken sample as in group two regressions. In all four group regressions, between 
estimator, fixed effects, random effects, FGLS, FGLS with lagged dependent variable 
and GMM Arellano-Bond panel data analysis methods have been employed. However, 
before using these methods for our analysis, it should also be ensured that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
 
3.5.2.1. Multicollinearity Diagnosis 
 
Multicollinearity is a poisonous condition that occurs when there are positive 
correlations among independent variables. If this correlation is 1 then a regressor is a 
linear combination of others causing perfect multicollinearity that makes the (X’X) 
explanatory variables matrix singular causing impossibility to estimate parameters. If 
correlation coefficient is close to 1 then regressors are nearly multicollinear. In order to 
look at that, correlation matrix can be used. As seen in Table 3.7, generally correlation 
coefficients among most regressors lie in an acceptable range. However, correlation 
coefficient between INDECR and RESECR is 0.78 and it should not be underestimated. 
Therefore, Belsley, Kuh & Welsch test for multicollinearity may be employed. This test 
says that square root of maximum over minimum of eigenvalues of X’X matrix should 
be less than 30. If not, multicollinearity is severe and it needs to be combated. 
When principal components analysis is made for the regressors and their eigenvalues 
were calculated as on Table 3.8, max eigenvalue is 3.82415 while minimum is 0.12950. 
Thus, applying Belsley, Kuh & Welsch test; square root of division of them is 
γ=√(3.82415/ 0.12950)= 5.4342 which is significantly less than 30. Hence, it is 
concluded that collinearity is not severe. 
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Table 3.7 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 gdpcr agrgdpr depositr resecr indecr depr pie trrr trpgdp pnps tur lwlps 
gdpcr 1            
agrgdpr -0.6413 1           
depositr 0.2272 -0.2859 1          
resecr -0.516 0.4551 0.0869 1         
indecr 0.6019 -0.6375 0.0254 -0.7818 1        
depr -0.4035 0.2918 -0.2826 0.0818 -0.3868 1       
pie 0.0305 0.0117 0.0213 0.0475 -0.0655 -0.0104 1      
trrr -0.0445 0.0059 0.0417 0.0982 -0.1111 0.0479 0.0513 1     
trpgdp 0.1342 -0.1176 0.1946 -0.1261 0.0466 0.1611 0.1209 0.1776 1    
pnps -0.5181 0.3885 -0.3077 0.2223 -0.4098 0.5537 0.0586 0.0704 0.1013 1   
tur 0.0399 -0.1616 -0.1925 -0.3775 0.2355 0.4388 -0.0703 0.06 0.4296 0.1311 1  
lwlps -0.3322 0.2687 -0.1758 0.2814 -0.3032 0.1722 0.1272 0.08 0.024 0.3939 -0.1022     1 
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Table 3.8 Principal Components for Independent Variables 
            (principal components; 13 components retained) 
Component    Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        3.82415         1.80041      0.2942         0.2942 
     2        2.02374         0.62066      0.1557         0.4498 
     3        1.40308         0.30307      0.1079         0.5578 
     4        1.10001         0.10579      0.0846         0.6424 
     5        0.99422         0.18962      0.0765         0.7189 
     6        0.80460         0.11329      0.0619         0.7808 
     7        0.69131         0.12375      0.0532         0.8339 
     8        0.56756         0.10502      0.0437         0.8776 
     9        0.46255         0.04849      0.0356         0.9132 
    10        0.41405         0.04493      0.0319         0.9450 
    11        0.36912         0.15300      0.0284         0.9734 
    12        0.21611         0.08662      0.0166         0.9900 
    13        0.12950               .      0.0100         1.0000 
 
 
3.5.2.2. TLR Regression for the Whole Sample 
 
As in all four group regressions, the first method used is between estimator. 
Between estimator regression is actually done by taking time average of all variables 
and then doing regression of averaged variables. Therefore, it covers only cross 
sectional information. Nevertheless, since our first aim is to explain cross sectional 
variation across provinces it should satisfy us in terms of this aim. It should be noted 
that over (81 province)*(8 year) = 648 observation requirements, 43 of them do not 
exist because some provinces were created later than 1994.  
When TLR is regressed with respect to independent variables by OLS method by 
employing the between estimator, four variables seem significant for this regression 
RESCR, DEPR, and TUR with positive and INDECR with negative sign. Summary 
results of TLR regressions via several panel data analysis methods for the whole sample 
are seen on Table 3.9 next page. 
Fixed effects method tries to capture unique characteristics of each cross sectional 
unit which are not covered by explanatory variables.17 Since time variation enters the 
models this point forward, for fixed effects, random effects, FGLS and GMM; time 
dummies were added for each regression causing loss of 8 degrees of freedom. 
Nevertheless, time dummies capture time effects and give more efficient results. When 
TLR is regressed against independent variables including time dummies with fixed 
effect, the results are very surprising as on summary Table 3.7. DEPR, TRRR and 
                                                 
17 In regressing math scores of a sample of people against their education level, IQ 
or smartness of each person can be considered as fixed effect of each person which is a 
unique property of each cross-section (person) that is independent of education level. 
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PNPS are significant with negative signs and AGRGDPR with positive sign. Especially, 
negative sign of DEPR is shocking. Individual effects capture the characteristics of each 
province and when these characteristics are controlled by fixed effects, DEPR may 
loose importance and it may even reflect the revelation of an intellectual position that is 
inversely correlated with theft-losses. 
 
Table-3.9 Summary of TLR Regressions Results for the Whole Sample 
  between     fixed      random     FGLS     FGLS-lg     GMM     
tlr(-1)                   0.8900 * * 0.4339 * *
gdpcr -0.0160    -0.0361   -0.1465 * * -0.0541 * * 0.0126    -0.0332    
agrgdpr -0.0518    0.0921 * * 0.0860 * * 0.0367    -0.0040    0.0951 *   
depositr -0.0474    0.0364   -0.0393    -0.0479 * * 0.0037    -0.0169    
resecr 0.1880 *   0.0234   0.0346    0.1647 * * 0.0299 *   0.0825    
indecr -0.2386 * * -0.0295   -0.1302 * * -0.0759 * * -0.0118    0.0990 * *
depr 0.8111 * * -0.2113 * * 0.2229 * * 0.8555 * * 0.0842 * * -0.1623 * *
pie 0.0001    -0.0000   -0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    
trrr 0.0002    -0.0006 *  -0.0006    -0.0001    -0.0002    0.0007    
trpgdp -0.0088    -0.0045   0.0173 * * 0.0097    -0.0035 *   -0.0196    
pnps -10.342    -16.425 * * 4.5393    -4.4765    2.7052 *   -5.8390    
tur 0.8529 * * -0.0292   0.1935 * * 0.2319 * * 0.0807 * * 0.1320    
lwlps -0.5580    -0.0250   -0.0518    0.2104 *   0.0630    -0.0417    
dumjp -0.0104    dropped   -0.0299    0.0041    0.0020    dropped    
dum94      -0.0082   -0.0141    0.0072    dropped    dropped    
dum95      0.0072   0.0072    0.0202 * * 0.0228 * * dropped    
dum96      0.0124 *  0.0182 * * 0.0289 * * 0.0178 * * 0.0016    
dum97      0.0182 * * 0.0201 * * 0.0243 * * 0.0174 * * 0.0023    
dum98      0.0116 *  0.0180 * * 0.0233 * * 0.0133 * * -0.0028    
dum99      0.0109   0.0262 * * 0.0298 * * 0.0176 * * 0.0100    
dum00      0.0162 * * 0.0147 * * 0.0121 * * 0.0110 * * 0.0079    
_cons 0.1256     0.2971 * * 0.2697 * * 0.1017 * * -0.0086     -0.0007   
# obs 605   605   605   605   525   433     
 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
 
Random effects method also captures individual cross sectional effects but this 
time they are not fixed for each individual (province) rather they are random. This 
method is preferable to fixed effect when there is no correlation between individual 
effects and the regressors. As seen on Table 3.7 above, this method gives AGRGDPR, 
DEPR, TRPGDP and TUR as significant with positive signs and GDPCR and INDECR 
with negative signs. 
Up to now, several methods and trials have been used for regressions but 
especially for panel data analysis nothing has been done against heteroskedasticity and 
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serial correlation. FGLS corrects the residual matrix against cross sectional 
heteroskedasticity and first order serial correlation. If there are such problems in the 
regressions employed especially inefficient and misleading results may emerge. 
When this method used for TLR it actually gives reasonable results that confirm a-
priori expectations. FGLS says that TLR is related with RESECR, DEPR, TUR and 
LWLPS positively, whereas it is related with GDPCR, DEPOSITR and INDECR 
negatively. Actually all these conclusions can be rationalized and are in harmony with 
a-priori predictions. 
In the regressions above, a feature of time series called persistency has not been 
taken into considerations. Since panel data also has time variation, persistency should 
be considered. Persistency means that, if a variable is high for a time period, it will also 
be high and relatively close to previous period value. For instance, if 1$ is 1.5 million 
TL today, it will be probably close to 1.5 million TL tomorrow. It is very unlikely that 
its value will drop to 100 TL. Similarly, if TLR is 20% this year its value will be near to 
20% next year. Its value is not expected to be 5% or 50% next year. This persistency 
problem can be handled by adding a lagged dependent variable into independent 
variables. Also, with its significant level and coefficient, degree of persistency can be 
inspected. A-priori it is thought that persistency in TLR is more than TLPC since TLPC 
is multiplication of TLR and GCPC.  
With regard to all these mentioned above, FGLS method will be used by adding 
lagged dependent variable to take persistency into considerations. As seen on the 
summary Table 3.7, when regression of TLR has been performed, lagged dependent 
variable TLR(-1), RESECR, DEPR, PNPS and TUR appear significant with positive 
signs, while TRPGDP seems significant with negative sign. Actually, considering 
persistency changes things a lot. First of all, GDPCR, LWLPS, DEPOSITR and 
INDECR are not significant anymore. Secondly, PNPS and TRPGDP become 
significant. Also, it seems that lagged dependent variable should enter the model since it 
has a very high z value, 45.52. 
The last method that is used for the regression analysis is generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimation. This method is suggested by Arellano and Bond in 1991 
(Stata, 2003). It assumes that there is no autocorrelation in residuals. Stata gives 
hypothesis test result for this autocorrelation. This method automatically inserts lagged 
dependent variables into the regressors at wished order. Hence, it is ensured that 
persistency is captured when Arellano-Bond is used. 
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When it is used to regress TLR against all regressors for all provinces in the 
dataset, lagged dependent variable TLR1, AGRGDPR and INDECR are significant with 
positive signs and DEPR with negative signs. 
3.5.2.2. TLR Regression for the Shrunk Sample 
What about dropping provinces with theft-losses greater than 30%? As mentioned 
before, from histograms and descriptive statistics it seems that the dynamics of theft and 
losses in these provinces are different from the rest. Actually, most of visual tools show 
that pair wise relations between TLR and independent variables change discontinuously 
at nearly 30% of theft-losses. In order to clarify this thought, provinces with excessive 
TLR were dropped and regressions were done for remaining cities. If the results of these 
regressions are consistent with previous ones using the whole sample, then it can be 
concluded that provinces with TLR more than 30% are not driven by a different 
mechanism. Summary of this group’s regressions can be seen on Table 3.10 below. 
 
Table 3.10 Summary of TLR Regressions Results for the Shrunk Sample 
  between     fixed    random     FGLS    FGLS-lg     GMM     
tlr(-1)                   0.8160 * * 0.1861 *   
gdpcr -0.0402    -0.0499    -0.0243   -0.0367 *   0.0007   -0.0799    
agrgdpr -0.1364 * * 0.0809 * * 0.0293   0.0523 * * -0.0198   0.1008 * *
depositr -0.0004    0.0422 *   0.0398 * * 0.0320 *   0.0031   -0.0186    
resecr 0.1989 * * 0.1146 * * 0.1496 * * 0.1256 * * 0.0583 * * 0.0426    
indecr -0.0650    0.0255    0.0243   0.0030    0.0036   0.0918 * *
depr 0.4021 * * 0.0121    0.0587   0.1083 * * 0.0270   0.0119    
pie 0.0000    -0.0000    -0.0000   0.0000    0.0000   -0.0000    
trrr -0.0004    -0.0006 * * -0.0006 * * -0.0003    -0.0003   -0.0004    
trpgdp 0.0102    0.0038    0.0177 * * 0.0169 * * 0.0035 *  -0.0140    
pnps 1.7890    7.3686    7.3350   3.0224    2.8783 *  0.3231    
tur 0.1702    -0.0923 *   -0.0634   0.0142    0.0487 *  0.0061    
lwlps 0.1470    0.2315    0.2345 *  0.2914 * * 0.1868 * * -0.0103    
dumjp 0.0002    dropped    -0.0044   0.0003    0.0021   dropped    
dum94      -0.0176 * * -0.0184 * * -0.0094    dropped   dropped    
dum95      -0.0059    -0.0059   0.0025    0.0187 * * dropped    
dum96      0.0039    0.0024   0.0085    0.0150 * * 0.0070    
dum97      0.0097 *   0.0086 *  0.0088 *   0.0151 * * 0.0105 * *
dum98      0.0102 *   0.0094 *  0.0117 * * 0.0159 * * 0.0090 *   
dum99      0.0065    0.0054   0.0099 * * 0.0142 * * 0.0138 * *
dum00      0.0135 * * 0.0133 * * 0.0131 * * 0.0142 * * 0.0110 * *
_cons 0.1503     0.1275 * * 0.1144 * * 0.0892 * * 0.0014     0.0007   
# obs 484   484   484   484   420   348     
 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
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Between estimator gives that RESECR and DEPR are significant with positive 
signs as whole sample case but INDECR and TUR loose their significance and 
AGRGDPR becomes important with negative sign. Also, t-value of DEPR is 
significantly reduced although it is still significant comparing the between estimator 
results of previous group regressions. Probably this serious reduction causes the 
reduction in between R-square of the model from 0.90 to 0.56.18 Additionally, 
magnitude of the coefficient of DEPR drops from 0.8s to 0.4s. These results strengthen 
the thoughts stating there are different mechanisms. However, coefficient of RESECR 
remains almost same (about 0.2) when provinces with excessive TLR are dropped.  
Fixed effect method yields AGRGDPR, DEPOSITR and RESECR with positive 
signs and TRRR and TUR with negative ones. Only, AGRGDPR and TRRR are 
consistent with previous group’s fixed effect regression. This supports the suggestion 
that different mechanism exists between two group provinces with theft-losses less 
(group1) and more (group2) than 30%.  
Comparing fixed effect’s results to those obtained from the between estimator, 
there are also considerable differences. DEPOSITR, TRR and TUR emerge significant 
additionally in fixed effect and more importantly DEPR looses its significance. This 
probably means that DEPR is an effect that plays a role in cross sectional variation 
rather than time variation since fixed effects sweep cross sectional characteristics of 
provinces and only considers variation in time.  
As for random effects, DEPOSITR, RESECR, TRPGDP and LWLPS appear 
significant positively and TRRR negatively. Results changed very much comparing to 
between estimator and fixed effects. 
When FGLS method is used to deal with first order serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, AGRGDPR, DEPOSITR, RESECR, DEPR, TRPGDP and LWLPS 
are seem significant with positive signs and GDPCR with negative sign. Here, only 
DEPOSITR and TRPGDP are difficult to defend due to their signs. Nevertheless, 
positive sign of DEPOSITR may be explained since Ankara and Istanbul which have 
relatively high theft-loss ratios among first group cities have very high DEPOSITR 
values that nearly seem as outliers. However, when second group cities enter the 
regression theft-loss ratio of Ankara and Istanbul become relatively low. Thus, 
DEPOSITR is not seemed significant with positive sign when all cities are taken into 
                                                 
18 This t-value and R-square reduction can be seen on Appendix-C by comparing 
detailed outputs on Table C.3 and Table C.9. 
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considerations. FGLS really yields results which as similar to those obtained from the 
random effects method  rather than the between estimator and fixed effects. 
If persistency is controlled by adding TLR(-1) to the right hand side of the 
regression equation in FGLS method, TLR(-1), RESECR, TRPGDP, PNPS, TUR and 
LWLPS appear significant all with positive signs. Unlike the case without lagged 
dependent variable, especially GDPCR and DEPR are not significant anymore. 
Incorporation of persistency changes the results. 
Finally, GMM Arellano-Bond method yield only TLR(-1), AGRGDPR and 
INDECR as significant with positive sign. Compared to the case where GMM is used 
over the whole sample, significance of DEPR drops. Actually for most methods, 
dropping group-2 provinces reduces the significance of DEPR. This may have 
important implications for privatization. 
 
3.5.2.3. TLPC Regression for the Whole Sample 
 
Same methods and procedures employed for TLR have been repeated for TLPC to 
check whether similar reasons are effective in determination of these different but 
closely related dependent variables. Actually results are not similar much to results of 
TLR although there are similarities as seen on table 3.11 next page.  
In between estimator, for both TLR and TLPC regressions, RESECR, INDECR, 
DEPR and TUR seem significant but the sign of RESECR turns to negative in TLPC 
regression. This means that gross consumption per capita (GCPC) component of TLPC 
is highly and inversely correlated with RESECR and it overweighs positive correlation 
of RESECR with TLR component. Moreover, AGRGDPR and PNPS with negative 
signs emerge as significant in TLPC regression.  
As for fixed effects, DEPR, TRPGDP and TUR emerge effective with positive and 
RESECR and PNPS with negative signs. These results dramatically differ from the TLR 
case. 
Random effects yield DEPR, TRPGDP and TUR with positive and AGRGDPCR, 
RESECR, INDECR and PNPS with negative signs. TLPC regression provides much 
more significant variables. 
FGLS regression gives GDPCR, DEPR, TRPGDP and TUR as significant with 
positive signs and RESECR, INDECR and PNPS with negative signs. Actually as in 
TLR case FGLS yields similar results as random effects. However, if persistency is 
taken into account by adding lagged dependent variable TLPC(-)1 in FGLS, GDPPCR, 
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DEPR and TUR come as significant with positive signs and INDECR with negative 
sign. The other variables lose their significance.  
Lastly, in GMM, test for no autocorrelation can be rejected for both whole and 
shrunk sample.19 Hence, it is not convenient to use Arellano Bond approach for TLPC 
regressions. 
 
Table 3.11 Summary of TLPC Regressions Results for the Whole Sample 
 
  between     fixed     random     FGLS    FGLS-lg     GMM    
tlpc(-1)                 0.9236 * * 0.8736 * *
gdpcr 0.0271    0.0638   -0.0121    0.1266 * * 0.0315 * * 0.3023 * *
agrgdpr -0.2730 * * -0.0440   -0.1021 *   0.0232   -0.0073    -0.0037    
depositr -0.0176    0.0350   -0.0131    0.0254   -0.0051    -0.0113    
resecr -0.5549 * * -0.2351 * * -0.3536 * * -0.0712 *  -0.0036    0.1677    
indecr -0.4990 * * -0.0966   -0.2211 * * -0.0567 * * -0.0294 * * 0.1318 *   
depr 0.7188 * * 0.2048 * * 0.5753 * * 0.6228 * * 0.0985 * * -0.1368    
pie 0.0001    -0.0000   -0.0000    0.0000   0.0000    0.0000    
trrr -0.0004    -0.0003   -0.0002    0.0003   -0.0002    0.0019 * *
trpgdp -0.0024    0.0414 *  0.0297 * * 0.0282 * * 0.0019    -0.0433 *   
pnps -34.1307 * * -21.8084 *  -15.9455 * * -10.3112 * * -0.5076    15.2888    
tur 1.4887 * * 0.4600 * * 0.7190 * * 0.5108 * * 0.1808 * * 0.5263 * *
lwlps -0.3181    -0.2713   -0.3329    0.1910   0.0202    0.4820    
dumjp -0.0041    dropped * * -0.0092    -0.0113   -0.0029    dropped    
dum94      -0.0844 * * -0.0728 * * -0.0381 * * dropped    dropped    
dum95      -0.0677 * * -0.0550 * * -0.0246 * * 0.0295 * * dropped    
dum96      -0.0469 * * -0.0330 * * -0.0168 * * 0.0300 * * -0.0001    
dum97      -0.0314 * * -0.0219 *   -0.0048   0.0344 * * 0.0060    
dum98      -0.0208 *  -0.0110    0.0037   0.0285 * * -0.0020    
dum99      0.0002   0.0169    0.0114 *  0.0327 * * 0.0106    
dum00      0.0152   0.0150    0.0145 * * 0.0198 * * 0.0162 * *
_cons 0.4688 * * 0.2911 * * 0.3396 * * 0.0298     -0.0062     -0.0007   
# obs 605   605   605   605   526   436     
 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
 
3.5.2.4. TLPC Regression for the Shrunk Sample 
 
Final group of regressions are TLPC regressions for the shrunk sample. Summary 
results of them are seen on Table 3.12. 
                                                 
19 Results of these autocorrelation tests can be seen in Appendix-C on tables C.20 
and C.26  
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For the between estimator the most striking point with this regression is that 
GDPCR comes out significant with positive sign. This is probably due to high 
correlation of GCPC and GDPCR. This event may be interpreted as the poor provinces’ 
theft costs being lower than those of the rich provinces. Another striking point is that 
DEPR is not significant anymore. This means that for group-1 provinces, high DEPR 
ratio provinces have less gross consumption and this effect eliminates the positive effect 
of TLR. Nevertheless, when group-2 provinces20 added, these provinces’ gross 
consumptions are also high enough to keep positive relations between TLPC and DEPR. 
For fixed effects, GDPCR, DEPOSITR and TRPGDP are significant with positive 
and TRRR with negative signs. For TLPC, difference of mechanisms for different 
groups reveals itself, too. 
 
Table 3.12 Summary of TLPC Regressions Results for the Shrunk Sample 
  between     fixed     random    FGLS     FGLS-lg     GMM    
tlpc(-1)                   0.7687 * * 0.0394    
gdpcr 0.1178 * * 0.1422 * * 0.1422 * * 0.2029 * * 0.0583 * * 0.1572 *   
agrgdpr -0.0872    0.0325   -0.0153    0.0126    -0.0087    0.1661 * *
depositr 0.0695    0.1006 * * 0.0921 * * 0.0730 * * 0.0156 *   0.0929 *   
resecr -0.1022    0.0151   -0.0061    0.0111    0.0082    -0.0426    
indecr -0.1228 *   0.0212   0.0263    0.0145    -0.0079    0.0621    
depr 0.1321    0.0493   0.0688    0.1020 *   0.0199    0.0470    
pie 0.0001    0.0000   0.0000    0.00003 * * 0.0000    0.0000    
trrr -0.0005    -0.0008 * * -0.0006 *   0.0001    -0.0003    0.0001    
trpgdp 0.0096    0.0346 * * 0.0281 * * 0.0212 * * 0.0085 * * 0.0228    
pnps -9.8990    -3.4052   -4.8517    -4.1893    0.2320    -14.3734    
tur 0.7036 * * 0.0038   0.1059 *   0.2033 * * 0.1623 * * 0.2244 * *
lwlps -0.0158    0.2617   0.2363    0.3608 * * 0.1847 * * 0.1721    
dumjp 0.0046    dropped   0.0090    -0.0033    -0.0033    dropped    
dum94      -0.0552 * * -0.0547 * * -0.0393 * * dropped    dropped    
dum95      -0.0401 * * -0.0398 * * -0.0268 * * 0.0179 * * dropped    
dum96      -0.0213 * * -0.0227 * * -0.0195 * * 0.0193 * * 0.0068    
dum97      -0.0048   -0.0070    -0.0054    0.0236 * * 0.0151 * *
dum98      0.0036   0.0020    0.0029    0.0254 * * 0.0133 *   
dum99      -0.0056   -0.0053    0.0000    0.0209 * * 0.0043    
dum00      0.0240 * * 0.0223 * * 0.0189 * * 0.0208 * * 0.0246 * *
_cons 0.1375     0.1005 *   0.0951 * * -0.0095     -0.0129     0.0061 * *
# obs 484   484   484   484   419   349   
 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
 
                                                 
20 Almost all group-2 provinces’ DEPR value is so high. 
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Random effects also give different results. GDPCR, DEPOSITR, TRPGDP and 
TUR are effective on TLPC positively, whereas effect of TRRR is negative.  
In FGLS method, GDPCR, DEPOSITR, DEPR, PIE, TRPGDP, TUR and LWLPS 
emerge positively correlated with TLPC. There is no negatively correlated variable for 
this regression. 
Additionally, dropping excessive cities leaves TLPC(-1), GDPCR, DEPOSITR, 
TRPGDP, TUR and LWLPS as significant with positive signs. DEPR and PIE loose 
significance comparing the case that ignores persistency. 
 
3.6. Summary and Inference 
 
 
It will be useful to summarize the main results of regressions made up to now, 
First of all, it can be said that there is a break even point at near 30% of theft-loss ratio. 
This means that two different groups of cities have different factors causing theft-losses 
although some factors are same. The most distinguishing factor is DEPR. It is the most 
significant factor effecting theft-loss ratio. Nevertheless, it loses significance when high 
theft-loss ratio cities were dropped from the regressions. Also, removing group-2 
provinces reduces explanatory power of the model. The reason is that high variance in 
TLR is in harmony with especially DEPR. Dropping group-2 provinces removes not 
only high variance in TLR but also DEPR and TUR. 
Secondly, it has been found that TLR and TLPC are different although they are 
correlated. Significant independent variables of the regression for these two dependent 
variables differ sufficiently. While income does not seem significant consistently for all 
methods of regression of TLR21, for TLPC it seems consistently significant but with 
positive sign. Hence, if the aim is to reduce costs of theft-losses, subsidies to 
compensate the poor do not seem to be a useful option to consider. In fact, rich 
provinces theft-loss costs are much higher. However, if the concern is privatization and 
unit costs rather than total costs, then subsidization may be considered. On the other 
hand, the most convenient methods of FGLS and GMM make income insignificant 
when persistency is captured by using lagged dependent variables.  
Thirdly, some of the variables that affect TLR and TLPC are factors that can be 
controlled by the distribution utilities, whereas some others are not. Especially, among 
                                                 
21 Income seems negatively correlated with TLR in some regressions but in others 
seems insignificant especially when persistence is taken into consideration. 
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significant factors DEPR, INDECR and RESECR, cannot be controlled by the 
distribution utility but TUR and LWLPS can be controlled. This observation implies an 
important result that it does not seem logical to place all the burden of decreasing theft-
losses on privatized utilities. Especially for the second group provinces, some of the 
burden should be placed on the state. It seems that in these provinces, social 
characteristics may overweigh economic ones.  
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION AND TARIFF DESIGN 
 
 
 
At the beginning of this section, it should be admitted that all regressions made via 
different methods have not produced sufficiently robust and consistent results to drive 
clear and definite recommendations for privatization and tariff design. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that nothing is obtained from the empirical analysis employed above. 
 
 
4.1. Privatization Concern 
 
 
With respect to privatization, inferences should be based on empirical results 
pertaining to the determinants of TLR. It has been found that, factors that drive TLR for 
the whole sample is a bit different from those that drive TLR in the sample which 
includes only provinces with theft-losses less than 30%. Especially DEPR and TUR 
seem significant when all provinces are taken into consideration. Nevertheless, they lose 
importance22 when the second group cities with high TLR are dropped from the 
regressions. What should be the correct comment on this situation?  
It can be said that TUR and especially DEPR are most important factors that drive 
theft-losses in provinces with extremely high theft-losses. Actually, it is very reasonable 
that 50-60% theft-loss ratios that probably prevail nowhere in the world, are caused by 
other than economical reasons. Actually, manual check for data and scatter plot 
diagrams of TUR and DEPR against TLR confirm this thought. When data is searched 
there is no province that has TLR more than 30% and relatively low DEPR at the same 
time. Also, scatter plot of DEPR against TLR shows a near linear relation for cities 
which have TLR more than 30%. Hence, privatization of these provinces’ distribution 
utilities may not be a good idea since the theft reasons reflected by DEPR cannot be 
controlled by distribution utilities. Theft-loss reasons reflected by DEPR may be habits 
of free electricity, opposition to and collusion against the authority. Since there had 
been a low intensity war in most of those provinces between 1986 and 1999, the state 
which is also the singe electricity supplier had been in difficulty to control those regions 
                                                 
22 They become insignificant or their t-values decreases.  
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and also it might have condoned electricity theft. After conflict in those regions is 
practically over, it may be difficult to break habits of people who are get used to thieve. 
Strong persistence in the regressions above supports this idea. Nevertheless, if DEPR 
reflects opposition against the authority of the state, transferring of electricity 
distribution utilities to the people of these regions may alleviate the problem of high 
theft. Other than this, it seems hard to expect privatized utilities to be successful enough 
in reduction of theft-losses in those regions.  
Another, important factor effecting TLR in regressions on the full sample of 
provinces is TUR. Nevertheless, this variable looses importance when group-2 cities 
dropped from the regressions meaning that it is an important factor for group-2 cities. 
TUR is actually a factor that can be controlled by the distribution utility. It is a measure 
of the electrical intensity of the physical system. High intensity inflames technical 
losses of the grid. Hence, it may be thought that technical losses of group-2 provinces 
are also higher than group-1 cities. In addition to technical loss point of view, TUR 
captures also physical investment level of the corresponding provinces. High TUR 
shows that transformers are not enough for the load of the grid meaning that physical 
investments are not sufficient in the corresponding city.  
However, all group-2 provinces’ and most group-1 provinces’ distribution 
facilities are owned by TEDAŞ. If TUR can be controlled by the distribution company, 
why does it differ across provinces? What might be the reason that pulls TUR upward? 
Probably, the mechanism operates like this. Distribution utilities possibly setup physical 
capacities for the amounts that they sell officially and they do not construct capacity for 
theft consumption. Actually, they cannot be blamed for this behavior of no investment 
for no return. Nevertheless, in group-2 cities, theft is somewhat higher driven by 
reasons which are reflected especially by DEPR. When theft is high, net consumption 
ratio23 becomes low and since physical system is constructed for net consumption, this 
may cause overload in the grid and high transformer utilization ratios. Therefore, as 
explained in technical losses part of section-2, technical losses increase. Thus, it can be 
said that if a distribution utility does not take this into consideration, high theft may also 
cause high technical losses. Furthermore, high utilization and overload on the physical 
system may diminish the quality of the electricity causing frequent cutoffs and voltage 
instabilities. These quality problems may also deter honest consumers from using grid 
                                                 
23 net consumption ratio is ratio of formal consumption to electricity drawn from 
the grid which is net consumption plus theft-losses 
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electricity and direct them to search for alternatives such as using generators and natural 
gas. This deterrence may reduce concentration of honest consumers and leading to more 
theft-loss ratios.  Also, some consumers may think that the utility does not payments 
since it does not carry out its own job well, leading to increase in theft. Lastly, overload 
of the system may cause more frequent breakdowns in the physical system leading the 
rise of maintenance costs. Regarding all these results above, if privatization is the 
concern, investment on the physical grid should be encouraged by the government. This 
may be realized by reducing costs of franchising contracts for transfer of operating 
rights in return of getting a guarantee from the private participants that they are going to 
make required investments. All the advantages of making required investments must not 
be sacrificed for just single shot income from franchising contracts. 
Another important factor which generally seems significant is RESECR focused 
on. It should be noted that RESECR generally remains significant when group-2 cities 
have been dropped. Its relevance with TLR seems positive meaning that theft-losses 
increase with residential electricity usage. It is required to make reasonable explanations 
(and recommendations if possible) for this result.  
The first comment regarding this result may be that theft associated with 
residential consumption is higher relative to that associated with industrial 
consumption.24 Actually, INDECR also seems negatively correlated with TLR in some 
regressions, although not as frequently or significantly as RESECR made. This also 
suggests that theft is more widespread among residences than among industrial 
establishments. The results are consistent. However, since the dependent variable 
includes both theft and losses, the conclusion that “theft is more widespread in 
residential consumption” may be wrong. Residential consumption may be associated 
with theft or technical losses or both. Since residences draw electricity from low voltage 
lines and industry get it from high or medium voltage, technical losses inflicted by 
residences and consumers other than industry, is higher than technical losses generated 
by the consumption of industry.25 In addition to this, industry spreads its consumption 
                                                 
24 In fact, INDECR is not the exact complement of RESECR but can be thought 
practically so. Correlation coefficient between them is -0.78. It should be noted that 
exact complement variables cannot be regressed together since it causes exact 
multicollinearity. 
25 As explained in technical losses part of section-2, on low voltage lines technical 
losses are higher since current is higher when voltage is low and technical loss is 
proportional to square of current.  
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better than other types of consumers (including residences) by operating at night. 
Therefore, as explained in technical losses part of section-2, industrial consumption 
likely causes lower technical losses relative to residential consumption. Thus, to 
improve allocative efficiency, residences should be charged more, as is the case in all 
developed countries. 
Still, it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion on which type of consumption 
involves more theft. It could be that residences thieve less than industrial establishments 
but lower technical losses for industry end up residence having more TLR. This means 
that higher technical losses dominate lower theft. The other possibility is that residences 
actually both thieve more and inflict more technical losses, leading to regression result. 
The last possibility is that theft among residential and other consumer types (especially 
industry) is almost equal. Since left hand side variable includes both theft and technical 
loss, it is very hard to determine which of the cases mentioned above is correct. If 
somehow TLR can be decomposed as theft ratio TR and technical loss ratio LR, more 
clear and definite results can be obtained. Nevertheless, it is clear that residential 
consumption generates more costs to the system irrespective of whether that comes 
from theft or technical losses. Thus, naturally provinces with high residential electricity 
usage ratios have higher TLR. One conclusion that can be reached is that when 
distribution utilities are privatized, those distribution utilities which operate in provinces 
with high residential usage cannot be expected to reduce TLR to the levels of more 
industrial cities. For instance 5% TLR of Bilecik can never be succeeded by 
unindustrialized cities even if theft is reduced to 0 percent.26 
 
 
4.2. Tariff Design Concern 
 
 
Unfortunately the econometric analysis does not suggest strong and unambiguous 
policy recommendations regarding the design of distribution and retail tariffs either. 
The most important explanatory variable of tariff design is income which is captured by 
GDPCR in regressions done above. Nevertheless, it does not show consistency across 
different methods used. The most convenient method used can be thought as FGLS 
since it takes care of both cross sectional heteroskedasticity and first order serial 
                                                 
26 Of course, if such cities get industrialized they can succeed even less 
percentages at least theoretically.  
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correlation. In this method, GDPCR seems significant with a negative sign. However, 
when persistency is taken into consideration by adding a lagged dependent variable to 
the right hand side, GDPCR becomes insignificant. Hence, although importance of 
GDPCR may not be directly rejected, it cannot be accepted, either. If GDPCR were 
determined to be significant in regression of TLR with negative sign, this might suggest 
that a subsidy mechanism targeting consumers could help lower theft in low income 
cities27. Nevertheless, when the left-hand side variable is TLPC, GDPCR emerges 
significant but with a positive sign. This means that in fact, richer provinces inflict more 
theft-loss cost. The reason is the gross consumption component (GCPC) of TLPC. Since 
TLPC is the product of TLR and GCPC, high correlation of GCPC and GDPCR makes 
TLPC correlated with GDPCR. Actually, this high positive correlation between GCPC 
and GDPCR outweighs probable negative correlation between TLR and GDPCR. The 
inference obtained from this observation is that, if a subsidy scheme were designed, an 
average person in a city with high TLR could end up getting lower subsidies than an 
average person on a city with TLR. Actually; an average consumer in Kocaeli which 
has average TLR about 12% would get more subsidies for theft-losses than an average 
consumer in Kars which has average TLR about 40%. However, assuming that 
subsidies are financed by a “tax” on consumption of electricity, the consumer in Kocaeli 
would pay more to the virtual subsidy pool28 than the consumer in Kars. Nevertheless, 
correlations between TLR and TLPC should not be underestimated which is 0.75.29 
As explained before in section-2, the current tariff mechanism is opaque. The 
costs cannot be allocated to its components. Activity segments, provinces, consumer 
groups, institutions and even other sectors like natural gas subsidize each other. None of 
these groups are burdened by their own costs.  
Theoretically one can say they help each other like adjacent touching houses do 
against earthquake. Actually, this is the reason that the system has survived up to now. 
However, stickiness of houses causes some of houses to support others making the 
                                                 
27 The presumption here is that negative correlation between income and theft 
reflects higher incentives to steal among poorer sections of society. 
28 Virtual subsidy pool can be considered as an imaginary pool that collect all 
funds required to finance theft-losses. Later, this imaginary pool will be concretized as 
theft-loss fund. 
29 It can be noted that Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Mardin and Batman are the top 4 
provinces with both highest TLR and TLPC ratios. 
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supporter weaker. Also in such a system, when one house collapses, it pulls down the 
others too, due to stickiness. Moreover, free rider condition is another problem of such 
systems. There is no incentive to make efforts to stand alone. The others would support 
you. Hence, in equilibrium no one tends to make any effort and the system becomes 
weaker over time. 
In analogy above, the aim should make each cross sectional unit (province, 
activity, consumer group etc) survive on its own. However, this may not be possible in 
some cases. For provinces with high theft-losses, surviving without other’s subsidies 
may not be possible, for instance. In such a situation, help or subsidy mechanism should 
be constructed in a way that free rider problem does not emerge and incentives for cost 
cutting are not eliminated. In fact, this help or subsidy would be designed to make 
needy cross sectional units strong enough to stand alone in the future.  
A stronger case for the implementation of a subsidy scheme exists: especially for 
those provinces where theft is high, the alternative, making tariffs completely cost-
based would result in extremely high retail prices. This would be both politically 
infeasible and also unfair since it would penalize those consumers in those provinces 
who do not take part in theft activities.  The current situation actually does entail 
subsidization but at very high efficiency cost. None of the electricity companies and 
none of the distribution utilities have an incentive to cut costs. This system is not 
compatible with privatized regional electricity distribution companies. It is clear that 
this system should be changed. Motivated by these concerns, as mentioned before, 
Electricity Market Law 2001 suggests30 disintegration of vertical segments of electricity 
and separation of regions (through the establishment of regional distribution 
companies). Also, it calls for separation of accounts to make the mechanism transparent. 
Moreover, it suggests cap regulations to force companies to operate efficiently. In 
addition to that, if a distribution utility needs to be subsidized, it would get subsidy 
directly from the treasury. Cross-subsidies are prohibited by the Law, 2001. 
Nevertheless, if the law is applied exactly, different prices emerge due to high 
variability of cost especially theft-loss costs. The law’s suggestion only alleviates 
excessive prices by direct subsidies. Regarding this point, the government prepared the 
strategy document on February 2004 which proposes a privatization calendar for 
                                                 
30  In fact, it dictates but the government does not apply its all articles. 
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electricity privatization. This document states that a mechanism is going to be created in 
order to equalize prices over all provinces.  
Based on the law and the strategy document, we can identify the characteristics of 
a desirable mechanism: Such a mechanism would have the following conditions  
• Helping financially weak provinces31   
• Transparency 
• Incentive for efficiency and cost cutting 
• Uniform prices across provinces (this is not a strong necessity rather 
political reasons drive it)  
In addition to all these, a question may be asked. How should such a subsidization 
mechanism be financed? The law’s suggestion is direct subsidy from the government. 
However, this may not be the best way of subsidization. As long as the properties 
identified above are observed, any other alternative can be considered. 
A Treasury subsidy, that is, a direct subsidy from the budget of the central 
government is the most general type of subsidies. It is financed by taxes which interfere 
with prices of different sectors’ good. Instead of this, the subsidy can be financed by a 
tax imposed on electricity consumption as long as the conditions above are satisfied. 
The question that must be asked is: which one is better? Or more clearly, which one 
disturbs the economy less? 
Regarding this question, price elasticity of electricity demand becomes important. 
If this elasticity is high, raising electricity prices to finance subsidies can inflict a large 
reduction in consumer surplus and creates a high welfare loss in terms of allocative 
efficiency. People would choose to consume less than they would, if prices were not 
increased to finance subsidies. Hence, price elasticity of electricity demand for Turkey 
is needed to reach a conclusion. Fortunately, Bakirtas, Karbuz and Bildirici had made a 
study in 2000 about income and price elasticities of electricity demand for Turkey. This 
study says that prices are insignificant in electricity demand. Thus, according to their 
result, demand is price inelastic. We can conclude that intervening electricity prices to 
create funds for theft-losses do not disturb the economy very much. Setting up a theft-
loss fund to finance theft losses seems better than treasury subsidy if treasury would 
have to raise the necessary funds to cover theft-losses from taxation of more elastic 
                                                 
31 Financial weakness comes from high theft-losses. Distribution utilities in those 
provinces cannot cover their costs. 
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goods. Certainly, amount of such a subsidy from theft-loss fund should be restricted 
with predetermined target theft-loss ratios. Most important property of these targets is 
that they should be declined in time and reaches zero in the long run. Hence, subsidy 
diminishes to zero at the end and each distribution utility survives on its own. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to clarify factors that drive high variances in electricity 
theft-losses across provinces in Turkey by using econometric methods of panel data 
analysis. After that, suggestions for transition to private participation, tariff design and, 
if necessary, subsidy mechanisms would be made. Nevertheless, econometric work has 
not produced intended results. The reason of those unintended results is not 
inconsistency with our a-priory expectations rather it is inconsistency among results of 
different methods employed. These different methods were between effects, fixed 
effects, random effects, Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) and Arellano Bond 
dynamic panel data estimation (GMM). While, similarity among results of between 
effects, random effects and FGLS exist, fixed effect and GMM give very different 
results. The most suitable method seems to be FGLS for two reasons:  First, since it 
makes correction for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Second, it avoids the 
important consequence of both fixed effect and GMM estimation, namely that in both 
cases much of the cross-sectional variation is swept away.  FGLS generates results 
which are largely consistent with a-priori expectations. Still, in the regression equation 
of TLR, when persistence in the dependent variable is captured by a lagged dependent 
variable, GDPCR looses its significance. 
On the other hand, the regression equations did produce some new information. 
First of all, the most significant variable emerging in the empirical study is vote ratio of 
Hadep (DEPR) which may indicate opposition to the authority. Theft-losses are 
positively correlated with Hadep vote ratio. Another result is that, transformer utility 
ratio (TUR) is also positively correlated with theft-losses. Nevertheless, when group-2 
provinces are dropped from the regressions, both DEPR and TUR loose significance or 
at least loose t-value even if they still remain significant.32 This supports the idea that 
different mechanism drives theft-losses. It may be better to treat group-2 provinces 
different than other provinces. In contrast to the prevailing idea that poverty is the 
reason of high theft-losses in group-2 provinces, the regression results do not support 
                                                 
32 In some regressions, they become insignificant and in some others they remain 
significant but t-values decreases. 
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this idea. Some other essential reasons push theft and losses up.33 The implication is that 
it may not be logical to expect an economic entity (a private distribution company) to 
control factors that are primarily non-economic in nature. 
However, this does not mean that there is nothing a private distribution company 
can do in those regions. TUR is intensively a control variable of the distribution utility 
and as mentioned earlier, high theft may increase value of this variable if sufficient 
investments are not made. As a chain affect, this causes high technical losses and 
quality reduction in electricity as well as increase in maintenance costs. 
Another significant variable that affects theft-losses is residential electricity 
consumption ratio RESECR. In contrast to DEPR and TUR, it is generally more 
significant when group-2 provinces were dropped from the regressions. It seems 
positively correlated with theft-losses ratio meaning that theft-losses are high in 
provinces with intense residential usage. One of the reasons of this result is clear that 
technical losses are higher for residential usage since residence use low voltage lines. 
Nevertheless, in terms of theft, nothing can be said exactly. If our dependent variable 
could be decomposed as theft and technical losses, then clearer results would be said 
whether residences or industries thieve more.  
Regarding tariff design and subsidy mechanism, GDPCR does not seem to have a 
significant effect on TLR, contrary to a -priori expectations. Nevertheless, it seems to 
have a positive and significant effect on TLPC. This is consistent with results obtained 
in studies which show that the wealthy steal electricity for residential, industrial and 
business use (BRDC, 2000).  
If GDPCR had emerged as a significant factor affecting the theft-loss ratio, then it 
might be conceived that a direct subsidy mechanism targeted to the poor might help 
reduce theft. Even when GDPCR is not taken as a significant actor, however, a subsidy 
mechanism may still be necessary during the transition period to enhance the political 
feasibility of reform and reduce the extent of inter-regional disparities.  Regarding the 
financing of such a subsidy, the  study of Bakirtas, Karbuz and Bildirici, 2000 shows 
that the price elasticity of electricity demand in Turkey is very low (in fact, 
insignificant). Therefore, direct subsidy from the treasury to regions with excessive 
                                                 
33 Despite relative incomes of provinces have been captured by GDPCR in 
regression equations, income distributions within provinces have not been captured. It 
may be the case that in southeastern provinces with high theft-losses, income is mostly 
earn by today’s feudal lords and poverty prevails extensively although per capita 
income seems relatively moderate. 
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theft-losses may not be rational, because funding theft-losses with a tax on electricity 
prices would result in a lower reduction in consumer welfare and may be a better 
option. Further research is needed to reach clearer result to determine whether theft-
losses should be financed by direct treasury subsidy or with electricity price increase, in 
the transition period towards private participation. 
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APPENDIX A: THE DATA SET 
 
 
In Appendix A, complete data set used for empirical analysis has been given.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1 the Panel Data 
Year Province tlr tlpc gdpcr agrgdpr depositr resecr indecr depr pie trrr trpgdp pnps tur lwlps dumjp 
1994 ADANA 0.2101 0.1079 0.3714 0.2253 0.1900 0.1919 0.6429 0.0667 7.9227 79.3298 0.6028 0.0020 0.1214 0.0369 0 
1994 ADIYAMAN 0.1415 0.0837 0.2041 0.2223 0.0936 0.2367 0.6464 0.0949 10.2948 86.0561 0.3549 0.0029 0.2671 0.0362 0 
1994 AFYON 0.1079 0.0588 0.2114 0.3222 0.3197 0.2006 0.5585 0.0074 4.8082 78.4379 0.3929 0.0019 0.1125 0.0206 0 
1994 AĞRI 0.3681 0.1194 0.0770 0.4471 0.0945 0.5238 0.1064 0.1795 4.0211 90.1532 0.4833 0.0034 0.1906 0.0372 0 
1994 AKSARAY 0.1753 0.0657 0.1803 0.3691 0.5267 0.4378 0.1780 0.0128 10.5824 80.0303 0.3446 0.0033 0.1100 0.0305 0 
1994 AMASYA 0.1716 0.1202 0.2323 0.4000 0.1707 0.2931 0.4096 0.0098 2.8329 84.9593 0.5152 0.0032 0.1249 0.0266 0 
1994 ANKARA 0.1602 0.1768 0.5391 0.0477 0.7763 0.3635 0.2174 0.0252 88.1410 87.6008 1.8351 0.0028 0.1424 0.0108 1 
1994 ANTALYA 0.1349 0.0956 0.4592 0.2066 0.2573 0.2587 0.3023 0.0186 31.8840 80.2602 0.4265 0.0016 0.1314 0.0522 0 
1994 ARDAHAN   0.1047 0.5839 0.1213   0.0650 12.8589 86.9565 0.3411    0 
1994 ARTVİN 0.1299 0.1319 0.5308 0.1708 0.0957 0.1952 0.6917 0.0147 19.0693 81.7330 0.2674 0.0027 0.1801 0.0501 0 
1994 AYDIN 0.1766 0.1452 0.4525 0.2973 0.2224 0.4520 0.2794 0.0321 11.0737 83.6359 0.3285 0.0018 0.1001 0.0178 0 
1994 BALIKESİR 0.1045 0.0973 0.3989 0.3233 0.2521 0.2557 0.5338 0.0103 24.6293 86.0097 0.4749 0.0013 0.1307 0.0214 0 
1994 BARTIN 0.1402 0.1252 0.1863 0.2437 0.3551 0.2728 0.3383 0.0112 6.0517 75.5725 0.5231 0.0018 0.1751 0.0280 1 
1994 BATMAN 0.5559 0.4288 0.2071 0.2077 0.0385 0.2371 0.1646 0.3735 16.3299 86.6035 0.3168 0.0042 0.2239 0.0327 0 
1994 BAYBURT 0.1307 0.0352 0.1277 0.3154 0.3361 0.5411 0.0642 0.0075 25.5058 86.0294 0.3541 0.0025 0.0609 0.0444 0 
1994 BİLECİK 0.0321 0.1002 0.6454 0.1571 0.0896 0.0642 0.8498 0.0069 8.7801 84.1691 0.2868 0.0025 0.3531  0 
1994 BİNGÖL 0.3609 0.0734 0.0922 0.4063 0.1782 0.5449 0.0495 0.0712 91.5192 90.3226 0.3843 0.0045 0.0905 0.0396 0 
1994 BİTLİS 0.5127 0.1418 0.0950 0.3888 0.0616 0.4546 0.0360 0.1002 1.2187 76.5281 0.3782 0.0045 0.1286 0.0339 0 
1994 BOLU 0.1204 0.1263 0.4187 0.3355 0.1186 0.2200 0.5471 0.0100 10.9671 77.9719 0.3536 0.0021 0.1614 0.0487 1 
1994 BURDUR 0.1561 0.0939 0.3263 0.2925 0.2312 0.3145 0.4032 0.0098 9.2100 86.7946 0.3683 0.0017 0.1196 0.0249 0 
1994 BURSA 0.0975 0.1658 0.5212 0.1471 0.2672 0.2000 0.6593 0.0137 23.4208 86.7452 0.7992 0.0017 0.1413 0.0147 0 
1994 ÇANAKKALE 0.0864 0.1278 0.5182 0.2857 0.1400 0.1457 0.7132 0.0087 23.8119 81.3725 0.2931 0.0018 0.1791 0.0144 0 
1994 ÇANKIRI 0.1428 0.0487 0.1843 0.3878 0.1169 0.4455 0.2266 0.0102 4.5700 85.8628 0.3132 0.0032 0.0869 0.0216 1 
1994 ÇORUM 0.1065 0.0577 0.2857 0.2978 0.1605 0.2939 0.5266 0.0086 10.6985 81.1903 0.2545 0.0017 0.1031 0.0039 0 
1994 DENİZLİ 0.1085 0.1013 0.4083 0.2220 0.3486 0.2269 0.5497 0.0140 16.1692 78.5782 0.3985 0.0018 0.1277 0.0240 0 
1994 DİYARBAKIR 0.5699 0.4008 0.2401 0.3086 0.0704 0.3223 0.3505 0.4644 24.4948 81.1770 0.2477 0.0029 0.1899 0.0206 0 
1994 DÜZCE               1 
1994 EDİRNE 0.1154 0.1469 0.3422 0.3027 0.2593 0.1991 0.4017 0.0083 19.7426 88.3468 0.8108 0.0015 0.1447 0.0153 1 
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Year Province tlr tlpc gdpcr agrgdpr depositr resecr indecr depr pie trrr trpgdp pnps tur lwlps dumjp 
1994 ELAZIĞ 0.0871 0.1345 0.3120 0.1287 0.1626 0.1143 0.7174 0.0391 21.1844 89.4766 0.4154 0.0045 0.3195 0.0275 0 
1994 ERZİNCAN 0.1057 0.0454 0.2049 0.3391 0.2225 0.3365 0.1708 0.0115 105.4843 78.6957 0.3623 0.0044 0.0878 0.0253 0 
1994 ERZURUM 0.2101 0.0925 0.1653 0.2071 0.1388 0.3493 0.2139 0.0589 22.5354 81.1254 0.5376 0.0037 0.1475 0.0400 0 
1994 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1215 0.1197 0.4279 0.1207 0.2634 0.2618 0.5153 0.0073 32.1452 77.6279 0.6208 0.0017 0.1554 0.0280 0 
1994 GAZİANTEP 0.1231 0.1096 0.2929 0.2080 0.1794 0.2036 0.6201 0.0667 9.2772 72.0426 0.3637 0.0023 0.2056 0.0188  0 
1994 GİRESUN 0.1176 0.0699 0.2138 0.3018 0.2841 0.1933 0.6471 0.0136 3.5390 81.9465 0.4223 0.0020 0.1375 0.0869   0 
1994 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.1951 0.0616 0.1589 0.3086 0.1841 0.4137 0.2652 0.0104 17.2056 86.9955 0.3062 0.0034 0.0778 0.0465 0 
1994 HAKKARİ 0.2673 0.0587 0.0709 0.3542 0.0998 0.4138 0.0760 0.5437 20.0887 84.5133 0.5414 0.0115 0.0982 0.0777 0 
1994 HATAY 0.1641 0.0950 0.3383 0.2403 0.2038 0.1194 0.7635 0.0317 13.0160 62.7027 0.5333 0.0020 0.1955 0.0170 0 
1994 IĞDIR  0.0000 0.1215 0.5678 0.2117 0.2171 122.4654 88.1119 0.2948 0.0148 0 
1994 ISPARTA 0.0947 0.0829 0.2396 0.2847 0.3153 0.1866 0.5510 0.0061 34.2585 86.5513 0.5486 0.0025 0.1194 0.0255 0 
1994 İÇEL 0.2904 0.1537 0.4653 0.1788 0.1373 0.2353 0.5195 0.0790 55.3540 84.0499 0.6116 0.0020 0.1169 0.0261 0 
1994 İSTANBUL 0.2073 0.2360 0.5635 0.0115 0.6020 0.2904 0.4787 0.0361 27.2707 78.0788 1.8598 0.0009 0.2223 0.0059 1 
1994 İZMİR 0.0434 0.0905 0.6441 0.0751 0.2928 0.1354 0.6891 0.0365 34.0000 87.4211 0.9252 0.0018 0.2979 0.0118 0 
1994 K.MARAŞ 0.1146 0.0814 0.2454 0.3006 0.0893 0.1442 0.6321 0.0273 5.5640 83.8658 0.3712 0.0028 0.1846 0.0292 0 
1994 KARABÜK  0.0076 1 
1994 KARAMAN 0.0504 0.0280 0.4366 0.5322 0.1890 0.2783 0.3062 0.0076 31.6366 75.0427 0.1821 0.0028 0.1019 0.0185 1 
1994 KARS 0.3104 0.2407 0.1373 0.3314 0.1908 0.3257 0.2198 0.0680 21.3588 88.3858 0.4081 0.0023 0.1920 0.0165 0 
1994 KASTAMONU 0.0984 0.0620 0.2674 0.3014 0.1512 0.2877 0.4997 0.0124 27.3088 90.4696 0.5003 0.0031 0.0985 0.0400 0 
1994 KAYSERİ 0.0832 0.0742 0.2654 0.1124 0.3369 0.2543 0.5671 0.0088 10.1576 80.8022 0.6286 0.0021 0.1083 0.0263 0 
1994 KIRIKKALE 0.0629 0.0573 0.4215 0.1172 0.0749 0.1619 0.6902 0.0080 6.8609 82.4138 0.3452 0.0049 0.2490 0.0136 1 
1994 KIRKLARELİ 0.0768 0.1476 0.5896 0.0981 0.1452 0.1321 0.7430 0.0090 13.6072 77.0677 0.3982 0.0024 0.2339 0.0148 1 
1994 KIRŞEHİR 0.1896 0.1151 0.2291 0.2669 0.3881 0.3414 0.4848 0.0424 38.1426 69.8138 0.3688 0.0039 0.1559 0.0272 0 
1994 KİLİS  0.0093 0 
1994 KOCAELİ 0.0735 0.2364 1.0000 0.0293 0.0824 0.0768 0.8525 0.0264 92.9485 96.8498 2.6683 0.0015 0.3191 0.0165 1 
1994 KONYA 0.1312 0.0707 0.2720 0.2431 0.1781 0.1344 0.7140 0.0250 16.4428 79.8018 0.4651 0.0033 0.1239 0.0268 1 
1994 KÜTAHYA 0.0853 0.0602 0.3645 0.1699 0.1536 0.2431 0.6087 0.0091 13.5237 89.1994 0.6529 0.0018 0.1296 0.0250 0 
1994 MALATYA 0.1424 0.0986 0.3044 0.1813 0.1487 0.3081 0.4799 0.0287 41.6868 75.9539 0.3123 0.0026 0.1393 0.0424 0 
1994 MANİSA 0.0962 0.0760 0.4927 0.2436 0.1434 0.2486 0.4640 0.0232 11.0924 86.3694 0.3170 0.0015 0.1474 0.0229 0 
1994 MARDİN 0.4978 0.4017 0.1703 0.3703 0.0590 0.1623 0.3175 0.2201 7.8449 80.4348 0.2436 0.0033 0.2801 0.0239 0 
1994 MUĞLA 0.1467 0.1660 0.5384 0.3097 0.2048 0.2431 0.3415 0.0137 99.8882 83.8332 0.3955 0.0017 0.1039 0.0894 0 
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1994 MUŞ 0.5213 0.1378 0.0882 0.5252 0.0762 0.4159 0.1338 0.1675 1.5960 86.5443 0.3193 0.0031 0.1349 0 
1994 NEVŞEHİR 0.1421 0.1377 0.4258 0.3218 0.2275 0.1902 0.2275 0.0090 9.4583 82.6033 0.2107 0.0029 0.0906 0.0208 0 
1994 NİĞDE 0.0903 0.0819 0.2848 0.4228 0.1375 0.1306 0.5199 0.0079 9.3184 84.6680 0.3858 0.0035 0.1644 0.0308 0 
1994 ORDU 0.2197 0.0964 0.1855 0.3318 0.2096 0.5874 0.2073 0.0146 5.7582 80.7860 0.3667 0.0020 0.1670 0.0450 0 
1994 OSMANİYE   0 
1994 RİZE 0.1648 0.1369 0.3463 0.2693 0.1329 0.3347 0.4030 0.0090 9.6072 67.8621 0.5337 0.0019 0.1446 0.0401 0 
1994 SAKARYA 0.0970 0.0869 0.3311 0.2494 0.1802 0.2258 0.5351 0.0123 10.8950 73.0154 0.4059 0.0026 0.1997 0.0167 1 
1994 SAMSUN 0.1633 0.1092 0.2850 0.2531 0.2204 0.3667 0.4348 0.0101 22.4235 83.5252 0.5517 0.0025 0.1427 0.0302 0 
1994 SİİRT 0.4395 0.4749 0.1765 0.2718 0.0477 0.1835 0.4094 0.2667 6.1474 84.8387 0.2368 0.0027 0.1629 0.0598 0 
1994 SİNOP 0.2046 0.1017 0.2241 0.2843 0.2598 0.4958 0.2738 0.0180 32.3235 86.6184 0.3466 0.0024 0.0994 0.0526 0 
1994 SİVAS 0.0803 0.0509 0.2203 0.1670 0.2835 0.2333 0.5982 0.0121 32.0898 56.5117 0.3566 0.0026 0.1224 0.0266 0 
1994 ŞANLIURFA 0.4215 0.3825 0.2018 0.4238 0.0550 0.2037 0.3370 0.1375 52.7508 87.0445 0.0366 0.0019 0.2506 0.0084 0 
1994 ŞIRNAK  0.0000 0.0845 0.5813 0.0864 0.2595 7.3267 86.4945 5.5858 0 
1994 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1040 0.1961 0.4908 0.1909 0.2467 0.1562 0.7067 0.0104 38.0516 82.2700 0.1745 0.0014 0.2242 0.0109 1 
1994 TOKAT 0.1496 0.0538 0.2337 0.2436 0.0982 0.3645 0.4196 0.0072 5.6252 84.7969 0.5985 0.0026 0.1222 0.0266 0 
1994 TRABZON 0.1856 0.1014 0.2550 0.3522 0.2903 0.4167 0.3052 0.0081 14.7061 89.7561 0.0366 0.0030 0.1361 0.0413 0 
1994 TUNCELİ 0.2600 0.0557 0.1684 0.4712 0.2437 0.4690 0.0759 0.1698 40.7190 80.6522 2.2890 0.0055 0.0534 0.0454 0 
1994 UŞAK 0.0599 0.0545 0.2887 0.2918 0.5092 0.2311 0.5774 0.0104 7.4046 86.8881 0.4569 0.0018 0.1433 0.0235 0 
1994 VAN 0.4802 0.2069 0.1271 0.1976 0.0734 0.4020 0.2621 0.2774 16.9704 85.4562 0.4227 0.0042 0.1715 0.0662 0 
1994 YALOVA  0.0284 0 
1994 YOZGAT 0.0746 0.0324 0.1824 0.4034 0.2923 0.3146 0.4331 0.0105 14.3521 85.6354 0.2844 0.0023 0.1122 0.0187 0 
1994 ZONGULDAK 0.1083 0.1199 0.3422 0.0842 0.2105 0.1008 0.8461 0.0092 24.1089 68.8922 0.8054 0.0023 0.2482 0.0192 1 
1995 ADANA 0.2115 0.1127 0.3831 0.2102 0.1900 0.1938 0.6278 0.0667 10.3005 82.8690 0.6035 0.0018 0.1234 0.0369 0 
1995 ADIYAMAN 0.1127 0.0771 0.1958 0.2247 0.0936 0.1189 0.6364 0.0949 12.1136 87.4800 0.3186 0.0028 0.1517 0.0362 0 
1995 AFYON 0.0941 0.0530 0.2097 0.3184 0.3197 0.2008 0.5056 0.0074 7.0972 78.2893 0.3513 0.1124 0.0206 0 
1995 AĞRI 0.5238 0.1905 0.0716 0.5777 0.0945 0.5281 0.0361 0.1795 6.6097 92.0676 0.5015 0.0032 0.1294 0.0372 0 
1995 AKSARAY 0.1716 0.0669 0.1833 0.3846 0.5267 0.4124 0.1166 0.0128 7.7478 83.0932 0.3034 0.0031 0.0805 0.0305 0 
1995 AMASYA 0.1728 0.1313 0.2365 0.3914 0.1707 0.3040 0.3716 0.0098 4.8608 89.1839 0.4996 0.0030 0.1298 0.0266 0 
1995 ANKARA 0.1911 0.2254 0.5506 0.0457 0.7763 0.3328 0.2365 0.0252 85.1604 91.4084 1.6730 0.0025 0.1460 0.0108 1 
1995 ANTALYA 0.1103 0.0846 0.4625 0.1908 0.2573 0.2639 0.3291 0.0186 24.3854 84.8977 0.4123 0.0015 0.0823 0.0522 0 
1995 ARDAHAN  0.1103 0.7665 0.1213 0.0650 11.2517 88.8350 0.3067 0 
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1995 ARTVİN 0.1636 0.1595 0.5261 0.1759 0.0957 0.2208 0.6509 0.0147 19.1962 82.4159 0.2404 0.0024 0.1726 0.0501 0 
1995 AYDIN 0.1715 0.1513 0.4560 0.2698 0.2224 0.3939 0.3439 0.0321 17.9733 87.1963 0.3210 0.0016 0.1031 0.0178 0 
1995 BALIKESİR 0.0910 0.0971 0.3946 0.2955 0.2521 0.2672 0.5245 0.0103 29.8210 90.0671 0.5184 0.0012 0.1386 0.0214 0 
1995 BARTIN 0.0499 0.0419 0.1951 0.2834 0.3551 0.2647 0.3757 0.0112 10.6110 83.0700 0.4220 0.0017 0.1498 0.0280 1 
1995 BATMAN 0.5726 0.5062 0.2018 0.2054 0.0385 0.2292 0.4297 0.3735 28.2692 85.5908 0.2438 0.0041 0.2437 0.0327 0 
1995 BAYBURT 0.1566 0.0457 0.1273 0.4202 0.3361 0.5403 0.0574 0.0075 39.3989 86.4322 0.3016 0.0026 0.0542 0.0444 0 
1995 BİLECİK 0.0341 0.1149 0.7316 0.1372 0.0896 0.0611 0.8738 0.0069 19.0718 85.4326 0.2564 0.0022 0.2080 0 
1995 BİNGÖL 0.3622 0.0869 0.0877 0.5158 0.1782 0.4675 0.0402 0.0712 212.0621 92.9539 0.3467 0.0043 0.1077 0.0396 0 
1995 BİTLİS 0.5399 0.1562 0.0885 0.4113 0.0616 0.4353 0.0332 0.1002 3.5938 77.0723 0.3140 0.0044 0.1332 0.0339 0 
1995 BOLU 0.1029 0.1152 0.4126 0.3156 0.1186 0.2003 0.5544 0.0100 13.7070 83.0110 0.3507 0.0019 0.1725 0.0487 1 
1995 BURDUR 0.1679 0.1051 0.3315 0.2957 0.2312 0.3283 0.3196 0.0098 11.0356 89.1245 0.3435 0.0016 0.1187 0.0249 0 
1995 BURSA 0.0765 0.1424 0.5254 0.1311 0.2672 0.1443 0.7100 0.0137 29.3112 90.6829 0.8440 0.0016 0.1583 0.0147 0 
1995 ÇANAKKALE 0.0842 0.1415 0.5452 0.2741 0.1400 0.1411 0.7226 0.0087 34.7407 82.3271 0.2644 0.0016 0.1904 0.0144 0 
1995 ÇANKIRI 0.1671 0.0639 0.1816 0.4215 0.1169 0.3682 0.2915 0.0102 4.9401 89.8698 0.2655 0.0031 0.0911 0.0216 1 
1995 ÇORUM 0.1270 0.0745 0.2902 0.2889 0.1605 0.3230 0.5242 0.0086 11.8872 84.3928 0.2432 0.0016 0.1063 0.0039 0 
1995 DENİZLİ 0.0923 0.0926 0.4236 0.2007 0.3486 0.2117 0.5588 0.0140 23.0394 81.8123 0.4077 0.0016 0.1319 0.0240 0 
1995 DİYARBAKIR 0.5858 0.5456 0.2294 0.3082 0.0704 0.3038 0.2357 0.4644 59.4541 82.2242 0.2144 0.0025 0.2144 0.0206 0 
1995 DÜZCE   1 
1995 EDİRNE 0.0913 0.1250 0.3381 0.3155 0.2593 0.1829 0.4343 0.0083 11.1281 88.3109 0.8864 0.0012 0.1600 0.0153 1 
1995 ELAZIĞ 0.1174 0.1747 0.2984 0.1473 0.1626 0.1332 0.7024 0.0391 32.6516 92.4571 0.3642 0.0043 0.2368 0.0275 0 
1995 ERZİNCAN 0.1379 0.0637 0.1924 0.3941 0.2225 0.3548 0.1715 0.0115 265.1022 78.3378 0.3561 0.0042 0.0843 0.0253 0 
1995 ERZURUM 0.2704 0.1283 0.1521 0.2632 0.1388 0.3212 0.1982 0.0589 19.5662 85.5794 0.5379 0.0035 0.1346 0.0400 0 
1995 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1557 0.1633 0.4170 0.1214 0.2634 0.2474 0.5453 0.0073 33.9584 81.0643 0.6400 0.0016 0.1462 0.0280 0 
1995 GAZİANTEP 0.1344 0.1359 0.3033 0.1857 0.1794 0.1950 0.6559 0.0667 9.2518 78.7157 0.3425 0.0020 0.1928 0.0188 0 
1995 GİRESUN 0.1218 0.0808 0.2141 0.2636 0.2841 0.2823 0.5466 0.0136 3.3850 88.4525 0.4047 0.0019 0.1449 0.0869 0 
1995 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2139 0.0741 0.1585 0.3558 0.1841 0.3929 0.3173 0.0104 24.8353 89.6657 0.2676 0.0032 0.0827 0.0465 0 
1995 HAKKARİ 0.6577 0.2899 0.0709 0.5495 0.0998 0.3352 0.0034 0.5437 19.0930 77.7429 0.3815 0.0087 0.1580 0.0777 0 
1995 HATAY 0.1941 0.1184 0.3424 0.2153 0.2038 0.0984 0.7964 0.0317 9.5164 69.5702 0.5284 0.0019 0.1159 0.0170 0 
1995 IĞDIR 0.5232 0.2125 0.1227 0.6200 0.2117 0.5145 0.0615 0.2171 163.4595 90.9804 0.3060 0.0031 0.1361 0.0148 0 
1995 ISPARTA 0.0888 0.0837 0.2344 0.2877 0.3153 0.1725 0.5822 0.0061 36.8664 87.8492 0.4986 0.0023 0.1225 0.0255 0 
1995 İÇEL 0.2939 0.1602 0.4501 0.1621 0.1373 0.2258 0.4968 0.0790 30.8053 88.7724 0.6634 0.0018 0.1270 0.0261 0 
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1995 İSTANBUL 0.2465 0.3113 0.6062 0.0129 0.6020 0.2691 0.5189 0.0361 22.0129 79.8085 1.7464 0.0008 0.1980 0.0059 1 
1995 İZMİR 0.0544 0.1167 0.6448 0.0676 0.2928 0.1250 0.7058 0.0365 34.8199 90.9408 1.0269 0.0017 0.2279 0.0118 0 
1995 K.MARAŞ 0.1112 0.0924 0.2524 0.2898 0.0893 0.1682 0.5940 0.0273 8.8807 86.2144 0.3383 0.0026 0.1807 0.0292 0 
1995 KARABÜK  0.0076 53.0047 1 
1995 KARAMAN 0.0708 0.0436 0.4404 0.5079 0.1890 0.2626 0.3078 0.0076 64.8117 75.6513 0.1743 0.0025 0.0959 0.0185 1 
1995 KARS 0.5212 0.3503 0.1269 0.4129 0.1908 0.2999 0.3478 0.0680 21.0718 84.4173 0.3479 0.0037 0.2308 0.0165 0 
1995 KASTAMONU 0.1324 0.0899 0.2790 0.3182 0.1512 0.2955 0.4755 0.0124 26.0366 90.7616 0.4235 0.0031 0.0915 0.0400 0 
1995 KAYSERİ 0.0791 0.0739 0.2688 0.1151 0.3369 0.2501 0.5754 0.0088 8.2694 87.0362 0.6621 0.0021 0.1094 0.0263 0 
1995 KIRIKKALE 0.0873 0.0784 0.4569 0.1163 0.0749 0.2132 0.5824 0.0080 34.6161 90.3059 0.2940 0.0046 0.2072 0.0136 1 
1995 KIRKLARELİ 0.0939 0.2049 0.6443 0.1031 0.1452 0.1165 0.7753 0.0090 24.2819 86.7461 0.4000 0.0019 0.2578 0.0148 1 
1995 KIRŞEHİR 0.1917 0.1257 0.2367 0.2905 0.3881 0.3392 0.4231 0.0424 32.5972 71.5412 0.3161 0.0037 0.1420 0.0272 0 
1995 KİLİS  0.0093 93.6434 0 
1995 KOCAELİ 0.0982 0.2635 1.0000 0.0266 0.0824 0.0680 0.8710 0.0264 216.6241 97.5549 3.0766 0.0019 0.3761 0.0165 1 
1995 KONYA 0.1155 0.0661 0.2673 0.2536 0.1781 0.1474 0.6863 0.0250 15.4564 80.8560 0.3957 0.0030 0.1239 0.0268 1 
1995 KÜTAHYA 0.1158 0.0860 0.3538 0.1805 0.1536 0.2297 0.6203 0.0091 11.0896 86.2888 0.5896 0.0016 0.1360 0.0250 0 
1995 MALATYA 0.1697 0.1267 0.2965 0.1811 0.1487 0.2838 0.4866 0.0287 46.2524 72.4745 0.2663 0.0025 0.1566 0.0424 0 
1995 MANİSA 0.1063 0.0921 0.5010 0.2204 0.1434 0.2368 0.4940 0.0232 21.4871 85.0970 0.2987 0.0015 0.1416 0.0229 0 
1995 MARDİN 0.6062 0.5676 0.1708 0.3678 0.0590 0.1861 0.3838 0.2201 3.7957 84.3674 0.2204 0.0031 0.2846 0.0239 0 
1995 MUĞLA 0.1611 0.1989 0.5469 0.2684 0.2048 0.2410 0.3147 0.0137 41.0873 87.3538 0.3630 0.0015 0.0531 0.0894 0 
1995 MUŞ 0.4797 0.1621 0.0823 0.5876 0.0762 0.3876 0.0399 0.1675 8.6828 85.1626 0.2809 0.0031 0.1563 0 
1995 NEVŞEHİR 0.1026 0.1047 0.4246 0.2953 0.2275 0.1722 0.2024 0.0090 2.8457 84.6094 0.1962 0.0026 0.0802 0.0208 0 
1995 NİĞDE 0.1000 0.0971 0.2859 0.3799 0.1375 0.1124 0.4945 0.0079 15.0361 88.2650 0.3882 0.0032 0.0984 0.0308 0 
1995 ORDU 0.1014 0.0429 0.1866 0.2897 0.2096 0.4110 0.3559 0.0146 4.5103 88.2848 0.3399 0.0018 0.1085 0.0450 0 
1995 OSMANİYE   0 
1995 RİZE 0.1742 0.1669 0.3413 0.2343 0.1329 0.3013 0.4489 0.0090 10.2618 65.1978 0.4600 0.0016 0.1591 0.0401 0 
1995 SAKARYA 0.1869 0.1575 0.3684 0.2313 0.1802 0.3083 0.3810 0.0123 11.8334 77.1624 0.3524 0.0023 0.1656 0.0167 1 
1995 SAMSUN 0.2106 0.1478 0.2983 0.2334 0.2204 0.3833 0.3974 0.0101 40.7078 87.7265 0.5268 0.0022 0.1320 0.0302 0 
1995 SİİRT 0.2836 0.2026 0.1635 0.3126 0.0477 0.1731 0.5349 0.2667 6.1622 84.8416 0.2035 0.0045 0.2142 0.0598 0 
1995 SİNOP 0.2152 0.1106 0.2235 0.2975 0.2598 0.4690 0.2777 0.0180 38.1962 91.1800 0.3183 0.0023 0.0880 0.0526 0 
1995 SİVAS 0.0737 0.0617 0.2153 0.1985 0.2835 0.1847 0.6731 0.0121 23.2406 62.5922 0.3655 0.0021 0.1401 0.0266 0 
1995 ŞANLIURFA 0.4246 0.4516 0.1794 0.4646 0.0550 0.1719 0.1968 0.1375 53.3720 88.5886 0.0306 0.0018 0.2137 0.0084 0 
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1995 ŞIRNAK  0.0000 0.0866 0.5920 0.0864 0.2595 7.4382 89.4745 5.1940 0 
1995 TEKİRDAĞ 0.0760 0.1572 0.5124 0.1842 0.2467 0.1358 0.6940 0.0104 27.3593 84.3015 0.1448 0.0010 0.2501 0.0109 1 
1995 TOKAT 0.1601 0.0593 0.2266 0.2618 0.0982 0.4519 0.3140 0.0072 3.4275 84.3293 0.5528 0.0024 0.1185 0.0266 0 
1995 TRABZON 0.2130 0.1197 0.2589 0.2596 0.2903 0.4146 0.3158 0.0081 18.8167 92.2034 0.0299 0.0027 0.2328 0.0413 0 
1995 TUNCELİ 0.2597 0.0956 0.1498 0.4953 0.2437 0.3800 0.0753 0.1698 75.3496 85.4404 2.2475 0.0049 0.0872 0.0454 0 
1995 UŞAK 0.0975 0.1033 0.2961 0.2972 0.5092 0.2171 0.6123 0.0104 3.8044 91.0448 0.4093 0.0017 0.1479 0.0235 0 
1995 VAN 0.4897 0.2151 0.1151 0.2891 0.0734 0.3581 0.2112 0.2774 18.3666 83.2363 0.3860 0.0039 0.1614 0.0662 0 
1995 YALOVA  0.0284 90.5346 0 
1995 YOZGAT 0.0982 0.0454 0.1774 0.4359 0.2923 0.2897 0.4560 0.0105 11.2467 87.2549 0.2433 0.0020 0.1204 0.0187 0 
1995 ZONGULDAK 0.1409 0.1544 0.3320 0.0999 0.2105 0.1115 0.7518 0.0092 14.4525 82.6854 0.7156 0.0020 0.2323 0.0192 1 
1996 ADANA 0.2161 0.1121 0.4171 0.2026 0.1864 0.1767 0.6357 0.0667 11.4755 84.3985 0.5360 0.0019 0.1023 0.0303 0 
1996 ADIYAMAN 0.1562 0.1195 0.1920 0.2197 0.1038 0.1946 0.6507 0.0949 13.2644 84.3077 0.2199 0.0024 0.1916 0.0341 0 
1996 AFYON 0.0957 0.0569 0.2245 0.3114 0.3158 0.2180 0.4661 0.0074 15.5214 78.5222 0.3228 0.0016 0.1090 0.0209 0 
1996 AĞRI 0.5899 0.2308 0.0758 0.4366 0.1095 0.5843 0.0451 0.1795 11.4333 91.6996 0.4058 0.0030 0.1388 0.0354 0 
1996 AKSARAY 0.1647 0.0749 0.1965 0.3427 0.4918 0.4180 0.1091 0.0128 13.0075 86.7940 0.3558 0.0030 0.0882 0.0263 0 
1996 AMASYA 0.1929 0.1628 0.2444 0.3474 0.2005 0.2991 0.3461 0.0098 8.1765 87.9352 0.4017 0.0029 0.1364 0.0265 0 
1996 ANKARA 0.2093 0.2619 0.5567 0.0438 1.0564 0.3568 0.2595 0.0252 94.7376 91.9463 1.5429 0.0024 0.1310 0.0106 1 
1996 ANTALYA 0.0902 0.0776 0.4800 0.1934 0.2946 0.2502 0.2643 0.0186 36.3684 85.5393 0.4187 0.0014 0.0863 0.0513 0 
1996 ARDAHAN 0.4694 0.1958 0.1287 0.5426 0.1630 0.6159 0.0282 0.0650 8.5000 90.0922 0.3188 0.0020 0.1771 0.0266 0 
1996 ARTVİN 0.1634 0.1815 0.5565 0.1805 0.1065 0.2137 0.6561 0.0147 83.9455 83.9801 0.2113 0.0024 0.1664 0.0491 0 
1996 AYDIN 0.1393 0.1358 0.4814 0.2953 0.2526 0.3208 0.2704 0.0321 20.8674 88.2675 0.3074 0.0015 0.1033 0.0205 0 
1996 BALIKESİR 0.0953 0.1035 0.4119 0.3124 0.2781 0.2416 0.5039 0.0103 46.8420 90.0656 0.4803 0.0011 0.1407 0.0230 0 
1996 BARTIN 0.1426 0.1230 0.1669 0.3024 0.3887 0.3227 0.5014 0.0112 21.9251 88.1238 0.4901 0.0014 0.1239 0.0250 1 
1996 BATMAN 0.5701 0.5651 0.2155 0.1796 0.0436 0.2044 0.4625 0.3735 9.5587 85.6578 0.1994 0.0039 0.2138 0.0312 0 
1996 BAYBURT 0.1435 0.0433 0.1294 0.2721 0.3222 0.5521 0.0658 0.0075 48.0312 90.2375 0.3086 0.0024 0.0732 0.0458 0 
1996 BİLECİK 0.0398 0.1397 0.7684 0.1372 0.1026 0.0475 0.8896 0.0069 48.1722 82.7795 0.2431 0.0021 0.2165 0.0157 0 
1996 BİNGÖL 0.3246 0.0849 0.1026 0.2346 0.1749 0.4786 0.0441 0.0712 350.8776 92.1875 0.3226 0.0040 0.1084 0.0381 0 
1996 BİTLİS 0.4389 0.1290 0.0948 0.3175 0.0771 0.4271 0.0247 0.1002 5.3935 80.0412 0.2695 0.0040 0.1311 0.0325 0 
1996 BOLU 0.1278 0.1598 0.4134 0.2758 0.1397 0.1947 0.5925 0.0100 24.0021 88.6424 0.3737 0.0018 0.1331 0.0334 1 
1996 BURDUR 0.1787 0.1259 0.3696 0.2519 0.2391 0.3367 0.3286 0.0098 17.9611 88.2913 0.3007 0.0016 0.1155 0.0282 0 
1996 BURSA 0.1110 0.2318 0.5410 0.1418 0.3043 0.1488 0.7182 0.0137 79.1622 90.7137 0.7874 0.0015 0.1253 0.0126 0 
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1996 ÇANAKKALE 0.0724 0.1287 0.5662 0.2778 0.1702 0.1399 0.7161 0.0087 58.0956 86.1938 0.2801 0.0015 0.1857 0.0147 0 
1996 ÇANKIRI 0.1245 0.0528 0.2009 0.3641 0.1452 0.3643 0.3078 0.0102 14.1881 88.7689 0.2740 0.0027 0.0870 0.0183 1 
1996 ÇORUM 0.0628 0.0388 0.3169 0.2782 0.1677 0.3302 0.4662 0.0086 25.5605 86.4951 0.2339 0.0015 0.0885 0.0279 0 
1996 DENİZLİ 0.1199 0.1484 0.4575 0.2022 0.3585 0.2057 0.5792 0.0140 26.6234 81.5851 0.3841 0.0015 0.1529 0.0230 0 
1996 DİYARBAKIR 0.6150 0.5694 0.2314 0.2918 0.0824 0.3043 0.2059 0.4644 60.5942 82.1994 0.1871 0.0027 0.2034 0.0152 0 
1996 DÜZCE   1 
1996 EDİRNE 0.0912 0.1367 0.3558 0.2970 0.3005 0.1671 0.5229 0.0083 24.5460 90.3149 0.8280 0.0011 0.1901 0.0159 1 
1996 ELAZIĞ 0.1105 0.1823 0.3104 0.1438 0.1724 0.1368 0.6820 0.0391 32.1452 93.7951 0.3249 0.0041 0.3004 0.0277 0 
1996 ERZİNCAN 0.1359 0.0651 0.1993 0.3534 0.2212 0.3600 0.1205 0.0115 28.8210 81.2500 0.3311 0.0040 0.0858 0.0265 0 
1996 ERZURUM 0.2478 0.1286 0.1582 0.2100 0.1513 0.3649 0.1770 0.0589 31.7144 85.9049 0.4629 0.0034 0.1366 0.0134 0 
1996 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1701 0.1911 0.4456 0.1598 0.3128 0.2351 0.5604 0.0073 42.2725 85.2054 0.5951 0.0021 0.1462 0.0382 0 
1996 GAZİANTEP  0.0000 0.3318 0.1497 0.1984 0.0667 14.8307 86.7698 0.3857 0 
1996 GİRESUN 0.0835 0.0476 0.2290 0.2964 0.2894 0.4312 0.3127 0.0136 5.2729 89.1138 0.3859 0.0016 0.1178 0.0796 0 
1996 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2285 0.0823 0.1748 0.2723 0.1869 0.4344 0.2728 0.0104 44.0875 91.2000 0.2518 0.0037 0.0807 0.0447 0 
1996 HAKKARİ  0.0000 0.0614 0.2480 0.1212 0.5437 25.9013 85.9310 0.5578 0 
1996 HATAY 0.1867 0.1236 0.3565 0.2105 0.2315 0.1128 0.7999 0.0317 13.7403 77.5200 0.5806 0.0018 0.1428 0.0186 0 
1996 IĞDIR 0.5320 0.2485 0.1427 0.4401 0.2059 0.5281 0.0603 0.2171 118.4682 88.8508 0.3073 0.0033 0.1518 0.0145 0 
1996 ISPARTA 0.0724 0.0755 0.2454 0.2946 0.3386 0.1664 0.5836 0.0061 45.1121 91.6741 0.4975 0.0021 0.1336 0.0267 0 
1996 İÇEL 0.3463 0.2041 0.4297 0.1993 0.1774 0.2317 0.5285 0.0790 56.1375 90.3239 0.6345 0.0020 0.1576 0.0283 0 
1996 İSTANBUL 0.2059 0.2810 0.6418 0.0084 0.7771 0.2912 0.4136 0.0361 29.6860 83.0629 1.6838 0.0006 0.2367 0.0051 1 
1996 İZMİR 0.0804 0.1694 0.6734 0.0725 0.3459 0.1486 0.6769 0.0365 42.5388 91.3926 1.0271 0.0016 0.2722 0.0107 0 
1996 K.MARAŞ 0.1737 0.1909 0.2678 0.2777 0.0990 0.1489 0.6179 0.0273 18.2224 87.0315 0.2984 0.0025 0.2160 0.0293 0 
1996 KARABÜK  0.7070 0.0467 0.2565 0.0076 7.4139 64.7036 0.2255 1 
1996 KARAMAN 0.0737 0.0517 0.4910 0.5611 0.1787 0.2558 0.3256 0.0076 76.4846 73.4945 0.1888 0.0021 0.1038 0.0187 1 
1996 KARS 0.4674 0.3013 0.1356 0.3232 0.2364 0.2859 0.3644 0.0680 22.2930 84.2351 0.3619 0.0039 0.2461 0.0180 0 
1996 KASTAMONU 0.1165 0.0918 0.3108 0.2960 0.1680 0.2830 0.4736 0.0124 80.9135 90.2124 0.3777 0.0028 0.1133 0.0387 0 
1996 KAYSERİ 0.0878 0.0976 0.2898 0.1019 0.3372 0.2274 0.6079 0.0088 11.3348 88.1286 0.6042 0.0023 0.1210 0.0262 0 
1996 KIRIKKALE 0.1089 0.0908 0.5278 0.1047 0.0699 0.1484 0.6813 0.0080 101.4957 93.7798 0.4299 0.0044 0.1791 0.0136 1 
1996 KIRKLARELİ 0.1104 0.2705 0.6698 0.0962 0.1765 0.1101 0.7773 0.0090 29.2380 88.7456 0.4476 0.0017 0.2346 0.0137 1 
1996 KIRŞEHİR 0.2002 0.1451 0.2725 0.2680 0.3369 0.3218 0.4384 0.0424 26.9896 80.0847 0.3030 0.0035 0.1356 0.0236 0 
1996 KİLİS 0.3500 0.1091 0.3281 0.5130 0.0617 0.5363 0.1242 0.0093 6.9057 90.4206 0.1804 0.0009 0.0850 0.0155 0 
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1996 KOCAELİ 0.1225 0.3482 1.0000 0.0317 0.1216 0.0684 0.8736 0.0264 112.9154 98.3109 4.0424 0.0018 0.3488 0.0171 1 
1996 KONYA 0.1398 0.0889 0.2857 0.2476 0.1814 0.1329 0.7340 0.0250 22.0407 81.7567 0.3508 0.0029 0.1260 0.0266 1 
1996 KÜTAHYA 0.0984 0.0816 0.3978 0.1572 0.1413 0.2263 0.6123 0.0091 21.0389 91.2564 0.4179 0.0015 0.1497 0.0237 0 
1996 MALATYA 0.1592 0.1307 0.3004 0.2165 0.1763 0.2612 0.5125 0.0287 53.3852 73.3595 0.2616 0.0023 0.1655 0.0414 0 
1996 MANİSA 0.1158 0.1133 0.5345 0.2523 0.1634 0.2272 0.5120 0.0232 12.1449 88.4892 0.2727 0.0013 0.1495 0.0190 0 
1996 MARDİN 0.5466 0.7564 0.1837 0.3382 0.0652 0.2008 0.2318 0.2201 2.8940 78.2609 0.1710 0.0024 0.2574 0.0327 0 
1996 MUĞLA 0.1669 0.2276 0.6071 0.2557 0.2250 0.2481 0.2794 0.0137 70.0450 88.6357 0.3614 0.0014 0.0983 0.0314 0 
1996 MUŞ 0.4759 0.1709 0.0864 0.4285 0.0927 0.3470 0.0363 0.1675 33.7759 82.7133 0.2479 0.0030 0.1572 0 
1996 NEVŞEHİR 0.1090 0.1396 0.4791 0.3132 0.2136 0.1549 0.1926 0.0090 17.9083 86.0729 0.1765 0.0024 0.0862 0.0226 0 
1996 NİĞDE 0.0880 0.0982 0.3168 0.3647 0.1400 0.1260 0.4531 0.0079 24.8039 84.9251 0.3199 0.0028 0.1048 0.0317 0 
1996 ORDU 0.1310 0.0620 0.2079 0.3360 0.2183 0.3890 0.3715 0.0146 5.0079 89.0226 0.3111 0.0017 0.1261 0.0443 0 
1996 OSMANİYE 0.1409 0.6356 0.0713  81.7067 0.0009 0.2733 0 
1996 RİZE 0.1976 0.2151 0.3939 0.2627 0.1556 0.3120 0.4664 0.0090 25.6333 77.8933 0.5066 0.0015 0.1737 0.0396 0 
1996 SAKARYA 0.2029 0.1817 0.3966 0.2601 0.1912 0.3386 0.3405 0.0123 14.6066 80.2144 0.3410 0.0021 0.1853 0.0246 1 
1996 SAMSUN 0.2209 0.1724 0.3307 0.2279 0.2323 0.3407 0.4608 0.0101 79.4106 90.0298 0.5146 0.0021 0.1354 0.0230 0 
1996 SİİRT 0.3703 0.3025 0.1632 0.2993 0.0653 0.1687 0.4948 0.2667 3.0158 87.4036 0.1918 0.0044 0.2350 0.0613 0 
1996 SİNOP 0.2140 0.1211 0.2442 0.2757 0.2657 0.4748 0.2494 0.0180 47.8716 91.9312 0.2855 0.0022 0.0961 0.0467 0 
1996 SİVAS 0.0963 0.0785 0.2280 0.1694 0.2941 0.2329 0.6251 0.0121 106.9172 64.1659 0.3365 0.0015 0.1044 0.0263 0 
1996 ŞANLIURFA 0.5285 0.5941 0.1868 0.4141 0.0708 0.2119 0.1968 0.1375 91.6719 92.2414 0.0375 0.0017 0.2192 0.0083 0 
1996 ŞIRNAK  0.0938 0.4588 0.0926 0.2595 10.8603 92.5440 6.1547 0 
1996 TEKİRDAĞ  0.5517 0.1576 0.2803 0.0104 25.2070 83.0897 0.1289 1 
1996 TOKAT 0.1792 0.0733 0.2419 0.2246 0.1069 0.4458 0.3217 0.0072 7.3577 87.0592 0.5577 0.0023 0.1165 0.0263 0 
1996 TRABZON 0.2019 0.1243 0.2643 0.2465 0.3297 0.4146 0.2549 0.0081 30.4215 92.8690 0.0319 0.0026 0.1146 0.0409 0 
1996 TUNCELİ 0.2639 0.1149 0.1587 0.4164 0.2512 0.3410 0.0562 0.1698 157.4261 89.8375 2.7992 0.0046 0.0927 0.0456 0 
1996 UŞAK 0.1106 0.1388 0.3192 0.2737 0.4939 0.2061 0.6248 0.0104 10.9687 90.4940 0.3786 0.0015 0.1562 0.0223 0 
1996 VAN 0.5103 0.2363 0.1209 0.2010 0.0953 0.4299 0.1949 0.2774 23.2638 89.4753 0.3781 0.0037 0.2354 0.0665 0 
1996 YALOVA  0.7832 0.0749 0.1897 0.0284 3.7645 89.4256 0.1844 0 
1996 YOZGAT 0.1020 0.0504 0.1896 0.4192 0.2856 0.3067 0.4232 0.0105 24.2558 88.5914 0.2337 0.0019 0.1218 0.0189 0 
1996 ZONGULDAK 0.1453 0.2194 0.3634 0.1149 0.2582 0.1021 0.8383 0.0092 30.8114 91.0126 1.0151 0.0015 0.2104 0.0181 1 
1997 ADANA 0.2500 0.2011 0.4571 0.1206 0.2129 0.1991 0.6350 0.0737 16.7789 85.3548 0.5262 0.0016 0.1430 0.0256 0 
1997 ADIYAMAN 0.1797 0.1397 0.1780 0.2668 0.1050 0.1980 0.6544 0.0752 15.4934 86.6680 0.1991 0.0024 0.1957 0.0290 0 
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1997 AFYON 0.1079 0.0731 0.2144 0.3429 0.2958 0.2013 0.5044 0.0112 23.4242 81.4223 0.3314 0.0015 0.1099 0.0224 0 
1997 AĞRI 0.4102 0.1769 0.0718 0.5066 0.1200 0.5225 0.1041 0.3373 17.7461 93.6934 0.4256 0.0029 0.1076 0.0242 0 
1997 AKSARAY 0.1890 0.0987 0.2130 0.5207 0.4001 0.4624 0.0991 0.0108 15.8293 93.0918 0.4521 0.0029 0.0909 0.0285 0 
1997 AMASYA 0.1876 0.1748 0.2472 0.3858 0.1734 0.2726 0.4008 0.0089 16.4833 89.6717 0.3458 0.0027 0.1389 0.0295 0 
1997 ANKARA 0.1894 0.2540 0.5081 0.0430 1.0696 0.0004 0.2464 0.0157 118.8191 93.2939 1.6329 0.0023 0.1483 0.0179 1 
1997 ANTALYA 0.1421 0.1394 0.4406 0.1792 0.2988 0.2485 0.2131 0.0248 65.4433 87.4162 0.4205 0.0013 0.0820 0.0508 0 
1997 ARDAHAN 0.5543 0.2266 0.1044 0.4917 0.1807 0.5912 0.0604 0.0784 10.4677 93.4077 0.3545 0.0022 0.1868 0.0584 0 
1997 ARTVİN 0.1592 0.1621 0.4617 0.1586 0.1379 0.2396 0.5801 0.0129 79.2415 89.9410 0.2527 0.0022 0.1420 0.0584 0 
1997 AYDIN 0.1322 0.1426 0.4281 0.2358 0.2631 0.3529 0.2710 0.0374 32.0392 90.6426 0.3340 0.0013 0.1038 0.0236 0 
1997 BALIKESİR 0.0971 0.1119 0.3584 0.2175 0.2832 0.2600 0.4261 0.0104 53.8782 92.0495 0.5377 0.0010 0.1380 0.0228 0 
1997 BARTIN 0.2420 0.2744 0.1629 0.2579 0.4033 0.3380 0.4705 0.0140 39.8256 89.6920 0.4909 0.0013 0.1320 0.0273 1 
1997 BATMAN 0.5893 0.7059 0.2403 0.2813 0.0434 0.1963 0.4520 0.4340 10.8723 86.8442 0.1840 0.0037 0.2896 0.0192 0 
1997 BAYBURT 0.1749 0.0584 0.1215 0.2202 0.4084 0.5247 0.0417 0.0145 35.5377 92.6166 0.3099 0.0026 0.0566 0.0446 0 
1997 BİLECİK 0.0386 0.1236 0.7020 0.1201 0.1085 0.0529 0.9048 0.0106 94.6193 81.3487 0.2552 0.0019 0.1762 0.0163 0 
1997 BİNGÖL 0.3308 0.1135 0.1000 0.2982 0.1784 0.4050 0.0299 0.1287 366.8032 92.2878 0.3186 0.0041 0.1252 0.0377 0 
1997 BİTLİS 0.4581 0.1605 0.1008 0.4487 0.1093 0.4086 0.0170 0.1370 5.0872 95.0137 0.2676 0.0042 0.1455 0.0318 0 
1997 BOLU 0.0906 0.1253 0.3777 0.2546 0.1422 0.2332 0.5237 0.0116 53.3005 90.6743 0.3534 0.0017 0.1590 0.0428 1 
1997 BURDUR 0.1847 0.1457 0.3492 0.2613 0.2379 0.2879 0.3932 0.0089 26.5315 92.8111 0.3183 0.0014 0.1040 0.0287 0 
1997 BURSA 0.0696 0.1566 0.5033 0.0740 0.2951 0.1601 0.5820 0.0172 88.5141 91.5617 0.7802 0.0014 0.1354 0.0137 0 
1997 ÇANAKKALE 0.0930 0.1686 0.4971 0.2199 0.1728 0.1686 0.6877 0.0105 68.9935 85.4958 0.3338 0.0014 0.1865 0.0144 0 
1997 ÇANKIRI 0.1252 0.0622 0.1901 0.2992 0.1580 0.3242 0.3195 0.0073 11.9406 91.6056 0.2788 0.0026 0.0968 0.0181 1 
1997 ÇORUM 0.1082 0.0795 0.3097 0.2275 0.1744 0.3133 0.4801 0.0076 62.4502 89.5075 0.2374 0.0014 0.1014 0.0268 0 
1997 DENİZLİ 0.1185 0.1743 0.4562 0.2153 0.3480 0.2008 0.5860 0.0192 42.3414 91.7179 0.3969 0.0014 0.1413 0.0230 0 
1997 DİYARBAKIR 0.6370 0.6968 0.2133 0.2665 0.0871 0.3230 0.1767 0.4590 68.0001 83.5871 0.1933 0.0027 0.2051 0.0171 0 
1997 DÜZCE   1 
1997 EDİRNE 0.0762 0.1242 0.3566 0.3078 0.2899 0.1865 0.5258 0.0113 53.4827 92.3373 0.7819 0.0010 0.1933 0.0147 1 
1997 ELAZIĞ 0.1014 0.1803 0.2768 0.1528 0.1725 0.1400 0.6755 0.0494 21.8617 94.2863 0.3259 0.0039 0.2682 0.0272 0 
1997 ERZİNCAN 0.1218 0.0654 0.1919 0.3471 0.2149 0.3395 0.1686 0.0106 54.1143 87.6241 0.3361 0.0040 0.0883 0.0266 0 
1997 ERZURUM 0.2505 0.1281 0.1346 0.2121 0.1593 0.3656 0.1977 0.0617 36.0351 86.0919 0.4525 0.0032 0.1347 0.0310 0 
1997 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1069 0.1390 0.4270 0.1233 0.3160 0.2262 0.5674 0.0085 55.8286 91.9269 0.6316 0.0015 0.1309 0.0373 0 
1997 GAZİANTEP 0.0780 0.1252 0.3302 0.1109 0.1814 0.2147 0.6252 0.0548 34.6957 91.3865 0.3984 0.0018 0.2199 0.0183 0 
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1997 GİRESUN 0.1827 0.1175 0.2149 0.3448 0.3441 0.3505 0.4099 0.0109 8.8798 84.8432 0.3079 0.0016 0.1382 0.0502 0 
1997 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2100 0.0784 0.1544 0.3130 0.2813 0.4265 0.2064 0.0118 101.4780 94.5055 0.2654 0.0027 0.0817 0.0439 0 
1997 HAKKARİ 0.5521 0.3266 0.0674 0.3249 0.0996 0.5245 0.0067 0.4608 48.7157 91.2756 0.5482 0.0076 0.1646 0.0768 0 
1997 HATAY 0.1624 0.1217 0.3471 0.2134 0.2151 0.1184 0.7821 0.0257 16.9880 91.2621 0.5472 0.0017 0.1441 0.0204 0 
1997 IĞDIR 0.5911 0.3341 0.1180 0.5122 0.2463 0.5311 0.0445 0.0884 163.3485 86.5798 0.4089 0.0034 0.1772 0.0141 0 
1997 ISPARTA 0.0721 0.0866 0.2831 0.2456 0.2994 0.1653 0.5750 0.2975 61.4902 92.0329 0.4403 0.0019 0.1357 0.0258 0 
1997 İÇEL 0.3093 0.2142 0.4353 0.2071 0.1738 0.2336 0.5835 0.0109 51.9471 93.1290 0.5432 0.0016 0.1288 0.0233 0 
1997 İSTANBUL 0.2524 0.3769 0.6205 0.0067 0.8255 0.2321 0.5575 0.0403 34.9525 84.9675 1.6427 0.0010 0.2357 0.0050 1 
1997 İZMİR 0.0913 0.2128 0.6292 0.0562 0.3424 0.1476 0.6798 0.0436 42.9990 90.6457 0.9868 0.0014 0.2185 0.0126 0 
1997 K.MARAŞ 0.1238 0.1512 0.2324 0.2707 0.1116 0.1267 0.6507 0.0176 33.9494 88.7773 0.3167 0.0024 0.2872 0.0291 0 
1997 KARABÜK 0.0991 0.1093 0.7569 0.0439 0.2324 0.2543 0.5768 0.0118 7.1360 77.9611 0.2261 0.0018 0.1313 0.0211 1 
1997 KARAMAN 0.0686 0.0586 0.4278 0.6027 0.1634 0.2438 0.3879 0.0079 29.8241 77.0027 0.2050 0.0019 0.1186 0.0365 1 
1997 KARS 0.3913 0.2424 0.1154 0.3269 0.2237 0.3029 0.3624 0.1750 31.8313 87.1108 0.3661 0.0038 0.1222 0.0323 0 
1997 KASTAMONU 0.1092 0.0924 0.3031 0.3140 0.1774 0.2625 0.5259 0.0149 69.2917 90.8723 0.3510 0.0027 0.0927 0.0396 0 
1997 KAYSERİ 0.0849 0.1190 0.2878 0.1337 0.3149 0.2019 0.6446 0.0106 20.1598 90.7365 0.5990 0.0020 0.1450 0.0291 0 
1997 KIRIKKALE 0.1293 0.1006 0.3919 0.1004 0.0755 0.1736 0.6558 0.0094 68.2820 95.6184 0.6217 0.0042 0.2467 0.0723 1 
1997 KIRKLARELİ 0.2025 0.5676 0.6354 0.1187 0.1768 0.1082 0.7834 0.0103 33.4362 93.0533 0.4100 0.0016 0.2103 0.0135 1 
1997 KIRŞEHİR 0.1530 0.1181 0.2548 0.3150 0.3063 0.3349 0.3958 0.0249 30.4324 91.3297 0.3335 0.0032 0.1128 0.0259 0 
1997 KİLİS 0.3244 0.1642 0.3637 0.2248 0.0794 0.5247 0.0941 0.0085 15.4310 86.7841 0.1284 0.0020 0.0978 0.0182 0 
1997 KOCAELİ 0.1118 0.3428 1.0000 0.0259 0.1092 0.0987 0.7247 0.0308 69.9100 98.2589 3.8333 0.0016 0.2983 0.0175 1 
1997 KONYA 0.0894 0.0647 0.2760 0.2804 0.1738 0.1527 0.6650 0.0245 28.6097 86.4075 0.3610 0.0027 0.1022 0.0261 1 
1997 KÜTAHYA 0.1221 0.1069 0.3101 0.1655 0.1565 0.1652 0.6060 0.0079 30.9979 92.7749 0.4095 0.0014 0.1454 0.0161 0 
1997 MALATYA 0.1765 0.1449 0.2494 0.1932 0.1732 0.2477 0.5209 0.0230 37.2633 77.8240 0.2789 0.0022 0.1800 0.0416 0 
1997 MANİSA 0.0950 0.1029 0.5498 0.1975 0.1529 0.2462 0.4774 0.0356 18.0347 91.0129 0.2678 0.0012 0.1471 0.0193 0 
1997 MARDİN 0.6447 0.8165 0.1715 0.3081 0.0673 0.1461 0.3128 0.2526 3.3622 84.0914 0.1907 0.0029 0.2277 0.0234 0 
1997 MUĞLA 0.1490 0.2391 0.5735 0.1729 0.2383 0.2668 0.2684 0.0158 152.4619 88.2089 0.3500 0.0013 0.1018 0.0301 0 
1997 MUŞ 0.4620 0.1964 0.0819 0.5309 0.1006 0.2837 0.1272 0.3180 100.0992 89.5090 0.2661 0.0030 0.1752 0 
1997 NEVŞEHİR 0.1206 0.1555 0.4427 0.3747 0.2116 0.1641 0.2130 0.0093 37.8431 89.9226 0.1971 0.0022 0.0808 0.0229 0 
1997 NİĞDE 0.1038 0.1158 0.3071 0.4703 0.1335 0.1503 0.4741 0.0089 33.9116 93.3095 0.3132 0.0027 0.1043 0.0250 0 
1997 ORDU 0.1395 0.0795 0.1941 0.4126 0.2285 0.3571 0.4343 0.0176 11.7868 90.5734 0.3389 0.0016 0.1372 0.0595 0 
1997 OSMANİYE 0.2247 0.0269 0.2247 0.2895 0.0778 0.2611 0.4936 0.0162 4.5331 85.5390 0.1730 0.0017 0.0566 0.0100 0 
 73
Year Province tlr tlpc gdpcr agrgdpr depositr resecr indecr depr pie trrr trpgdp pnps tur lwlps dumjp 
1997 RİZE 0.1755 0.1809 0.2915 0.2049 0.1942 0.3664 0.5883 0.0114 25.8086 92.0710 0.6024 0.0015 0.1335 0.0398 0 
1997 SAKARYA 0.1521 0.1553 0.3823 0.1776 0.1911 0.2953 0.4344 0.0147 19.0350 85.0801 0.3668 0.0019 0.1771 0.0242 1 
1997 SAMSUN 0.2091 0.1803 0.3083 0.2400 0.2442 0.3515 0.4167 0.0099 74.3569 93.1221 0.5255 0.0020 0.1304 0.0315 0 
1997 SİİRT 0.4327 0.4068 0.1491 0.2957 0.0805 0.1664 0.4999 0.2212 3.2805 90.8383 0.2055 0.0048 0.2394 0.0594 0 
1997 SİNOP 0.2341 0.1525 0.2424 0.3106 0.2757 0.4807 0.2239 0.0179 68.6345 93.5017 0.2769 0.0021 0.0954 0.0461 0 
1997 SİVAS 0.1030 0.0643 0.2161 0.2014 0.2944 0.3294 0.4470 0.0068 129.8029 71.1931 0.3586 0.0022 0.0762 0.0251 0 
1997 ŞANLIURFA 0.4899 0.6068 0.1969 0.4051 0.0700 0.1954 0.1552 0.1656 86.6498 93.7924 0.0548 0.0018 0.2406 0.0085 0 
1997 ŞIRNAK 0.7349 0.7489 0.1058 0.3897 0.0773 0.1868 0.0042 0.2408 17.4520 93.0457 6.3199 0.0035 0.3641 0.0387 0 
1997 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1188 0.2784 0.5414 0.1331 0.2605 0.1141 0.7221 0.0169 51.3781 88.6485 0.1238 0.2675 0.0107 1 
1997 TOKAT 0.2388 0.1164 0.2353 0.2346 0.1118 0.3635 0.4103 0.0070 10.3197 90.4914 0.5355 0.0022 0.1239 0.0251 0 
1997 TRABZON 0.2192 0.1350 0.2334 0.2586 0.3259 0.4290 0.2011 0.0078 38.2190 93.3232 0.0329 0.0024 0.1289 0.0426 0 
1997 TUNCELİ 0.2565 0.1603 0.1519 0.4206 0.2919 0.3066 0.0518 0.1337 260.9042 94.3828 4.0026 0.0053 0.1088 0.0474 0 
1997 UŞAK 0.0882 0.1267 0.2876 0.2693 0.5178 0.1851 0.6504 0.0130 14.8369 93.1248 0.4081 0.0015 0.1611 0.0222 0 
1997 VAN 0.4712 0.2539 0.1103 0.2135 0.1190 0.3867 0.1959 0.3571 27.3125 92.9285 0.4363 0.0040 0.1830 0.0347 0 
1997 YALOVA 0.1400 0.1754 0.8073 0.0565 0.1980 0.3786 0.2907 0.0323 19.6203 92.0835 0.2879 0.0010 0.1717 0.0078 0 
1997 YOZGAT 0.1756 0.1031 0.1543 0.3808 0.3017 0.3080 0.4189 0.0095 37.3836 92.2939 0.2934 0.0018 0.1420 0.0191 0 
1997 ZONGULDAK 0.1145 0.1421 0.3641 0.0910 0.2709 0.0847 0.8596 0.0119 31.5901 89.1441 0.8869 0.0020 0.2458 0.0081 1 
1998 ADANA 0.2445 0.1980 0.4844 0.1277 0.2293 0.1979 0.6178 0.0737 12.9050 83.2763 0.4974 0.0015 0.1457 0.0280 0 
1998 ADIYAMAN 0.1443 0.1143 0.1857 0.2602 0.1042 0.1920 0.4944 0.0752 15.4431 87.3582 0.1762 0.0023 0.2003 0.0211 0 
1998 AFYON 0.0934 0.0683 0.2282 0.3389 0.2798 0.2117 0.4897 0.0112 16.9925 86.4283 0.3162 0.0013 0.1157 0.0286 0 
1998 AĞRI 0.4608 0.2287 0.0763 0.4755 0.1780 0.4630 0.0968 0.3373 11.3985 96.0226 0.6600 0.0028 0.1742 0.0236 0 
1998 AKSARAY 0.1718 0.1060 0.1999 0.4626 0.4264 0.3795 0.1331 0.0108 18.8559 89.4188 0.3771 0.0024 0.1068 0.0253 0 
1998 AMASYA 0.1543 0.1482 0.2801 0.3911 0.1665 0.2955 0.4207 0.0089 5.3968 91.4990 0.3130 0.0026 0.1301 0.0315 0 
1998 ANKARA 0.2096 0.2980 0.5457 0.0482 1.1099 0.3521 0.2628 0.0157 70.8401 94.1818 1.8120 0.0019 0.1488 0.0168 1 
1998 ANTALYA 0.1523 0.1627 0.4489 0.1820 0.3059 0.1814 0.4461 0.0248 63.1235 87.0271 0.4103 0.0011 0.0882 0.0498 0 
1998 ARDAHAN 0.5005 0.2177 0.1108 0.4871 0.2349 0.3638 0.0686 0.0784 10.3724 94.2077 0.5368 0.0021 0.1565 0.0589 0 
1998 ARTVİN 0.1816 0.2070 0.5230 0.1373 0.1477 0.2477 0.5648 0.0129 712.2868 90.0690 0.2580 0.0020 0.1514 0.0537 0 
1998 AYDIN 0.1277 0.1488 0.4685 0.2592 0.2644 0.3387 0.2680 0.0374 23.7981 91.4279 0.2975 0.0012 0.1103 0.0233 0 
1998 BALIKESİR 0.0947 0.1241 0.3959 0.2651 0.2856 0.2867 0.4212 0.0104 36.7129 86.1000 0.4743 0.0010 0.1582 0.0215 0 
1998 BARTIN 0.1770 0.1785 0.1568 0.2528 0.4112 0.3790 0.4309 0.0140 17.8749 86.8561 0.5841 0.0014 0.1142 0.0287 1 
1998 BATMAN 0.5898 0.8017 0.2506 0.2393 0.0504 0.1886 0.3842 0.4340 10.3526 84.0645 0.1543 0.0036 0.2780 0.0189 0 
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1998 BAYBURT 0.1382 0.0510 0.1277 0.3119 0.2822 0.5844 0.0350 0.0145 9.9755 92.2615 0.3165 0.0024 0.0615 0.0422 0 
1998 BİLECİK 0.0647 0.1864 0.6775 0.1377 0.1217 0.0366 0.9272 0.0106 144.6934 84.8132 0.2582 0.0018 0.1691 0.0177 0 
1998 BİNGÖL 0.3399 0.1274 0.1020 0.3633 0.1844 0.4218 0.0278 0.1287 310.9524 91.6867 0.2785 0.0036 0.1255 0.0344 0 
1998 BİTLİS 0.4652 0.1816 0.0954 0.4545 0.0814 0.3921 0.0171 0.1370 15.8508 91.7858 0.2456 0.0040 0.1551 0.0321 0 
1998 BOLU 0.1205 0.1722 0.4100 0.3767 0.1518 0.2060 0.5990 0.0116 43.1630 90.0737 0.3405 0.2661 0.0264 1 
1998 BURDUR 0.1741 0.1531 0.3861 0.2938 0.2479 0.2841 0.4090 0.0089 18.3695 93.0931 0.2941 0.0013 0.1087 0.0265 0 
1998 BURSA 0.0913 0.2059 0.5445 0.0994 0.2926 0.1660 0.7069 0.0172 226.6277 93.0164 0.7642 0.0013 0.1337 0.0177 0 
1998 ÇANAKKALE 0.1151 0.1963 0.4840 0.2751 0.1997 0.1658 0.6481 0.0105 66.1845 83.7871 0.3241 0.0016 0.1766 0.0142 0 
1998 ÇANKIRI 0.0948 0.0488 0.2183 0.3585 0.1507 0.3547 0.3206 0.0073 9.6060 93.7170 0.2552 0.0026 0.0986 0.0181 1 
1998 ÇORUM 0.1268 0.0993 0.3389 0.2334 0.1680 0.3215 0.4522 0.0076 67.0441 87.6512 0.2095 0.0014 0.1064 0.0281 0 
1998 DENİZLİ 0.1142 0.1831 0.4818 0.1886 0.3669 0.2017 0.5204 0.0192 32.9587 90.6377 0.3698 0.0013 0.1510 0.0227 0 
1998 DİYARBAKIR 0.6737 0.8509 0.2290 0.2483 0.0903 0.3376 0.0773 0.4590 64.2860 85.0242 0.1692 0.0028 0.2175 0.0188 0 
1998 DÜZCE   1 
1998 EDİRNE 0.0982 0.1650 0.4328 0.3699 0.2516 0.2037 0.5094 0.0113 33.4992 89.8801 0.6439 0.0011 0.1986 0.0162 1 
1998 ELAZIĞ 0.1339 0.2488 0.3021 0.1851 0.1749 0.1353 0.6747 0.0494 46.6861 93.3526 0.2857 0.0036 0.2063 0.0269 0 
1998 ERZİNCAN 0.1153 0.0655 0.2085 0.3551 0.2101 0.3320 0.1652 0.0106 26.1919 90.3898 0.3003 0.0039 0.0848 0.0027 0 
1998 ERZURUM 0.2731 0.1513 0.1379 0.2385 0.1618 0.3691 0.1825 0.0617 27.9128 86.7478 0.4250 0.0030 0.1371 0.0297 0 
1998 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1312 0.1615 0.5027 0.1240 0.2906 0.2539 0.5444 0.0085 54.8536 89.8205 0.5383 0.0014 0.1032 0.0134 0 
1998 GAZİANTEP 0.1594 0.2817 0.3322 0.0844 0.2123 0.1681 0.6233 0.0548 39.8311 88.5999 0.3653 0.0017 0.2227 0.0192 0 
1998 GİRESUN 0.1944 0.1428 0.2590 0.4035 0.2877 0.3383 0.4211 0.0109 44.3435 88.4227 0.2907 0.0015 0.1559 0.0503 0 
1998 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.1602 0.0620 0.1800 0.3649 0.1841 0.4409 0.1682 0.0118 42.7983 93.2005 0.2264 0.0026 0.0829 0.0433 0 
1998 HAKKARİ 0.5626 0.4070 0.0709 0.4914 0.1001 0.3131 0.0166 0.4608 17.1855 92.7461 0.6203 0.0072 0.1900 0.0733 0 
1998 HATAY 0.1935 0.1638 0.3556 0.2110 0.2581 0.1197 0.7623 0.0257 10.5764 94.1837 0.4872 0.0015 0.1580 0.0184 0 
1998 IĞDIR 0.5100 0.3243 0.1357 0.4813 0.2755 0.5458 0.0303 0.0884 39.5882 88.6964 0.4567 0.0033 0.1871 0.0132 0 
1998 ISPARTA 0.0719 0.0902 0.2893 0.3430 0.2981 0.1869 0.5432 0.2975 47.4741 92.1797 0.4128 0.0018 0.1390 0.0258 0 
1998 İÇEL 0.3167 0.2379 0.4507 0.2097 0.1705 0.2431 0.5571 0.0109 53.7515 91.7904 0.4663 0.0015 0.1075 0.0342 0 
1998 İSTANBUL 0.2416 0.3569 0.6282 0.0048 0.8771 0.2442 0.5373 0.0403 46.5808 85.1066 1.8807 0.0010 0.1780 0.0079 1 
1998 İZMİR 0.1026 0.2322 0.6511 0.0679 0.3549 0.1685 0.6487 0.0436 64.8712 91.0307 0.8787 0.0013 0.2013 0.0133 0 
1998 K.MARAŞ 0.0953 0.1253 0.2505 0.2216 0.1052 0.1328 0.6758 0.0176 28.8128 87.5955 0.2845 0.0023 0.2773 0.0291 0 
1998 KARABÜK 0.0687 0.1028 0.7852 0.0449 0.2354 0.2084 0.6521 0.0118 8.2640 90.5553 0.1733 0.0018 0.1281 0.0208 1 
1998 KARAMAN 0.0694 0.0636 0.4270 0.5351 0.1524 0.2587 0.3261 0.0079 16.7304 82.1777 0.1825 0.0017 0.1094 0.0367 1 
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1998 KARS 0.3632 0.2439 0.1354 0.3529 0.2147 0.2532 0.3665 0.1750 28.6731 91.0744 0.3236 0.0036 0.1803 0.0311 0 
1998 KASTAMONU 0.1341 0.1245 0.3160 0.3222 0.1969 0.2598 0.5250 0.0149 48.5218 93.3985 0.3527 0.0026 0.0933 0.0395 0 
1998 KAYSERİ 0.0850 0.1268 0.3026 0.1249 0.3353 0.2042 0.6303 0.0106 11.1943 92.9246 0.5757 0.0022 0.1380 0.0268 0 
1998 KIRIKKALE 0.2033 0.1685 0.3796 0.1074 0.0765 0.1924 0.6699 0.0094 38.6724 91.0891 0.4764 0.0039 0.1889 0.0745 1 
1998 KIRKLARELİ 0.1077 0.2552 0.6438 0.1144 0.1898 0.1069 0.8048 0.0103 43.4169 90.0391 0.4079 0.0016 0.1606 0.0134 1 
1998 KIRŞEHİR 0.1772 0.1472 0.2677 0.2871 0.3009 0.3043 0.4107 0.0249 22.4874 92.8095 0.2943 0.0030 0.1165 0.0258 0 
1998 KİLİS 0.2500 0.1416 0.3932 0.1939 0.0908 0.4612 0.0933 0.0085 7.5409 89.4198 0.1600 0.0018 0.1055 0.0177 0 
1998 KOCAELİ 0.1233 0.3470 1.0000 0.0255 0.1549 0.0965 0.7329 0.0308 35.4177 98.0008 3.1660 0.0015 0.2573 0.0170 1 
1998 KONYA 0.1166 0.0936 0.3057 0.2446 0.1717 0.2434 0.4573 0.0245 17.2173 86.0854 0.3217 0.0027 0.0997 0.0259 1 
1998 KÜTAHYA 0.1012 0.0897 0.3133 0.1592 0.1611 0.2247 0.3972 0.0079 14.9698 91.1610 0.3840 0.0013 0.1466 0.0159 0 
1998 MALATYA 0.1833 0.1575 0.2518 0.2086 0.1887 0.2558 0.4862 0.0230 30.0511 91.4275 0.2699 0.0020 0.1706 0.0408 0 
1998 MANİSA 0.1140 0.1288 0.5800 0.2408 0.1566 0.2326 0.4968 0.0356 14.5197 91.9453 0.2736 0.0012 0.1445 0.0195 0 
1998 MARDİN 0.6300 0.9606 0.1899 0.3310 0.0750 0.1636 0.2751 0.2526 2.6618 83.8309 0.1664 0.0028 0.2541 0.0230 0 
1998 MUĞLA 0.1585 0.2847 0.6092 0.2285 0.2565 0.2302 0.2470 0.0158 133.3841 85.9445 0.3364 0.0013 0.0978 0.0605 0 
1998 MUŞ 0.5034 0.2358 0.0847 0.4845 0.1087 0.2894 0.1213 0.3180 54.0488 88.7962 0.2384 0.0030 0.1764 0 
1998 NEVŞEHİR 0.0981 0.1468 0.4308 0.4130 0.2303 0.1654 0.1787 0.0093 66.6754 89.9324 0.1892 0.0021 0.0863 0.0227 0 
1998 NİĞDE 0.0937 0.1225 0.3209 0.5986 0.1472 0.1268 0.4516 0.0089 26.9245 91.8386 0.2794 0.0025 0.1060 0.0248 0 
1998 ORDU 0.1263 0.0794 0.2075 0.3735 0.2425 0.3888 0.3656 0.0176 14.3795 91.7049 0.3508 0.0015 0.1872 0.0597 0 
1998 OSMANİYE  0.0000 0.2019 0.2446 0.1187 0.0162 6.6196 89.7473 0.1984 0 
1998 RİZE 0.1566 0.1788 0.3149 0.1635 0.2057 0.3146 0.4667 0.0114 41.5432 92.7644 0.5434 0.0014 0.1088 0.0372 0 
1998 SAKARYA 0.1821 0.2031 0.4104 0.2440 0.1854 0.3109 0.3858 0.0147 15.2382 84.3088 0.3338 0.0018 0.1453 0.0237 1 
1998 SAMSUN 0.1656 0.1650 0.3507 0.2088 0.2299 0.3497 0.2938 0.0099 43.0623 93.5533 0.3807 0.0019 0.1435 0.0304 0 
1998 SİİRT 0.4152 0.4630 0.1531 0.2284 0.0780 0.1976 0.4728 0.2212 4.9362 91.4936 0.1984 0.0047 0.2466 0.0594 0 
1998 SİNOP 0.2278 0.1692 0.2621 0.2989 0.2816 0.4839 0.2300 0.0179 75.7026 91.3537 0.2730 0.0020 0.0968 0.0454 0 
1998 SİVAS 0.1429 0.1041 0.2375 0.1974 0.2770 0.3009 0.4852 0.0068 225.7204 91.1985 0.3408 0.0021 0.0874 0.0251 0 
1998 ŞANLIURFA 0.3599 0.5272 0.2014 0.3716 0.0792 0.1662 0.1585 0.1656 67.5373 94.0709 0.0804 0.0019 0.2456 0.0090 0 
1998 ŞIRNAK 0.6340 0.8177 0.1024 0.3296 0.0854 0.1288 0.5212 0.2408 17.3928 91.9046 6.2146 0.0034 0.4409 0.0427 0 
1998 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1247 0.3113 0.5629 0.1470 0.2672 0.1167 0.6961 0.0169 41.6094 90.5623 0.1182 0.0012 0.2561 0.0103 1 
1998 TOKAT 0.1903 0.1047 0.2825 0.2687 0.0974 0.3915 0.3890 0.0070 10.3650 90.3091 0.4404 0.0022 0.1270 0.0003 0 
1998 TRABZON 0.2034 0.1381 0.2421 0.2048 0.3274 0.4457 0.1906 0.0078 28.6457 95.8054 0.0320 0.0022 0.1545 0.0423 0 
1998 TUNCELİ 0.2594 0.1886 0.1749 0.3691 0.3427 0.2968 0.0450 0.1337 332.6652 92.3077 4.2512 0.0049 0.1122 0.0482 0 
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1998 UŞAK 0.1192 0.1823 0.3083 0.2576 0.5246 0.1917 0.6268 0.0130 7.8707 90.6241 0.3897 0.0014 0.1734 0.0218 0 
1998 VAN 0.5381 0.3151 0.1206 0.2371 0.1138 0.2859 0.1200 0.3571 15.4445 91.5227 0.3937 0.0037 0.1594 0.0320 0 
1998 YALOVA 0.1200 0.1712 0.8291 0.0478 0.2133 0.1419 0.7093 0.0323 13.1261 89.6332 0.2562 0.0010 0.1955 0.0085 0 
1998 YOZGAT 0.1584 0.0982 0.1751 0.4183 0.2658 0.3032 0.4091 0.0095 26.0489 90.1408 0.2934 0.0017 0.1415 0.0200 0 
1998 ZONGULDAK 0.1396 0.1787 0.3686 0.1007 0.3068 0.0990 0.8234 0.0119 30.8633 92.9531 0.7789 0.0020 0.2501 0.0083 1 
1999 ADANA 0.2352 0.2052 0.5192 0.1277 0.3436 0.2088 0.6062 0.0737 10.2332 80.3364 0.4502 0.0014 0.1371 0.0293 0 
1999 ADIYAMAN 0.1163 0.0920 0.2012 0.2307 0.1487 0.2104 0.6090 0.0752 13.6056 84.7920 0.1496 0.0024 0.1934 0.0215 0 
1999 AFYON 0.1024 0.0786 0.2505 0.3631 0.3432 0.2205 0.4817 0.0112 12.4214 80.5340 0.2757 0.0012 0.1170 0.0225 0 
1999 AĞRI 0.3771 0.2256 0.0964 0.5858 0.1504 0.3410 0.0943 0.3373 7.5868 96.7582 1.0943 0.0029 0.2115 0.0236 0 
1999 AKSARAY 0.1822 0.1226 0.2178 0.4272 0.5203 0.3759 0.1359 0.0108 14.9454 85.6751 0.2808 0.0024 0.0835 0.0329 0 
1999 AMASYA 0.1838 0.1906 0.3095 0.3630 0.2162 0.3210 0.3784 0.0089 20.2501 87.0577 0.2924 0.0026 0.1348 0.0319 0 
1999 ANKARA 0.1943 0.2836 0.5829 0.0515 1.4625 0.3442 0.2424 0.0157 50.3472 92.2943 1.9350 0.0017 0.1488 0.0178 1 
1999 ANTALYA 0.1424 0.1558 0.4607 0.1759 0.4311 0.2767 0.1953 0.0248 52.0382 80.7447 0.3693 0.0011 0.0918 0.0466 0 
1999 ARDAHAN 0.4823 0.2549 0.1364 0.6107 0.3407 0.6053 0.0265 0.0784 16.1479 96.1256 1.3366 0.0023 0.1755 0.0602 0 
1999 ARTVİN 0.1919 0.2302 0.4432 0.2410 0.2355 0.2518 0.5616 0.0129 315.7971 90.1946 0.4893 0.0018 0.1422 0.0538 0 
1999 AYDIN 0.0826 0.0969 0.4643 0.2363 0.3675 0.3767 0.2232 0.0374 40.0481 85.6501 0.2920 0.0011 0.1051 0.0245 0 
1999 BALIKESİR 0.0978 0.1330 0.4127 0.2258 0.3983 0.2794 0.4121 0.0104 41.8105 80.5882 0.5620 0.0009 0.1653 0.0208 0 
1999 BARTIN 0.1731 0.1917 0.1777 0.2583 0.6690 0.3766 0.4082 0.0140 34.2389 85.7881 0.5429 0.2191 0.0214 1 
1999 BATMAN 0.6068 0.9569 0.2401 0.2070 0.0722 0.1643 0.3899 0.4340 5.7935 88.6219 0.2007 0.0034 0.2539 0.0194 0 
1999 BAYBURT 0.1896 0.0792 0.1643 0.3670 0.2647 0.5298 0.0378 0.0145 51.2022 86.0465 0.2183 0.0025 0.0673 0.0413 0 
1999 BİLECİK 0.0562 0.1443 0.7638 0.1338 0.1566 0.0430 0.9241 0.0106 81.4963 78.4338 0.1933 0.0018 0.1479 0.0174 0 
1999 BİNGÖL 0.3987 0.1804 0.1212 0.4393 0.1962 0.4541 0.0374 0.1287 291.7804 87.2080 0.2246 0.0036 0.1404 0.0333 0 
1999 BİTLİS 0.4872 0.2276 0.1087 0.5056 0.1064 0.3692 0.0180 0.1370 14.9762 88.1043 0.2090 0.0037 0.1827 0.0316 0 
1999 BOLU 0.0991 0.0869 0.4586 0.4221 0.1297 0.1531 0.6706 0.0116 34.3121 81.7208 0.2496 0.0018 0.1767 0.0260 1 
1999 BURDUR 0.1739 0.1665 0.4271 0.2804 0.3183 0.2921 0.3966 0.0089 10.2767 90.4300 0.2680 0.0016 0.1141 0.0292 0 
1999 BURSA 0.1428 0.2539 0.5899 0.1109 0.3702 0.1501 0.7132 0.0172 58.4536 89.5043 0.6575 0.0012 0.0885 0.0139 0 
1999 ÇANAKKALE 0.1111 0.1856 0.5276 0.2454 0.2533 0.1940 0.5977 0.0105 48.2450 82.1471 0.2753 0.0016 0.1736 0.0139 0 
1999 ÇANKIRI 0.1585 0.0861 0.2334 0.3367 0.2017 0.3689 0.3165 0.0073 2.0634 88.2625 0.2326 0.0024 0.0978 0.0172 1 
1999 ÇORUM 0.1293 0.1073 0.3646 0.2323 0.2373 0.3342 0.4306 0.0076 124.9851 84.4941 0.1968 0.0014 0.0872 0.0195 0 
1999 DENİZLİ 0.0974 0.1517 0.5374 0.1847 0.4784 0.2072 0.5914 0.0192 29.9780 82.9983 0.3416 0.0012 0.1406 0.0225 0 
1999 DİYARBAKIR 0.7155 1.0381 0.2328 0.2473 0.1312 0.3303 0.0756 0.4590 46.4525 81.9567 0.1697 0.0024 0.2549 0.0188 0 
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1999 DÜZCE 0.2043 0.3054 0.4819  0.0012 0.1380 0.0269 1 
1999 EDİRNE 0.1377 0.2436 0.4496 0.3551 0.3460 0.2374 0.4937 0.0113 33.5133 91.6341 0.5927 0.4835 0.0146 1 
1999 ELAZIĞ 0.1242 0.2313 0.3200 0.2404 0.2278 0.1577 0.6338 0.0494 19.9190 89.6514 0.2796 0.0036 0.2001 0.0266 0 
1999 ERZİNCAN 0.1336 0.0806 0.2320 0.4028 0.2829 0.3484 0.1412 0.0106 84.2001 85.3136 0.2652 0.0039 0.0872 0.0257 0 
1999 ERZURUM 0.2866 0.1822 0.1668 0.3203 0.1847 0.3461 0.1700 0.0617 38.1887 81.8516 0.3493 0.0030 0.1539 0.0293 0 
1999 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1652 0.1781 0.5256 0.1343 0.4206 0.2728 0.5134 0.0085 53.2221 87.1827 0.4780 0.0013 0.0898 0.0132 0 
1999 GAZİANTEP 0.1820 0.3331 0.3541 0.1017 0.3319 0.1680 0.6149 0.0548 35.2713 84.5000 0.3682 0.0015 0.2033 0.0212 0 
1999 GİRESUN 0.1019 0.0828 0.2879 0.3790 0.3767 0.3169 0.3349 0.0109 38.5306 86.4308 0.3244 0.0014 0.1506 0.0449 0 
1999 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2074 0.0865 0.2097 0.4495 0.2047 0.4948 0.1283 0.0118 51.2016 87.5212 0.1926 0.0026 0.0835 0.0418 0 
1999 HAKKARİ 0.5415 0.4885 0.0721 0.4655 0.1363 0.3951 0.0223 0.4608 14.3711 96.9124 1.5992 0.0090 0.2215 0.0798 0 
1999 HATAY 0.2346 0.2169 0.3897 0.1917 0.3800 0.1253 0.7103 0.0257 11.6410 83.7187 0.4277 0.0013 0.1400 0.0180 0 
1999 IĞDIR 0.6073 0.4575 0.1550 0.5262 0.3348 0.5542 0.0388 0.0884 37.1009 87.5943 0.5525 0.0028 0.1962 0.0138 0 
1999 ISPARTA 0.0954 0.1194 0.3172 0.3127 0.3795 0.1948 0.5171 0.2975 30.0010 89.5268 0.4249 0.0018 0.1375 0.0252 0 
1999 İÇEL 0.3129 0.2556 0.4941 0.2170 0.2445 0.2626 0.5137 0.0109 48.2473 87.9088 0.4269 0.0012 0.1094 0.0325 0 
1999 İSTANBUL 0.2211 0.3226 0.6628 0.0049 1.2201 0.2719 0.5232 0.0403 49.7936 82.1386 1.9055 0.0009 0.1676 0.0081 1 
1999 İZMİR 0.1005 0.2285 0.6846 0.0623 0.5060 0.1887 0.6141 0.0436 43.5825 88.2198 0.8298 0.0012 0.1967 0.0133 0 
1999 K.MARAŞ 0.1124 0.1562 0.2783 0.2094 0.1361 0.1424 0.6615 0.0176 29.1578 86.8087 0.2308 0.0021 0.2011 0.0275 0 
1999 KARABÜK 0.0801 0.1296 0.9051 0.0400 0.3043 0.2060 0.6410 0.0118 16.9466 74.9381 0.1439 0.0018 0.1465 0.0205 1 
1999 KARAMAN 0.0628 0.0626 0.4667 0.5404 0.1817 0.2464 0.2976 0.0079 10.8260 81.5167 0.1479 0.0017 0.1146 0.0394 1 
1999 KARS 0.3688 0.2692 0.1532 0.4184 0.2550 0.2477 0.3444 0.1750 35.1977 84.4248 0.2905 0.0033 0.1779 0.0299 0 
1999 KASTAMONU 0.1070 0.1039 0.3583 0.2944 0.2507 0.2738 0.4994 0.0149 51.8526 89.2570 0.3205 0.0026 0.0940 0.0391 0 
1999 KAYSERİ 0.0878 0.1197 0.3378 0.1395 0.4362 0.2228 0.5958 0.0106 16.2298 88.4121 0.5169 0.0020 0.1232 0.0257 0 
1999 KIRIKKALE 0.1267 0.1126 0.4964 0.0833 0.0795 0.1927 0.4906 0.0094 41.6606 93.6348 0.3751 0.0966 0.0739 1 
1999 KIRKLARELİ 0.1253 0.2844 0.6921 0.1185 0.2546 0.1285 0.7667 0.0103 32.0045 86.7188 0.3542 0.0015 0.1467 0.0126 1 
1999 KIRŞEHİR 0.1449 0.1202 0.2929 0.3026 0.3933 0.3440 0.4210 0.0249 38.4845 89.3332 0.2559 0.0028 0.1145 0.0250 0 
1999 KİLİS 0.3435 0.2305 0.4293 0.1783 0.1038 0.5396 0.1081 0.0085 17.4361 86.5930 0.1249 0.0018 0.1521 0.0175 0 
1999 KOCAELİ 0.1217 0.2891 1.0000 0.0311 0.2529 0.1268 0.7809 0.0308 40.6578 97.3541 3.4503 0.0013 0.1915 0.0182 1 
1999 KONYA 0.1254 0.1076 0.3204 0.2602 0.2275 0.1687 0.6167 0.0245 18.8634 81.2382 0.3142 0.0025 0.1067 0.0255 1 
1999 KÜTAHYA 0.0745 0.0670 0.3415 0.1738 0.1978 0.2419 0.5614 0.0079 33.6145 85.4750 0.3246 0.0012 0.1466 0.0157 0 
1999 MALATYA 0.1893 0.1669 0.2607 0.1598 0.2749 0.2834 0.3932 0.0230 29.0468 88.6934 0.2519 0.0019 0.1413 0.0473 0 
1999 MANİSA 0.0949 0.1090 0.6319 0.1859 0.2208 0.2628 0.4390 0.0356 5.2098 87.9653 0.2492 0.0011 0.1359 0.0193 0 
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1999 MARDİN 0.6371 1.2035 0.1904 0.2270 0.0958 0.1276 0.2885 0.2526 3.6118 81.8888 0.1851 0.0030 0.2996 0.0235 0 
1999 MUĞLA 0.1354 0.2484 0.6201 0.2187 0.3434 0.2558 0.3288 0.0158 227.0686 81.0285 0.3491 0.0013 0.0984 0.0584 0 
1999 MUŞ 0.5458 0.2993 0.1016 0.5543 0.1277 0.2759 0.1228 0.3180 49.0988 80.9982 0.1799 0.0030 0.1957 0.0284 0 
1999 NEVŞEHİR 0.0801 0.1329 0.4538 0.3590 0.2793 0.1671 0.1532 0.0093 40.5237 87.9840 0.1815 0.0019 0.0868 0.0224 0 
1999 NİĞDE 0.1113 0.1631 0.3749 0.6023 0.1847 0.1465 0.4115 0.0089 20.6887 89.2015 0.2633 0.0022 0.1001 0.0245 0 
1999 ORDU 0.1318 0.0885 0.2399 0.3515 0.3051 0.3902 0.3286 0.0176 35.6175 88.0924 0.2951 0.0013 0.2046 0.0596 0 
1999 OSMANİYE 0.1749 0.0714 0.2235 0.2579 0.1728 0.4717 0.2646 0.0162 3.9544 83.6103 0.1799 0.0017 0.1592 0.0100 0 
1999 RİZE 0.1597 0.2068 0.3827 0.2198 0.2412 0.3113 0.4898 0.0114 42.5580 90.8691 0.4508 0.0014 0.1481 0.0375 0 
1999 SAKARYA 0.1892 0.2143 0.4302 0.2327 0.2681 0.3493 0.3502 0.0147 19.6444 65.6636 0.2106 0.0017 0.1385 0.0253 1 
1999 SAMSUN 0.2100 0.2327 0.3834 0.2345 0.3303 0.3496 0.4278 0.0099 42.5086 90.3581 0.3928 0.0017 0.1416 0.0295 0 
1999 SİİRT 0.3577 0.4424 0.1895 0.1960 0.0964 0.1837 0.4074 0.2212 10.3102 87.8982 0.1598 0.0047 0.2512 0.0587 0 
1999 SİNOP 0.2145 0.1819 0.2938 0.2963 0.3772 0.4643 0.2154 0.0179 35.8072 86.9938 0.2676 0.0019 0.0800 0.0446 0 
1999 SİVAS 0.1260 0.0945 0.2720 0.2264 0.3274 0.3271 0.4514 0.0068 188.8096 78.3439 0.2713 0.0020 0.0866 0.0250 0 
1999 ŞANLIURFA 0.4424 0.7291 0.2113 0.3543 0.1070 0.3146 0.1250 0.1656 59.0734 91.7541 0.0789 0.0019 0.2463 0.0091 0 
1999 ŞIRNAK 0.6453 1.0923 0.0935 0.2733 0.1581 0.0980 0.7472 0.2408 5.4465 90.4135 6.8000 0.0036 0.5941 0.0657 0 
1999 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1251 0.3223 0.6533 0.1240 0.3103 0.1213 0.7447 0.0169 27.3059 85.5492 0.0980 0.0011 0.2406 0.0099 1 
1999 TOKAT 0.1817 0.1085 0.2917 0.2771 0.1441 0.3985 0.3669 0.0070 6.2467 86.9869 0.4496 0.0021 0.1285 0.0245 0 
1999 TRABZON 0.2150 0.1557 0.2875 0.2806 0.3815 0.4650 0.1747 0.0078 26.2395 92.9770 0.0286 0.0021 0.1517 0.0394 0 
1999 TUNCELİ 0.2882 0.2569 0.2137 0.4153 0.4080 0.3161 0.0922 0.1337 570.2263 88.4119 3.5610 0.0047 0.1101 0.0485 0 
1999 UŞAK 0.1179 0.1813 0.3283 0.2587 0.7169 0.2250 0.5982 0.0130 7.6191 87.0056 0.3535 0.0012 0.1572 0.0210 0 
1999 VAN 0.5585 0.3807 0.1325 0.2425 0.1514 0.4089 0.1549 0.3571 14.3499 92.3178 0.6056 0.0033 0.1419 0.0297 0 
1999 YALOVA 0.1708 0.2406 0.8908 0.0606 0.2620 0.1594 0.7245 0.0323 19.3175 83.1222 0.2075 0.0010 0.1981 0.0086 0 
1999 YOZGAT 0.1487 0.0988 0.1916 0.3903 0.3029 0.3237 0.3716 0.0095 11.2415 88.2357 0.4223 0.0016 0.1262 0.0215 0 
1999 ZONGULDAK 0.1417 0.1846 0.4012 0.0980 0.4294 0.1069 0.8146 0.0119 26.1541 91.7352 0.7455 0.1870 0.0085 1 
2000 ADANA 0.2357 0.2087 0.4417 0.1231 0.2987 0.2202 0.5169 0.0927 13.9340 80.6700 0.3545 0.0013 0.1463 0.0301 0 
2000 ADIYAMAN 0.2089 0.2187 0.1813 0.2254 0.1257 0.2056 0.5978 0.1193 18.7646 79.8537 0.1502 0.0021 0.2082 0.0020 0 
2000 AFYON 0.0993 0.0805 0.2340 0.2997 0.2780 0.2305 0.4881 0.0108 17.7760 80.3229 0.2311 0.0012 0.1135 0.0243 0 
2000 AĞRI 0.3689 0.2240 0.0800 0.6122 0.0975 0.4550 0.0672 0.3510 7.2605 93.8346 0.4951 0.0028 0.2103 0.0547 0 
2000 AKSARAY 0.1550 0.1021 0.1873 0.3997 0.3898 0.3499 0.1465 0.0163 12.3202 88.8502 0.2910 0.0024 0.0848 0.0328 0 
2000 AMASYA 0.1645 0.1635 0.2623 0.2972 0.1732 0.3237 0.3913 0.0131 43.9003 90.6687 0.2649 0.0025 0.1336 0.0314 0 
2000 ANKARA 0.2061 0.3072 0.5478 0.0466 1.3895 0.3524 0.2363 0.0242 43.9150 93.9518 1.5572 0.0017 0.1470 0.0180 1 
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2000 ANTALYA 0.1749 0.1949 0.3938 0.1598 0.3726 0.2792 0.1860 0.0279 46.1205 83.5391 0.3234 0.0010 0.0965 0.0644 0 
2000 ARDAHAN 0.4620 0.2422 0.1023 0.6480 0.2645 0.5773 0.0308 0.1618 24.3053 89.1731 0.4112 0.0023 0.1550 0.0582 0 
2000 ARTVİN 0.1762 0.2124 0.3547 0.2319 0.1879 0.2634 0.5316 0.0092 1,188.9808 87.2059 0.3281 0.0017 0.1524 0.0502 0 
2000 AYDIN 0.2251 0.2693 0.4353 0.2669 0.2806 0.3380 0.2293 0.0500 55.6479 86.8694 0.2223 0.1059 0.0239 0 
2000 BALIKESİR 0.1557 0.2306 0.3809 0.2734 0.3136 0.2628 0.4532 0.0161 48.6641 87.4281 0.4185 0.0009 0.1723 0.0203 0 
2000 BARTIN 0.2111 0.2228 0.1509 0.2755 0.5920 0.3874 0.2826 0.0150 38.7636 88.7688 0.5419 0.0012 0.1204 0.0256 1 
2000 BATMAN 0.5657 0.8601 0.1889 0.2096 0.0691 0.2090 0.3433 0.4716 6.8277 87.0772 0.1877 0.0032 0.2426 0.0181 0 
2000 BAYBURT 0.1376 0.0665 0.1361 0.4028 0.2105 0.4956 0.0247 0.0060 7.7667 86.2192 0.2045 0.0025 0.0786 0.0402 0 
2000 BİLECİK 0.0681 0.1857 0.6762 0.1377 0.1437 0.0391 0.9258 0.0105 90.2239 78.6615 0.1595 0.0019 0.1495 0.0171 0 
2000 BİNGÖL 0.3966 0.1915 0.1033 0.4880 0.1543 0.4909 0.0199 0.2212 252.0257 84.0953 0.1865 0.0036 0.1458 0.0326 0 
2000 BİTLİS 0.4496 0.2179 0.0827 0.5681 0.0988 0.4044 0.0191 0.2956 15.9798 89.4283 0.2159 0.0039 0.1965 0.0315 0 
2000 BOLU 0.0873 0.1711 0.7261 0.3814 0.1421 0.2010 0.6093 0.0140 31.2315 60.3174 0.0840 0.0018 0.1893 0.0262 1 
2000 BURDUR 0.1693 0.1670 0.3700 0.2532 0.2400 0.3061 0.3696 0.0084 15.5258 91.9936 0.2185 0.0017 0.1107 0.0285 0 
2000 BURSA 0.1633 0.2619 0.5486 0.0929 0.3349 0.1374 0.7423 0.0210 73.1608 89.6078 0.6312 0.0011 0.0768 0.0152 0 
2000 ÇANAKKALE 0.1119 0.2003 0.5011 0.2282 0.1956 0.1914 0.5935 0.0101 57.2953 83.3649 0.2193 0.0015 0.1635 0.0139 0 
2000 ÇANKIRI 0.1109 0.0587 0.2060 0.3335 0.1713 0.3755 0.3061 0.0158 5.3675 90.7841 0.2123 0.0024 0.0975 0.0384 1 
2000 ÇORUM 0.1604 0.1342 0.3331 0.2185 0.1846 0.3292 0.4245 0.0193 105.4041 86.2745 0.1627 0.0013 0.1041 0.0195 0 
2000 DENİZLİ 0.0807 0.1326 0.4943 0.1418 0.3909 0.1904 0.6225 0.0184 27.3890 84.0001 0.2997 0.0012 0.1403 0.0221 0 
2000 DİYARBAKIR 0.6754 1.0748 0.2017 0.2339 0.1059 0.2489 0.1343 0.5618 51.3068 81.1771 0.1750 0.0023 0.2427 0.0248 0 
2000 DÜZCE 0.1890 0.2430 0.2523 0.2509 0.3404 0.3621 0.3431 0.0162 33.4091 56.7686 0.1281 0.0011 0.1663 0.0273 1 
2000 EDİRNE 0.1414 0.2378 0.4292 0.3750 0.2625 0.2426 0.4442 0.0088 37.7197 90.8604 0.3578 0.0010 0.1565 0.0144 1 
2000 ELAZIĞ 0.1369 0.2399 0.2526 0.2595 0.1924 0.1642 0.6212 0.0710 24.6147 88.1773 0.2734 0.0035 0.2013 0.0267 0 
2000 ERZİNCAN 0.1645 0.0917 0.1625 0.4312 0.2395 0.3309 0.1208 0.0136 32.1130 81.9471 0.2633 0.0040 0.0911 0.0255 0 
2000 ERZURUM 0.2600 0.1601 0.1405 0.3320 0.1591 0.3386 0.1991 0.0985 43.4685 83.1441 0.3398 0.0029 0.1637 0.0281 0 
2000 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1478 0.1697 0.4624 0.1173 0.3516 0.2678 0.5322 0.0124 41.7684 90.3808 0.3908 0.0012 0.0984 0.0128 0 
2000 GAZİANTEP 0.2021 0.3907 0.3100 0.1211 0.2109 0.1549 0.6257 0.0801 38.4091 83.3454 0.2866 0.0015 0.2557 0.0196 0 
2000 GİRESUN 0.1042 0.0820 0.2074 0.2876 0.3356 0.3126 0.4132 0.0129 86.2339 86.2196 0.2890 0.0013 0.1668 0.0446 0 
2000 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2024 0.0756 0.1571 0.5075 0.1506 0.4937 0.1364 0.0103 84.3384 87.8670 0.1664 0.0027 0.0888 0.0412 0 
2000 HAKKARİ 0.6516 0.7010 0.0731 0.6299 0.0949 0.2611 0.0104 0.4523 17.3400 93.3333 0.5435 0.0071 0.2506 0.0639 0 
2000 HATAY 0.2348 0.2356 0.3511 0.2198 0.3193 0.1495 0.7032 0.0343 12.6083 88.1786 0.5374 0.0013 0.1341 0.0185 0 
2000 IĞDIR 0.4871 0.3704 0.1243 0.4869 0.2895 0.4962 0.0254 0.3270 23.6078 80.6173 0.7735 0.0025 0.2407 0.0127 0 
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2000 ISPARTA 0.0885 0.1055 0.2546 0.3162 0.3300 0.2092 0.4849 0.0109 39.7171 89.8016 0.3553 0.0018 0.1355 0.0247 0 
2000 İÇEL 0.3468 0.2973 0.4254 0.2175 0.2642 0.2417 0.4949 0.0960 52.5672 90.6641 0.4334 0.0012 0.1165 0.0309 0 
2000 İSTANBUL 0.2365 0.3638 0.6044 0.0057 1.0804 0.2966 0.4603 0.0552 53.6196 89.0579 1.8794 0.0008 0.1738 0.0085 1 
2000 İZMİR 0.0893 0.2128 0.6123 0.0781 0.4194 0.1787 0.5911 0.0518 59.3477 90.5719 0.8026 0.0011 0.2046 0.0126 0 
2000 K.MARAŞ 0.1203 0.1901 0.2482 0.2229 0.1190 0.1440 0.6649 0.0319 278.6048 88.8261 0.2538 0.0020 0.2142 0.0232 0 
2000 KARABÜK 0.0658 0.1136 0.7894 0.0408 0.2480 0.1967 0.6460 0.0143 36.1381 74.6744 0.1370 0.0017 0.1638 0.0189 1 
2000 KARAMAN 0.1024 0.1001 0.3747 0.5302 0.1585 0.2471 0.3022 0.0125 13.3991 83.0408 0.1408 0.0016 0.0984 0.0383 1 
2000 KARS 0.4103 0.3329 0.1297 0.3733 0.2042 0.2946 0.3474 0.2008 38.0383 82.3698 0.2553 0.0033 0.1789 0.0304 0 
2000 KASTAMONU 0.0962 0.0909 0.3069 0.2785 0.2033 0.2950 0.4712 0.0141 59.0575 86.4672 0.2728 0.0025 0.0927 0.0385 0 
2000 KAYSERİ 0.0881 0.1250 0.3000 0.1239 0.3467 0.2349 0.5776 0.0155 17.4830 90.5288 0.4375 0.0018 0.1338 0.0252 0 
2000 KIRIKKALE 0.1671 0.1418 0.3698 0.0915 0.0763 0.2329 0.2887 0.0096 57.9925 94.5474 0.4793 0.0035 0.1822 0.0847 1 
2000 KIRKLARELİ 0.1756 0.4705 0.6418 0.1164 0.2030 0.1326 0.7142 0.0085 35.2608 86.2283 0.3261 0.0016 0.2453 0.0134 1 
2000 KIRŞEHİR 0.1536 0.1192 0.2490 0.2711 0.3092 0.3439 0.4437 0.0407 117.8585 89.1131 0.2142 0.0026 0.1063 0.0240 0 
2000 KİLİS 0.3315 0.2527 0.3960 0.2509 0.1184 0.4821 0.0822 0.0226 27.1335 84.1306 0.0832 0.0024 0.1353 0.0167 0 
2000 KOCAELİ 0.1334 0.3430 1.0000 0.0324 0.2181 0.1078 0.7896 0.0394 46.3665 93.7627 3.2286 0.0012 0.2028 0.0163 1 
2000 KONYA 0.1092 0.0906 0.2739 0.2485 0.1790 0.1713 0.5971 0.0315 28.1620 81.1099 0.2431 0.0024 0.1079 0.0251 1 
2000 KÜTAHYA 0.0714 0.0673 0.3017 0.1569 0.1716 0.2414 0.5539 0.0096 53.7285 84.8003 0.2696 0.0012 0.1503 0.0154 0 
2000 MALATYA 0.1866 0.1856 0.2536 0.1714 0.1926 0.2539 0.4616 0.0419 34.2596 84.8010 0.2138 0.0017 0.1561 0.0449 0 
2000 MANİSA 0.1136 0.1352 0.5950 0.1563 0.1657 0.2590 0.4340 0.0394 9.1216 88.3409 0.1881 0.0010 0.1325 0.0189 0 
2000 MARDİN 0.5830 1.1574 0.1632 0.2561 0.0853 0.1438 0.1842 0.3961 1.9448 82.7790 0.1723 0.0028 0.2958 0.0224 0 
2000 MUĞLA 0.1386 0.2602 0.6085 0.2282 0.2368 0.2546 0.2669 0.0172 114.7055 82.3231 0.2542 0.0012 0.0988 0.0590 0 
2000 MUŞ 0.5183 0.3318 0.0814 0.5524 0.1209 0.2821 0.1061 0.3789 58.9540 83.7611 0.1866 0.0027 0.2380 0.0253 0 
2000 NEVŞEHİR 0.0994 0.1603 0.3928 0.3535 0.2033 0.1616 0.1661 0.0116 17.7463 85.9644 0.1411 0.0019 0.0878 0.0230 0 
2000 NİĞDE 0.1389 0.1873 0.3079 0.5235 0.1489 0.1471 0.3547 0.0130 21.2787 89.8169 0.2109 0.0021 0.0966 0.0242 0 
2000 ORDU 0.1655 0.1173 0.1975 0.3206 0.2416 0.3853 0.4176 0.0144 43.9920 87.0655 0.2530 0.0013 0.1779 0.0635 0 
2000 OSMANİYE 0.1604 0.0682 0.1896 0.2514 0.1428 0.4757 0.2248 0.0217 21.9613 83.0339 0.1664 0.0017 0.1460 0.0095 0 
2000 RİZE 0.1536 0.1695 0.2933 0.2128 0.2046 0.3296 0.4506 0.0060 36.0759 90.6569 0.4052 0.0014 0.1396 0.0189 0 
2000 SAKARYA 0.1927 0.3418 0.4126 0.2450 0.2275 0.3189 0.3577 0.0168 55.7483 54.3379 0.1371 0.0015 0.1577 0.0235 1 
2000 SAMSUN 0.1785 0.1457 0.3280 0.2135 0.2619 0.3610 0.3931 0.0126 33.5969 91.7236 0.3607 0.0017 0.1454 0.0047 0 
2000 SİİRT 0.3760 0.5124 0.1748 0.2514 0.0722 0.2128 0.4302 0.3219 7.4177 87.3976 0.1420 0.0050 0.2538 0.0582 0 
2000 SİNOP 0.1937 0.1506 0.2357 0.2961 0.2887 0.4789 0.2135 0.0161 51.3961 89.5149 0.2361 0.0019 0.0687 0.0179 0 
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2000 SİVAS 0.1373 0.1027 0.2235 0.1908 0.2591 0.3065 0.4461 0.0117 57.7357 80.0362 0.2608 0.0019 0.1126 0.0245 0 
2000 ŞANLIURFA 0.5958 1.0815 0.2010 0.3670 0.0824 0.2103 0.1349 0.1936 102.1757 95.3570 0.1536 0.0018 0.2670 0.0087 0 
2000 ŞIRNAK 0.5982 0.9423 0.0775 0.2728 0.1302 0.1440 0.3365 0.4595 9.8588 89.3653 7.7597 0.0031 0.4639 0.0360 0 
2000 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1365 0.3682 0.5794 0.1188 0.2487 0.1193 0.7035 0.0168 28.4892 90.1739 0.0862 0.0011 0.2529 0.0109 1 
2000 TOKAT 0.1274 0.0660 0.2243 0.2489 0.1184 0.3877 0.3782 0.0130 7.6906 90.0176 0.4196 0.0021 0.1302 0.0243 0 
2000 TRABZON 0.1695 0.1125 0.2178 0.2049 0.3446 0.5100 0.1524 0.0081 33.6072 94.3214 0.0274 0.0020 0.1534 0.0042 0 
2000 TUNCELİ 0.2934 0.2292 0.1442 0.4741 0.3716 0.3381 0.0880 0.3256 435.7642 82.4982 3.1390 0.0047 0.1175 0.0475 0 
2000 UŞAK 0.0931 0.1575 0.2839 0.2416 0.5942 0.1881 0.6219 0.0158 20.2467 89.0008 0.2992 0.0013 0.1646 0.0204 0 
2000 VAN 0.4935 0.3734 0.1163 0.2941 0.1010 0.3639 0.1392 0.4090 18.9570 91.7082 0.3450 0.0030 0.1597 0.0268 0 
2000 YALOVA 0.1616 0.2711 0.8495 0.0524 0.2398 0.1286 0.7713 0.0396 29.0128 74.3537 0.2154 0.0014 0.1059 0.0106 0 
2000 YOZGAT 0.1486 0.0951 0.1702 0.3501 0.2048 0.2965 0.4341 0.0149 7.0213 85.1948 0.2376 0.0017 0.1541 0.0353 0 
2000 ZONGULDAK 0.1462 0.1992 0.3662 0.0908 0.2686 0.1035 0.8284 0.0124 34.1783 92.9590 0.7249 0.0018 0.2707 0.0194 1 
2001 ADANA 0.2422 0.2085 0.4146 0.1274 0.2987 0.2117 0.5042 0.0927 6.0125 80.4717 0.3510 0.0011 0.1464 0.0291 0 
2001 ADIYAMAN 0.1724 0.1711 0.1825 0.2213 0.1257 0.2297 0.4110 0.1193 11.6829 80.8210 0.1632 0.0020 0.1885 0.0215 0 
2001 AFYON 0.0873 0.0692 0.2292 0.2997 0.2780 0.2375 0.4110 0.0108 16.0779 78.2481 0.2370 0.0013 0.1072 0.0245 0 
2001 AĞRI 0.3189 0.2133 0.0798 0.5224 0.0975 0.4781 0.1536 0.3510 4.8829 93.7139 0.4194 0.0027 0.2289 0.0550 0 
2001 AKSARAY 0.1067 0.0703 0.1637 0.3780 0.3898 0.3441 0.1357 0.0163 7.3435 85.6842 0.3104 0.0022 0.0715 0.0334 0 
2001 AMASYA 0.1496 0.1480 0.2404 0.2662 0.1732 0.2969 0.3301 0.0131 47.7080 90.5013 0.2577 0.0023 0.1300 0.0287 0 
2001 ANKARA 0.1988 0.2781 0.5081 0.0409 1.3895 0.3686 0.2149 0.0242 28.5951 92.7239 2.0909 0.0017 0.1302 0.0176 1 
2001 ANTALYA 0.1670 0.1844 0.4067 0.1362 0.3726 0.2631 0.1719 0.0279 46.3940 83.4982 0.3414 0.0009 0.0981 0.0462 0 
2001 ARDAHAN 0.3679 0.1851 0.1174 0.6842 0.2645 0.5296 0.0216 0.1618 23.2451 88.3110 0.2717 0.0025 0.1471 0.0589 0 
2001 ARTVİN 0.1654 0.1876 0.3695 0.2350 0.1879 0.2952 0.4604 0.0092 1,215.0240 84.7369 0.2748 0.0018 0.1433 0.0475 0 
2001 AYDIN 0.1283 0.1509 0.3979 0.2456 0.2806 0.3882 0.2225 0.0500 52.7421 87.6941 0.2500 0.0011 0.1003 0.0238 0 
2001 BALIKESİR 0.1246 0.1791 0.3590 0.2619 0.3136 0.2563 0.4194 0.0161 73.9125 85.2663 0.4138 0.0009 0.1436 0.0200 0 
2001 BARTIN 0.1480 0.1477 0.1565 0.2698 0.5920 0.4235 0.1758 0.0150 39.9747 87.1995 0.4849 0.0012 0.1084 0.0286 1 
2001 BATMAN 0.5156 0.7355 0.1864 0.1981 0.0691 0.2227 0.2880 0.4716 22.9649 85.8076 0.1674 0.0032 0.2472 0.0180 0 
2001 BAYBURT 0.1184 0.0560 0.1470 0.4156 0.2105 0.4913 0.0375 0.0060 7.4913 86.6848 0.1975 0.0027 0.0751 0.0392 0 
2001 BİLECİK 0.0536 0.1352 0.6677 0.1238 0.1437 0.0394 0.9259 0.0105 38.0024 64.1759 0.1410 0.0018 0.1354 0.0175 0 
2001 BİNGÖL 0.3970 0.2207 0.1165 0.3807 0.1543 0.3697 0.0204 0.2212 159.5393 82.0879 0.1692 0.0034 0.1560 0.0320 0 
2001 BİTLİS 0.4464 0.2277 0.0895 0.5162 0.0988 0.3729 0.0178 0.2956 13.3914 89.0320 0.2028 0.0039 0.1806 0.0344 0 
2001 BOLU 0.1515 0.2119 0.6285 0.5169 0.1421 0.1978 0.5313 0.0140 25.1315 39.8924 0.1413 0.0016 0.1505 0.0235 1 
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2001 BURDUR 0.1393 0.1339 0.3576 0.2256 0.2400 0.2139 0.3427 0.0084 8.3907 90.2859 0.2234 0.0016 0.1056 0.0282 0 
2001 BURSA 0.1471 0.2094 0.5229 0.0857 0.3349 0.1485 0.7207 0.0210 59.0673 84.9993 0.5698 0.0011 0.0704 0.0149 0 
2001 ÇANAKKALE 0.0936 0.1537 0.4407 0.2383 0.1956 0.2130 0.5024 0.0101 106.7019 83.7653 0.2447 0.0014 0.1469 0.0153 0 
2001 ÇANKIRI 0.1208 0.0621 0.1979 0.3235 0.1713 0.3693 0.3024 0.0158 3.6190 89.8723 0.1842 0.0022 0.0811 0.0373 1 
2001 ÇORUM 0.1391 0.1126 0.3065 0.2195 0.1846 0.3496 0.3787 0.0193 49.0055 85.2620 0.1760 0.0012 0.0977 0.0180 0 
2001 DENİZLİ 0.0738 0.1214 0.5112 0.1303 0.3909 0.1868 0.6251 0.0184 32.4914 81.6770 0.3136 0.0010 0.1427 0.0224 0 
2001 DİYARBAKIR 0.6270 1.0579 0.2155 0.2585 0.1059 0.2112 0.1241 0.5618 32.3539 83.1739 0.1611 0.0024 0.2465 0.0268 0 
2001 DÜZCE 0.1105 0.1151 0.2409 0.2717 0.3404 0.3391 0.4246 0.0162 22.7887 33.1960 0.1992 0.0011 0.1294 0.0249 1 
2001 EDİRNE 0.1491 0.2266 0.3860 0.3560 0.2625 0.2547 0.3701 0.0088 30.4511 89.7334 0.3708 0.0010 0.1265 0.0139 1 
2001 ELAZIĞ 0.1605 0.2120 0.2482 0.2577 0.1924 0.2138 0.5001 0.0710 15.8574 88.5558 0.2671 0.0033 0.1826 0.0263 0 
2001 ERZİNCAN 0.1237 0.0666 0.1752 0.4304 0.2395 0.3751 0.1054 0.0136 15.9915 84.2677 0.2491 0.0040 0.0881 0.0293 0 
2001 ERZURUM 0.2828 0.1786 0.1500 0.2872 0.1591 0.3500 0.1616 0.0985 31.3645 81.3618 0.2918 0.0026 0.1521 0.0253 0 
2001 ESKİŞEHİR 0.1197 0.1313 0.5193 0.0995 0.3516 0.2664 0.5046 0.0124 29.4149 89.7062 0.3350 0.0012 0.0924 0.0128 0 
2001 GAZİANTEP 0.1856 0.3370 0.3125 0.1017 0.2109 0.1653 0.6099 0.0801 20.2944 82.4375 0.2911 0.0014 0.2084 0.0209 0 
2001 GİRESUN 0.1190 0.0854 0.2427 0.3404 0.3356 0.3658 0.3099 0.0129 88.0661 87.0799 0.2432 0.0012 0.1589 0.0433 0 
2001 GÜMÜŞHANE 0.2093 0.0788 0.1596 0.5589 0.1506 0.4822 0.1352 0.0103 324.5299 87.0355 0.1614 0.0025 0.0873 0.0409 0 
2001 HAKKARİ 0.6254 0.6478 0.0803 0.6772 0.0949 0.2917 0.0203 0.4523 20.3948 86.2958 0.2351 0.0068 0.2234 0.0637 0 
2001 HATAY 0.1627 0.1621 0.3401 0.2068 0.3193 0.1774 0.6259 0.0343 12.2355 90.0821 0.5628 0.0011 0.1102 0.0180 0 
2001 IĞDIR 0.3856 0.3079 0.1268 0.5145 0.2895 0.4444 0.0232 0.3270 16.7547 70.6012 0.7503 0.0029 0.2389 0.0130 0 
2001 ISPARTA 0.0789 0.0885 0.2616 0.2997 0.3300 0.2053 0.4709 0.0109 24.6066 90.1685 0.3531 0.0016 0.1280 0.0237 0 
2001 İÇEL 0.2761 0.2315 0.4233 0.2229 0.2642 0.2728 0.4785 0.0960 20.7067 92.4111 0.4463 0.0012 0.1190 0.0317 0 
2001 İSTANBUL 0.2496 0.3650 0.5614 0.0072 1.0804 0.2839 0.4551 0.0552 22.4724 90.5484 1.9110 0.0008 0.1661 0.0080 1 
2001 İZMİR 0.0842 0.1934 0.5941 0.0832 0.4194 0.1852 0.5830 0.0518 42.7098 87.6321 0.7541 0.0009 0.1898 0.0117 0 
2001 K.MARAŞ 0.0942 0.1484 0.2655 0.2047 0.1190 0.1480 0.6547 0.0319 249.3045 84.7547 0.2441 0.0018 0.2064 0.0237 0 
2001 KARABÜK 0.0625 0.0883 0.6724 0.0467 0.2480 0.1459 0.7397 0.0143 10.6791 67.7410 0.1470 0.0016 0.1247 0.0183 1 
2001 KARAMAN 0.0729 0.0743 0.3717 0.5623 0.1585 0.2336 0.2620 0.0125 15.1341 85.3099 0.1406 0.0013 0.0966 0.0378 1 
2001 KARS 0.4241 0.3532 0.1445 0.3599 0.2042 0.3044 0.3310 0.2008 32.9225 83.9467 0.2401 0.0032 0.1696 0.0299 0 
2001 KASTAMONU 0.1096 0.1030 0.3009 0.2702 0.2033 0.2693 0.4711 0.0141 24.1526 86.0971 0.2701 0.0023 0.0884 0.0379 0 
2001 KAYSERİ 0.0884 0.1230 0.3041 0.1232 0.3467 0.2321 0.5732 0.0155 15.1005 89.0025 0.4201 0.0016 0.1302 0.0246 0 
2001 KIRIKKALE 0.1451 0.1037 0.3648 0.0825 0.0763 0.2412 0.3653 0.0096 86.8428 94.4744 0.3256 0.0036 0.1474 0.0824 1 
2001 KIRKLARELİ 0.1003 0.2227 0.6428 0.1119 0.2030 0.0878 0.8087 0.0085 41.8541 71.9053 0.2442 0.0015 0.1482 0.0137 1 
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2001 KIRŞEHİR 0.1439 0.1179 0.2549 0.3010 0.3092 0.3695 0.3356 0.0407 39.0274 87.5614 0.2131 0.0024 0.1098 0.0321 0 
2001 KİLİS 0.3318 0.2545 0.4079 0.2735 0.1184 0.4466 0.1116 0.0226 31.2903 83.5585 0.0840 0.0025 0.1351 0.0168 0 
2001 KOCAELİ 0.1633 0.4294 1.0000 0.0317 0.2181 0.0901 0.8268 0.0394 70.3759 96.7684 3.5674 0.0011 0.1657 0.0200 1 
2001 KONYA 0.0787 0.0650 0.2459 0.2439 0.1790 0.1778 0.5624 0.0315 14.1480 81.7942 0.2811 0.0023 0.1011 0.0261 1 
2001 KÜTAHYA 0.1036 0.0940 0.3063 0.1550 0.1716 0.2790 0.5045 0.0096 36.1964 85.6793 0.2631 0.0005 0.1142 0.0151 0 
2001 MALATYA 0.1751 0.1740 0.2558 0.1507 0.1926 0.2524 0.4429 0.0419 30.9425 83.0626 0.1994 0.0016 0.3737 0.0465 0 
2001 MANİSA 0.0927 0.1006 0.5789 0.1540 0.1657 0.2630 0.4081 0.0394 8.3969 87.0088 0.1888 0.0010 0.1204 0.0189 0 
2001 MARDİN 0.5931 1.2056 0.1927 0.3532 0.0853 0.1429 0.1808 0.3961 1.3363 81.9078 0.1499 0.0027 0.2706 0.0222 0 
2001 MUĞLA 0.1340 0.2433 0.5546 0.2215 0.2368 0.2618 0.2339 0.0172 94.3972 81.8284 0.2914 0.0011 0.0950 0.0849 0 
2001 MUŞ 0.5115 0.3518 0.0871 0.6469 0.1209 0.2970 0.1001 0.3789 35.2325 79.6349 0.1735 0.0027 0.2028 0.0264 0 
2001 NEVŞEHİR 0.0553 0.0900 0.3874 0.2984 0.2033 0.1746 0.1531 0.0116 14.2656 83.7123 0.1457 0.0018 0.0834 0.0239 0 
2001 NİĞDE 0.1235 0.1593 0.3021 0.5007 0.1489 0.1707 0.2602 0.0130 12.3595 88.8084 0.2174 0.0019 0.0851 0.0267 0 
2001 ORDU 0.1463 0.0955 0.2226 0.3229 0.2416 0.4033 0.3771 0.0144 66.4273 85.4733 0.2382 0.0012 0.1674 0.0492 0 
2001 OSMANİYE 0.1392 0.0558 0.1948 0.2347 0.1428 0.4632 0.2339 0.0217 45.1381 84.7106 0.1757 0.0016 0.1319 0.0274 0 
2001 RİZE 0.1341 0.1425 0.3063 0.2651 0.2046 0.3430 0.4381 0.0060 17.8168 92.2739 0.4093 0.0014 0.1343 0.0415 0 
2001 SAKARYA 0.2417 0.3241 0.3816 0.3001 0.2275 0.3176 0.3727 0.0168 35.7348 35.3449 0.2042 0.0013 0.1487 0.0220 1 
2001 SAMSUN 0.1999 0.2199 0.3228 0.2172 0.2619 0.3657 0.3015 0.0126 34.7572 90.7646 0.3580 0.0015 0.1446 0.0328 0 
2001 SİİRT 0.4389 0.6268 0.1993 0.2122 0.0722 0.1651 0.5052 0.3219 4.0963 87.5429 0.1237 0.0051 0.2535 0.0581 0 
2001 SİNOP 0.1886 0.1489 0.2467 0.2963 0.2887 0.4657 0.1851 0.0161 107.0365 90.1064 0.2318 0.0018 0.0663 0.1174 0 
2001 SİVAS 0.1227 0.0904 0.2361 0.1917 0.2591 0.3073 0.4280 0.0117 29.5428 73.4346 0.2356 0.0016 0.1087 0.0243 0 
2001 ŞANLIURFA 0.6665 1.1534 0.2049 0.4127 0.0824 0.1748 0.1631 0.1936 81.4074 96.3394 0.2293 0.0016 0.2374 0.0085 0 
2001 ŞIRNAK 0.5285 1.0013 0.0885 0.3960 0.1302 0.2562 0.2724 0.4595 7.3452 88.4452 6.8348 0.0033 0.5738 0.0323 0 
2001 TEKİRDAĞ 0.1359 0.3164 0.5556 0.1152 0.2487 0.1351 0.7443 0.0168 10.2069 89.9439 0.0832 0.0009 0.1432 0.0099 1 
2001 TOKAT 0.1564 0.0789 0.2224 0.2330 0.1184 0.4174 0.3137 0.0130 7.4109 89.4473 0.4036 0.0019 0.1275 0.0236 0 
2001 TRABZON 0.1840 0.1144 0.2383 0.2162 0.3446 0.5175 0.1233 0.0081 28.4805 96.4195 0.0249 0.0018 0.1248 0.0359 0 
2001 TUNCELİ 0.2624 0.2022 0.1635 0.5007 0.3716 0.3631 0.0839 0.3256 471.7347 81.9461 2.9098 0.0047 0.1111 0.0456 0 
2001 UŞAK 0.0822 0.1376 0.2685 0.2172 0.5942 0.1978 0.6235 0.0158 8.5998 89.3728 0.3306 0.0011 0.1641 0.0199 0 
2001 VAN 0.5838 0.5081 0.1225 0.3346 0.1010 0.4055 0.0781 0.4090 13.0343 89.2366 0.2486 0.0032 0.1801 0.0280 0 
2001 YALOVA 0.1883 0.2829 0.8030 0.0526 0.2398 0.1444 0.7421 0.0396 19.3771 82.3527 0.2321 0.0015 0.1160 0.0165 0 
2001 YOZGAT 0.1199 0.0747 0.1556 0.3179 0.2048 0.3020 0.3341 0.0149 3.8276 78.5304 0.2136 0.0014 0.1418 0.0338 0 
2001 ZONGULDAK 0.1311 0.1738 0.3778 0.1027 0.2686 0.1182 0.7813 0.0124 31.5791 81.9745 0.6340 0.0016 0.2422 0.0262 1 
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Province pthschr asphrr ruralpopr drinkvr insuredwpc murderpc injpc kidnpc robbpc theftpc theftpa 
ADANA 0.189 55.56 0.151319 91 25.9562787 0.035792 0.434384 0.049349 0.027115 0.918117 0.768924
ADIYAMAN 0.087 37.47 0.367061 82 9.06249678 0.014517 0.125812 0.017743 0.006452 0.420988 0.559308
AFYON 0.183 76.38 0.209022 95 22.4086437 0.011109 0.137013 0.053077 0.035796 0.280199 0.323572
AĞRI 0.054 16.76 0.475216 63 7.94608169 0.022829 0.144586 0.022829 0.01522 0.426148 0.640533
AKSARAY 0.127 77.12 0.173736 94 30.3782228 0.022625 0.231279 0.082959 0.020111 0.392168 0.656758
AMASYA 0.225 57.03 0.340625 98 11.8996824 0.008215 0.082145 0.09036 0.019167 0.706447 0.473695
ANKARA 0.285 65.43 0.066256 99 84.6288864 0.022856 0.437775 0.085395 0.019088 1.54113 0.759518
ANTALYA 0.176 54.38 0.174371 86 19.0651518 0.024631 0.267422 0.096178 0.08093 3.311108 0.955668
ARDAHAN 0.105 28.82 0.718674 65 4.86055012 0 0.08152 0.059287 0 0.133397 0.369959
ARTVİN 0.468 11.49 0.502529 69 5.18548181 0.005186 0.046678 0.057051 0.010373 0.233389 0.330972
AYDIN 0.23 58.59 0.29152 93 14.2190855 0.034782 0.303548 0.101183 0.035835 0.945425 0.928839
BALIKESİR 0.237 57.37 0.369922 90 12.1624494 0.013977 0.283277 0.083865 0.023296 0.530213 0.227913
BARTIN 0.311 36.95 0.710622 78 2.63853517 0.016209 0.124272 0.043225 0 0.297173 0.21248
BATMAN 0.034 23.21 0.264872 58 12.7336802 0.056412 0.354269 0.040617 0.002256 0.690487 1.806771
BAYBURT 0.156 28.16 0.402572 98 11.4526841 0 0.07159 0.020454 0 0.357951 0.227428
BİLECİK 0.433 70.41 0.306881 97 16.7665143 0.030968 0.134196 0.015484 0.005161 0.366459 0.723477
BİNGÖL 0.066 23.21 0.37927 74 8.45698784 0.003917 0.235019 0.015668 0.007834 0.348612 0.190404
BİTLİS 0.051 27.88 0.308106 77 13.0193782 0.010343 0.100848 0.007758 0.018101 0.281857 0.918033
BOLU 0.389 39.74 0.454853 97 5.63950617 0.014787 0.136777 0.103507 0.003697 0.54341 0.240696
BURDUR 0.178 85.78 0.314255 97 18.0950817 0.007786 0.186864 0.093432 0.027251 0.836996 0.189915
BURSA 0.346 76.6 0.156738 94 29.6728243 0.020106 0.317385 0.113454 0.033031 2.34999 0.811945
ÇANAKKALE 0.272 68.8 0.418483 95 11.5874852 0.012931 0.191804 0.11422 0.015086 0.648685 0.272698
ÇANKIRI 0.23 52.87 0.363199 82 11.2631057 0.007436 0.130123 0.007436 0.003718 0.45729 0.179598
ÇORUM 0.177 45.7 0.424037 98 10.3387581 0.016728 0.127129 0.085311 0.023419 0.834705 0.756573
DENİZLİ 0.225 81.28 0.225832 66 18.682545 0.027376 0.264233 0.080936 0.019044 0.721286 0.490365
DİYARBAKIR 0.033 21.42 0.268474 51 10.8005198 0.032471 0.557177 0.036161 0.005166 0.656067 0.817761
DÜZCE 0.358 50.76 0.466851 97 4.90259017 0.015978 0.194929 0.08628 0.012782 0.425008 1.518219
EDİRNE 0.332 78.88 0.328776 90 19.161975 0.01241 0.223382 0.039712 0.009928 0.054604 0.344052
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ELAZIĞ 0.097 41.69 0.22293 83 14.5367251 0.026294 0.383887 0.038564 0.028047 0.425957 0.19411
ERZİNCAN 0.182 32.79 0.201944 93 23.0902995 0.009513 0.091957 0.044393 0.009513 0.196598 0.198955
ERZURUM 0.114 26.55 0.343235 94 13.275972 0.007452 0.252298 0.051098 0.009581 0.294879 0.210615
ESKİŞEHİR 0.359 61.88 0.142156 95 29.7389636 0.011364 0.254263 0.096591 0.024148 1.133528 0.802162
GAZİANTEP 0.112 90.7 0.161659 77 23.3241373 0.03193 0.621464 0.074763 0.064638 3.548107 0.923777
GİRESUN 0.224 11.14 0.351635 81 6.39138729 0.019106 0.143296 0.043944 0.019106 0.401229 0.931733
GÜMÜŞHANE 0.158 17.13 0.337614 93 11.1291123 0 0.096575 0.021461 0.005365 0.187784 0.648508
HAKKARİ 0.07 21.8 0.319091 87 10.042623 0.012841 0.072766 0.047084 0.008561 0.226858 6.369427
HATAY 0.125 77.15 0.225909 92 14.5364085 0.019528 0.238401 0.034174 0.007323 0.445883 0.400287
IĞDIR 0.11 35.35 0.371548 62 11.5655701 0.005961 0.274197 0.113255 0.059608 0.751061 0.214823
ISPARTA 0.218 82.98 0.192862 95 30.4714666 0.01368 0.130933 0.066444 0.021496 0.353714 0.364412
İÇEL 0.167 68.78 0.145772 77 24.6704028 0.02116 0.390548 0.138445 0.035669 1.631715 0.560447
İSTANBUL 0.273 97.78 0.014557 60 328.117153 0.106101 0.426416 0.066942 0.038152 3.105914 8.247548
İZMİR 0.294 84.28 0.095551 95 41.6630615 0.03032 0.480663 0.083826 0.014863 1.765403 1.484181
K.MARAŞ 0.148 47.95 0.265585 83 11.026678 0.01593 0.286737 0.047789 0.012943 0.604338 0.8726
KARABÜK 0.338 31.43 0.290844 79 7.95026929 0.022131 0.221308 0.075245 0.035409 0.641795 1.353668
KARAMAN 0.172 77.1 0.282898 92 23.2161498 0.016496 0.23094 0.065983 0.045363 0.313419 0.029212
KARS 0.107 25.3 0.530242 82 8.46779083 0.01523 0.216267 0.115749 0.024368 0.392937 0.182983
KASTAMONU 0.277 25.39 0.557135 79 4.28546675 0.010564 0.150536 0.021128 0.002641 0.24297 0.290217
KAYSERİ 0.225 68.42 0.157013 100 36.9675712 0.02007 0.443458 0.077414 0.021982 0.640338 0.754483
KIRIKKALE 0.195 70.75 0.112351 74 58.8687316 0.015687 0.321578 0.078434 0.010458 1.124215 2.097401
KIRKLARELİ 0.328 85.5 0.281279 100 28.888259 0.015247 0.186011 0.158567 0.024395 0.756241 0.374521
KIRŞEHİR 0.198 80.07 0.231603 99 23.2693907 0.019724 0.256408 0.06706 0.035503 0.757388 0.928649
KİLİS 0.2 76.8 0.359056 77 9.30218273 0.086687 0.225385 0.052012 0 0.390089 1.057082
KOCAELİ 0.338 79.35 0.085243 99 38.6078962 0.026812 0.258061 0.081272 0.031001 0.654369 1.790763
KONYA 0.133 70.34 0.115385 92 49.9368891 0.020436 0.208905 0.06585 0.016349 0.448691 0.431075
KÜTAHYA 0.26 59.56 0.269813 98 17.25778 0.004586 0.154397 0.044332 0.010701 0.342426 0.409796
MALATYA 0.108 22.49 0.188119 85 14.9410798 0.02239 0.233326 0.060099 0.018855 0.558569 0.786005
MANİSA 0.243 75.36 0.273083 87 13.0430086 0.01989 0.292775 0.11536 0.024663 0.582367 0.424505
MARDİN 0.071 42.16 0.271008 84 13.176512 0.021427 0.101422 0.039997 0.005714 0.482824 0.120724
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MUĞLA 0.222 65.01 0.345753 83 12.4858676 0.012639 0.178357 0.08005 0.030896 1.433878 0.497782
MUŞ 0.037 34.98 0.410282 82 10.4106571 0.006651 0.148544 0.017737 0.002217 0.565353 0.314317
NEVŞEHİR 0.178 97.05 0.214256 100 30.8982031 0.006466 0.40087 0.071122 0.032328 0.649798 0.400604
NİĞDE 0.186 91.96 0.194934 100 34.6641859 0.020199 0.150049 0.054826 0.028856 0.401093 0.362004
ORDU 0.183 18.06 0.28204 76 6.09612108 0.010158 0.11061 0.053048 0.010158 0.183974 0.512379
OSMANİYE 0.13 52.71 0.234373 84 12.3000814 0.010857 0.29966 0.067315 0.019543 1.007554 0.563409
RİZE 0.263 13.64 0.357769 76 4.00038841 0.010944 0.205198 0.032832 0 0.484267 0.358089
SAKARYA 0.292 79.37 0.297667 97 11.3604083 0.01747 0.184105 0.170667 0.014782 0.714918 1.22083
SAMSUN 0.218 28.76 0.401489 78 5.55905406 0.019123 0.311783 0.075659 0.032425 0.463933 0.689681
SİİRT 0.081 26.93 0.312874 81 13.2600434 0 0.219588 0.011358 0.003786 0.200658 0.162127
SİNOP 0.259 21.84 0.565922 90 4.02182283 0.013207 0.132065 0.057228 0.004402 0.515055 1.022372
SİVAS 0.206 31.39 0.311462 96 14.3272554 0.009287 0.269319 0.038474 0.00796 0.319734 0.505433
ŞANLIURFA 0.04 29.12 0.325316 86 8.0560911 0.011958 0.182186 0.010551 0.015475 0.330607 0.373676
ŞIRNAK 0.077 31.82 0.236162 77 16.5334667 0.0057 0.076956 0.017101 0.0057 0.213767 0.182789
TEKİRDAĞ 0.393 97.46 0.195989 97 27.1276538 0.016102 0.254406 0.115932 0.043474 0.644066 1.748604
TOKAT 0.171 38.96 0.248191 100 16.4928033 0.016981 0.151619 0.083694 0.013343 0.277767 0.498364
TRABZON 0.174 7.98 0.235611 92 7.49533172 0.011305 0.166489 0.086327 0.009249 0.3227 0.917398
TUNCELİ 0.336 5.9 0.316504 77 6.92085778 0.010514 0.136678 0.094623 0 0.357465 0.40833
UŞAK 0.3 72.85 0.319913 69 11.0263648 0.012436 0.52855 0.136801 0.015546 0.724424 0.404992
VAN 0.091 24.18 0.404658 71 11.141561 0.011506 0.147276 0.027614 0.016108 0.361285 0.756401
YALOVA 0.316 94.3 0.174832 79 28.4081525 0.011944 0.191106 0.083609 0.035832 1.027197 2.953149
YOZGAT 0.17 55.52 0.299716 96 17.6081373 0.013246 0.08095 0.045626 0.008831 0.264927 0.67904
ZONGULDAK 0.31 56.4 0.396019 56 4.83949571 0.012959 0.200861 0.090711 0.022678 0.366085 0.172253
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: MEAN AND VARIANCE COMPARISON TESTS 
 
 
 
In Appendix B, Stata outputs for testing equality of independent panel variables’ means 
and variances using whole and shrunk sample are displayed. Each tests show whether 
an independent variable’s mean or variance calculated using whole sample (all 
provinces) is different from the one calculated using shrunk sample.  
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Table B.1 Testing the Equality of Means of GDPCR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   gdpcr |     633    .3270467    .0073417    .1847133    .3126296    .3414638 
  dgdpcr |     499    .3707648    .0079479    .1775416    .3551493    .3863802 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    .3463182    .0054332    .1828016    .3356579    .3569785 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0437181    .0108198               -.0649482   -.0224879 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1086.89 
 
                  Ho: mean(gdpcr) - mean(dgdpcr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =  -4.0405                t =  -4.0405              t =  -4.0405 
   P < t =   0.0000          P > |t| =   0.0001          P > t =   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 Testing the Equality of Means of RESECR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  resecr |     623     .278128    .0048779    .1217521    .2685489    .2877072 
 dresecr |     495    .2645649    .0051273    .1140742     .254491    .2746388 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1118    .2721229    .0035456    .1185536     .265166    .2790797 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0135631    .0070769               -.0003228    .0274491 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1086.21 
 
                 Ho: mean(resecr) - mean(dresecr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   1.9165                t =   1.9165              t =   1.9165 
   P < t =   0.9722          P > |t| =   0.0556          P > t =   0.0278 
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Table B.3 Testing the Equality of Means of INDECR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  indecr |     623    .4095809    .0089321    .2229451    .3920401    .4271216 
 dindecr |     496    .4640149    .0089941     .200309    .4463435    .4816863 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1119    .4337089     .006422    .2148255    .4211084    .4463095 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -.054434    .0126758               -.0793056   -.0295625 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1100.78 
 
                 Ho: mean(indecr) - mean(dindecr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =  -4.2943                t =  -4.2943              t =  -4.2943 
   P < t =   0.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.4 Testing the Equality of Means of DEPOSITR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
depositr |     633    .2373885    .0066729    .1678877    .2242847    .2504923 
ddepos~r |     499    .2672277    .0078014    .1742697       .2519    .2825554 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132     .250542    .0050913    .1712966    .2405526    .2605314 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0298392    .0102659               -.0499833   -.0096951 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1050.28 
 
               Ho: mean(depositr) - mean(ddepositr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =  -2.9066                t =  -2.9066              t =  -2.9066 
   P < t =   0.0019          P > |t| =   0.0037          P > t =   0.9981 
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Table B.5 Testing the Equality of Means of DEPR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    depr |     639    .0709599    .0046194    .1167723    .0618888    .0800311 
   ddepr |     503    .0250174     .001644    .0368706    .0217875    .0282473 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1142    .0507243     .002767    .0935057    .0452954    .0561532 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0459425    .0049033                .0363176    .0555674 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  793.662 
 
                   Ho: mean(depr) - mean(ddepr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   9.3698                t =   9.3698              t =   9.3698 
   P < t =   1.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.6 Testing the Equality of Means of PIE for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     pie |     633    46.61494    3.629714    91.32175    39.48718    53.74269 
    dpie |     499    47.84753    4.350183    97.17572    39.30056     56.3945 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    47.15828    2.791098    93.90706    41.68197    52.63459 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -1.232593     5.66559               -12.34992    9.884737 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1036.81 
 
                    Ho: mean(pie) - mean(dpie) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =  -0.2176                t =  -0.2176              t =  -0.2176 
   P < t =   0.4139          P > |t| =   0.8278          P > t =   0.5861 
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Table B.7 Testing the Equality of Means of TRRR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    trrr |     637    86.18518    .2830265    7.143266     85.6294    86.74096 
   dtrrr |     502    85.75747    .3395219    7.607109    85.09041    86.42453 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1139    85.99667    .2178163    7.351098    85.56931    86.42404 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .4277162    .4420171               -.4396283    1.295061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1042.62 
 
                   Ho: mean(trrr) - mean(dtrrr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   0.9676                t =   0.9676              t =   0.9676 
   P < t =   0.8333          P > |t| =   0.3334          P > t =   0.1667 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.8 Testing the Equality of Means of TRPGDP for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  trpgdp |     633    .5363982    .0341201    .8584433    .4693958    .6034006 
 dtrpgdp |     499    .4961545    .0267247    .5969844    .4436474    .5486615 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    .5186583    .0224222    .7543982    .4746646     .562652 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0402438    .0433404               -.0447942    .1252818 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1113.47 
 
                 Ho: mean(trpgdp) - mean(dtrpgdp) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   0.9286                t =   0.9286              t =   0.9286 
   P < t =   0.8233          P > |t| =   0.3533          P > t =   0.1767 
 
 
 
 
 92
 
 
 
Table B.9 Testing the Equality of Means of PNPS for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    pnps |     615    .0022886    .0000465    .0011537    .0021972    .0023799 
   dpnps |     488    .0020166    .0000383    .0008471    .0019413     .002092 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1103    .0021683    .0000312    .0010377    .0021069    .0022296 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             .000272    .0000603                .0001537    .0003903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1094.67 
 
                   Ho: mean(pnps) - mean(dpnps) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   4.5115                t =   4.5115              t =   4.5115 
   P < t =   1.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.10 Testing the Equality of Means of TUR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     tur |     623    .1560958    .0025903    .0646537     .151009    .1611826 
    dtur |     496    .1447589     .002458    .0547423    .1399295    .1495883 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1119    .1510707    .0018145    .0606973    .1475105    .1546309 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0113369    .0035709                .0043304    .0183434 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1112.76 
 
                    Ho: mean(tur) - mean(dtur) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   3.1748                t =   3.1748              t =   3.1748 
   P < t =   0.9992          P > |t| =   0.0015          P > t =   0.0008 
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Table B.11 Testing the Equality of Means of LWLPS for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lwlps |     616    .0289822     .000638    .0158343    .0277294    .0302351 
  dlwlps |     493    .0279732    .0006784    .0150637    .0266402    .0293061 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1109    .0285337    .0004654    .0154977    .0276206    .0294468 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0010091    .0009313               -.0008183    .0028364 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1074.62 
 
                  Ho: mean(lwlps) - mean(dlwlps) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   1.0835                t =   1.0835              t =   1.0835 
   P < t =   0.8606          P > |t| =   0.2788          P > t =   0.1394 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.12 Testing the Equality of Means of AGRGDPR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 agrgdpr |     633    .7424493    .0532177    1.338931    .6379444    .8469543 
dagrgdpr |     499    .7255186    .0622562    1.390698    .6032014    .8478357 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132     .734986    .0404637    1.361411    .6555936    .8143785 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0169308    .0819021               -.1437797    .1776412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  1049.95 
 
                Ho: mean(agrgdpr) - mean(dagrgdpr) = diff = 0 
 
     Ha: diff < 0               Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0 
       t =   0.2067                t =   0.2067              t =   0.2067 
   P < t =   0.5819          P > |t| =   0.8363          P > t =   0.4181 
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Table B.13 Testing the Equality of Variances of GDPCR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   gdpcr |     633    .3270467    .0073417    .1847133    .3126296    .3414638 
  dgdpcr |     499    .3707648    .0079479    .1775416    .3551493    .3863802 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    .3463182    .0054332    .1828016    .3356579    .3569785 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                         Ho: sd(gdpcr) = sd(dgdpcr)  
 
             F(632,498) observed   = F_obs           =    1.082 
             F(632,498) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.924 
             F(632,498) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.082 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.8236     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.3503     P > F_obs = 0.1764 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.14 Testing the Equality of Variances of RESECR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  resecr |     623     .278128    .0048779    .1217521    .2685489    .2877072 
 dresecr |     495    .2645649    .0051273    .1140742     .254491    .2746388 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1118    .2721229    .0035456    .1185536     .265166    .2790797 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                        Ho: sd(resecr) = sd(dresecr)  
 
             F(622,494) observed   = F_obs           =    1.139 
             F(622,494) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.878 
             F(622,494) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.139 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.9358     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.1267     P > F_obs = 0.0642 
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Table B.15 Testing the Equality of Variances of INDECR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  indecr |     623    .4095809    .0089321    .2229451    .3920401    .4271216 
 dindecr |     496    .4640149    .0089941     .200309    .4463435    .4816863 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1119    .4337089     .006422    .2148255    .4211084    .4463095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                        Ho: sd(indecr) = sd(dindecr)  
 
             F(622,495) observed   = F_obs           =    1.239 
             F(622,495) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.807 
             F(622,495) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.239 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.9937     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0121     P > F_obs = 0.0063 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.16 Testing the Equality of Variances of DEPOSITR for Whole and Shrunk 
Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
depositr |     633    .2373885    .0066729    .1678877    .2242847    .2504923 
ddepos~r |     499    .2672277    .0078014    .1742697       .2519    .2825554 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132     .250542    .0050913    .1712966    .2405526    .2605314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                      Ho: sd(depositr) = sd(ddepositr)  
 
             F(632,498) observed   = F_obs           =    0.928 
             F(632,498) lower tail = F_L   = F_obs   =    0.928 
             F(632,498) upper tail = F_U   = 1/F_obs =    1.077 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.1882     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.3788     P > F_obs = 0.8118 
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Table B.17 Testing the Equality of Variances of DEPR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    depr |     639    .0709599    .0046194    .1167723    .0618888    .0800311 
   ddepr |     503    .0250174     .001644    .0368706    .0217875    .0282473 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1142    .0507243     .002767    .0935057    .0452954    .0561532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                          Ho: sd(depr) = sd(ddepr)  
 
             F(638,502) observed   = F_obs           =   10.030 
             F(638,502) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.100 
             F(638,502) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =   10.030 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 1.0000     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0000     P > F_obs = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.18 Testing the Equality of Variances of PIE for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     pie |     633    46.61494    3.629714    91.32175    39.48718    53.74269 
    dpie |     499    47.84753    4.350183    97.17572    39.30056     56.3945 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    47.15828    2.791098    93.90706    41.68197    52.63459 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                           Ho: sd(pie) = sd(dpie)  
 
             F(632,498) observed   = F_obs           =    0.883 
             F(632,498) lower tail = F_L   = F_obs   =    0.883 
             F(632,498) upper tail = F_U   = 1/F_obs =    1.132 
 
Ha: sd(pie) < sd(dpie)     Ha: sd(pie) != sd(dpie)    Ha: sd(pie) > sd(dpie) 
  P < F_obs = 0.0705     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.1428     P > F_obs = 0.9295 
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Table B.19 Testing the Equality of Variances of TRRR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    trrr |     637    86.18518    .2830265    7.143266     85.6294    86.74096 
   dtrrr |     502    85.75747    .3395219    7.607109    85.09041    86.42453 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1139    85.99667    .2178163    7.351098    85.56931    86.42404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                          Ho: sd(trrr) = sd(dtrrr)  
 
             F(636,501) observed   = F_obs           =    0.882 
             F(636,501) lower tail = F_L   = F_obs   =    0.882 
             F(636,501) upper tail = F_U   = 1/F_obs =    1.134 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.0674     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.1367     P > F_obs = 0.9326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.20 Testing the Equality of Variances of TRPGDP for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  trpgdp |     633    .5363982    .0341201    .8584433    .4693958    .6034006 
 dtrpgdp |     499    .4961545    .0267247    .5969844    .4436474    .5486615 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132    .5186583    .0224222    .7543982    .4746646     .562652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                        Ho: sd(trpgdp) = sd(dtrpgdp)  
 
             F(632,498) observed   = F_obs           =    2.068 
             F(632,498) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.484 
             F(632,498) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    2.068 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 1.0000     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0000     P > F_obs = 0.0000 
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Table B.21 Testing the Equality of Variances of PNPS for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    pnps |     615    .0022886    .0000465    .0011537    .0021972    .0023799 
   dpnps |     488    .0020166    .0000383    .0008471    .0019413     .002092 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1103    .0021683    .0000312    .0010377    .0021069    .0022296 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                          Ho: sd(pnps) = sd(dpnps)  
 
             F(614,487) observed   = F_obs           =    1.855 
             F(614,487) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.539 
             F(614,487) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.855 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 1.0000     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0000     P > F_obs = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.22 Testing the Equality of Variances of TUR for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     tur |     623    .1560958    .0025903    .0646537     .151009    .1611826 
    dtur |     496    .1447589     .002458    .0547423    .1399295    .1495883 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1119    .1510707    .0018145    .0606973    .1475105    .1546309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                           Ho: sd(tur) = sd(dtur)  
 
             F(622,495) observed   = F_obs           =    1.395 
             F(622,495) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.717 
             F(622,495) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.395 
 
Ha: sd(tur) < sd(dtur)     Ha: sd(tur) != sd(dtur)    Ha: sd(tur) > sd(dtur) 
  P < F_obs = 0.9999     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0001     P > F_obs = 0.0001 
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Table B.23 Testing the Equality of Variances of LWLPS for Whole and Shrunk Sample 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lwlps |     616    .0289822     .000638    .0158343    .0277294    .0302351 
  dlwlps |     493    .0279732    .0006784    .0150637    .0266402    .0293061 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1109    .0285337    .0004654    .0154977    .0276206    .0294468 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                         Ho: sd(lwlps) = sd(dlwlps)  
 
             F(615,492) observed   = F_obs           =    1.105 
             F(615,492) lower tail = F_L   = 1/F_obs =    0.905 
             F(615,492) upper tail = F_U   = F_obs   =    1.105 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.8771     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.2437     P > F_obs = 0.1229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.24 Testing the Equality of Variances of AGRGDPR for Whole and Shrunk 
Sample 
 
Variance ratio test 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 agrgdpr |     633    .7424493    .0532177    1.338931    .6379444    .8469543 
dagrgdpr |     499    .7255186    .0622562    1.390698    .6032014    .8478357 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1132     .734986    .0404637    1.361411    .6555936    .8143785 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                       Ho: sd(agrgdpr) = sd(dagrgdpr)  
 
             F(632,498) observed   = F_obs           =    0.927 
             F(632,498) lower tail = F_L   = F_obs   =    0.927 
             F(632,498) upper tail = F_U   = 1/F_obs =    1.079 
 
   Ha: sd(1) < sd(2)         Ha: sd(1) != sd(2)          Ha: sd(1) > sd(2) 
  P < F_obs = 0.1842     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.3709     P > F_obs = 0.8158 
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APPENDIX C: STATA OUTPUTS OF REGRESSIONS 
 
 
 
In Appendix C, complete outputs of all regressions performed via Stata have been 
given. These outputs show detailed information about each regression other than sign, 
magnitude and significance level of each variable. 
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Table C.1 Stata Output for Year 2000 Regression (TLR) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      80 
                                                       F( 24,    55) =   56.16 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9071 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05616 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .0473685   .0589822     0.80   0.425    -.0708346    .1655715 
     agrgdpr |  -.0403944   .0917722    -0.44   0.662    -.2243099    .1435212 
    depositr |   .0416855    .037523     1.11   0.271    -.0335123    .1168834 
      resecr |  -.0600702   .1669656    -0.36   0.720    -.3946766    .2745363 
      indecr |  -.1804981   .1050244    -1.72   0.091    -.3909717    .0299754 
        depr |   .7503671   .1228311     6.11   0.000     .5042082    .9965261 
         pie |   .0000996   .0000468     2.13   0.038     5.85e-06    .0001933 
        trrr |   .0012319    .001022     1.21   0.233    -.0008163    .0032801 
      trpgdp |  -.0043785   .0065447    -0.67   0.506    -.0174944    .0087374 
        pnps |  -11.83214   10.80929    -1.09   0.278    -33.49444    9.830154 
         tur |   .3502625   .2031024     1.72   0.090    -.0567639    .7572888 
       lwlps |  -.6731025   .6582458    -1.02   0.311    -1.992257    .6460516 
       dumjp |    .011129   .0161945     0.69   0.495    -.0213256    .0435835 
     pthschr |  -.3939796   .1727591    -2.28   0.026    -.7401965   -.0477627 
      asphrr |   .0002634   .0004755     0.55   0.582    -.0006895    .0012163 
   ruralpopr |   .1330159   .0861161     1.54   0.128    -.0395646    .3055964 
     drinkvr |   .0001587   .0006974     0.23   0.821     -.001239    .0015563 
  insuredwpc |  -.0004752   .0002804    -1.69   0.096     -.001037    .0000867 
    murderpc |   .4853173   .7503323     0.65   0.520    -1.018382    1.989017 
       injpc |  -.1179374   .0668521    -1.76   0.083    -.2519121    .0160373 
      kidnpc |   .3371323   .2936067     1.15   0.256    -.2512687    .9255334 
      robbpc |   -.795398   .6235631    -1.28   0.207    -2.045046    .4542505 
     theftpc |   .0153926   .0180507     0.85   0.398    -.0207819     .051567 
     theftpa |   .0168596   .0067629     2.49   0.016     .0033064    .0304128 
       _cons |    .112357   .1779195     0.63   0.530    -.2442015    .4689156 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.2 Stata Output for Year 2000 Regression (TLPC) 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =      80 
                                                       F( 24,    55) =   32.80 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8256 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .11511 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .0708212    .112971     0.63   0.533    -.1555777    .2972202 
     agrgdpr |  -.3791396   .2151533    -1.76   0.084    -.8103165    .0520373 
    depositr |   .0366015    .069246     0.53   0.599    -.1021706    .1753736 
      resecr |  -1.103856   .3630224    -3.04   0.004    -1.831369    -.376343 
      indecr |  -.6367928   .2230062    -2.86   0.006    -1.083707   -.1898783 
        depr |   .8500397   .2982548     2.85   0.006     .2523237    1.447756 
         pie |   .0001188   .0000837     1.42   0.162     -.000049    .0002865 
        trrr |   .0016802   .0018827     0.89   0.376    -.0020928    .0054532 
      trpgdp |  -.0151803   .0177804    -0.85   0.397     -.050813    .0204524 
        pnps |  -45.25694   23.60536    -1.92   0.060    -92.56314    2.049262 
         tur |    1.19604   .4009524     2.98   0.004     .3925132    1.999566 
       lwlps |  -1.413927   1.316438    -1.07   0.287    -4.052128    1.224273 
       dumjp |   .0229198   .0312571     0.73   0.467    -.0397208    .0855604 
     pthschr |  -.2757703    .257357    -1.07   0.289    -.7915253    .2399846 
      asphrr |  -.0001351   .0008782    -0.15   0.878    -.0018951    .0016249 
   ruralpopr |   .2110755   .1385422     1.52   0.133    -.0665692    .4887202 
     drinkvr |   .0018211   .0013286     1.37   0.176    -.0008416    .0044838 
  insuredwpc |  -.0006171   .0004951    -1.25   0.218    -.0016093     .000375 
    murderpc |   1.273766   1.027004     1.24   0.220    -.7843951    3.331927 
       injpc |  -.1397975   .1884269    -0.74   0.461    -.5174134    .2378183 
      kidnpc |   .5123796   .3953379     1.30   0.200    -.2798952    1.304654 
      robbpc |  -1.950839   1.412746    -1.38   0.173    -4.782045    .8803679 
     theftpc |   .0226257   .0391278     0.58   0.565    -.0557882    .1010396 
     theftpa |   .0209596   .0148541     1.41   0.164    -.0088087    .0507279 
       _cons |   .4355356   .3421664     1.27   0.208    -.2501813    1.121252 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.3 Stata Output for Between Estimator Regression using Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0044                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.8955                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.7684                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(13,67)           =     44.15 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .0537335                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0159753   .0574383    -0.28   0.782    -.1306227    .0986721 
     agrgdpr |  -.0518208   .0831992    -0.62   0.535    -.2178871    .1142456 
    depositr |  -.0474182   .0488263    -0.97   0.335    -.1448759    .0500395 
      resecr |   .1880241   .1096894     1.71   0.091    -.0309168     .406965 
      indecr |  -.2386161   .0717051    -3.33   0.001      -.38174   -.0954921 
        depr |    .811104   .0968947     8.37   0.000     .6177013    1.004507 
         pie |   .0000798   .0001016     0.78   0.435    -.0001231    .0002826 
        trrr |   .0001626   .0010358     0.16   0.876    -.0019048      .00223 
      trpgdp |   -.008835   .0095577    -0.92   0.359    -.0279122    .0102422 
        pnps |  -10.34203   8.584842    -1.20   0.233    -27.47745    6.793385 
         tur |   .8528824   .1816754     4.69   0.000     .4902567    1.215508 
       lwlps |  -.5580377   .5390792    -1.04   0.304    -1.634044    .5179688 
       dumjp |  -.0104488   .0186144    -0.56   0.576    -.0476033    .0267057 
       _cons |   .1255852   .1194145     1.05   0.297    -.1127672    .3639375 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.4 Stata Output for Fixed Effects Regression using Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1467                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.3290                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.2567                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(19,505)          =      4.57 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6757                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0360771   .0594999    -0.61   0.545    -.1529749    .0808207 
     agrgdpr |   .0920669   .0355248     2.59   0.010     .0222723    .1618614 
    depositr |   .0363793   .0338533     1.07   0.283    -.0301314    .1028899 
      resecr |   .0233597   .0521503     0.45   0.654    -.0790986     .125818 
      indecr |  -.0295252    .030871    -0.96   0.339    -.0901766    .0311262 
        depr |  -.2113176   .0476919    -4.43   0.000    -.3050166   -.1176186 
         pie |  -5.69e-06   .0000224    -0.25   0.799    -.0000497    .0000383 
        trrr |  -.0005995   .0003525    -1.70   0.090    -.0012921    .0000931 
      trpgdp |  -.0044649   .0110566    -0.40   0.687    -.0261876    .0172577 
        pnps |  -16.42496   5.872164    -2.80   0.005    -27.96184   -4.888082 
         tur |  -.0292263   .0566974    -0.52   0.606    -.1406181    .0821656 
       lwlps |  -.0250422   .1866627    -0.13   0.893    -.3917733     .341689 
       dumjp |  (dropped) 
       dum94 |   -.008237   .0079304    -1.04   0.299    -.0238176    .0073436 
       dum95 |    .007198   .0072602     0.99   0.322    -.0070659    .0214618 
       dum96 |    .012355   .0067825     1.82   0.069    -.0009704    .0256804 
       dum97 |   .0181704   .0065423     2.78   0.006     .0053169    .0310238 
       dum98 |    .011578   .0064616     1.79   0.074     -.001117     .024273 
       dum99 |   .0109322   .0067486     1.62   0.106    -.0023266    .0241911 
       dum00 |   .0162087   .0056341     2.88   0.004     .0051396    .0272777 
       _cons |   .2971033   .0493677     6.02   0.000      .200112    .3940946 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .17688316 
     sigma_e |  .03471248 
         rho |  .96291599   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(80, 505) =    25.04             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table C.5 Stata Output for Random Effects Regression using Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0100                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.6928                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.6213                                        max =         8 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(20)      =    235.08 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.1464561   .0427667    -3.42   0.001    -.2302772    -.062635 
     agrgdpr |   .0859823   .0380644     2.26   0.024     .0113775    .1605872 
    depositr |  -.0392983   .0328481    -1.20   0.232    -.1036795    .0250829 
      resecr |    .034642   .0567486     0.61   0.542    -.0765832    .1458672 
      indecr |  -.1301884   .0332514    -3.92   0.000      -.19536   -.0650169 
        depr |   .2229158   .0496878     4.49   0.000     .1255296     .320302 
         pie |  -.0000169   .0000267    -0.63   0.527    -.0000693    .0000355 
        trrr |  -.0005596   .0004088    -1.37   0.171    -.0013609    .0002416 
      trpgdp |   .0172641   .0077086     2.24   0.025     .0021555    .0323727 
        pnps |   4.539315   5.325002     0.85   0.394    -5.897497    14.97613 
         tur |   .1935404   .0661925     2.92   0.003     .0638055    .3232754 
       lwlps |  -.0518177   .2159941    -0.24   0.810    -.4751582    .3715229 
       dumjp |  -.0299303   .0196567    -1.52   0.128    -.0684567     .008596 
       dum94 |  -.0140587   .0089864    -1.56   0.118    -.0316717    .0035542 
       dum95 |   .0071612   .0084146     0.85   0.395    -.0093312    .0236536 
       dum96 |   .0181778   .0080525     2.26   0.024     .0023953    .0339604 
       dum97 |     .02008   .0078698     2.55   0.011     .0046553    .0355046 
       dum98 |   .0179639   .0077445     2.32   0.020      .002785    .0331428 
       dum99 |   .0261615   .0077128     3.39   0.001     .0110448    .0412783 
       dum00 |   .0146842   .0070067     2.10   0.036     .0009513     .028417 
       _cons |   .2696959   .0540967     4.99   0.000     .1636682    .3757236 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .05001627 
     sigma_e |  .03471248 
         rho |  .67491465   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.6 Stata Output for FGLS Regression using Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5622) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        81          Number of obs      =       605 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        81 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  7.469136 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =   1065.19 
Log likelihood             =  1164.756          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0541057   .0194254    -2.79   0.005    -.0921788   -.0160326 
     agrgdpr |    .036668   .0252116     1.45   0.146    -.0127458    .0860818 
    depositr |  -.0479271   .0195201    -2.46   0.014    -.0861857   -.0096684 
      resecr |   .1646756   .0343699     4.79   0.000     .0973119    .2320394 
      indecr |   -.075892   .0197335    -3.85   0.000    -.1145689   -.0372152 
        depr |   .8554788    .042158    20.29   0.000     .7728506    .9381069 
         pie |   .0000194    .000013     1.49   0.136    -6.12e-06    .0000449 
        trrr |  -.0000981   .0002554    -0.38   0.701    -.0005987    .0004024 
      trpgdp |   .0097403   .0064158     1.52   0.129    -.0028345     .022315 
        pnps |  -4.476482     3.6558    -1.22   0.221    -11.64172    2.688755 
         tur |   .2318746   .0503057     4.61   0.000     .1332773     .330472 
       lwlps |    .210408   .1096618     1.92   0.055    -.0045252    .4253412 
       dumjp |   .0040707   .0072852     0.56   0.576     -.010208    .0183494 
       dum94 |   .0072401    .006564     1.10   0.270    -.0056251    .0201053 
       dum95 |   .0202071    .006035     3.35   0.001     .0083788    .0320355 
       dum96 |   .0289233   .0058068     4.98   0.000     .0175421    .0403044 
       dum97 |   .0243395   .0055824     4.36   0.000     .0133982    .0352809 
       dum98 |   .0232877   .0052985     4.40   0.000     .0129029    .0336726 
       dum99 |   .0297557   .0051416     5.79   0.000     .0196783    .0398332 
       dum00 |   .0120705   .0038018     3.17   0.001     .0046192    .0195218 
       _cons |   .1017218   .0327326     3.11   0.002     .0375671    .1658764 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.7 Stata Output for FGLS Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable using 
Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (-0.0608) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        81          Number of obs      =       525 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        81 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  6.481481 
                                                               max =         7 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =  11321.12 
Log likelihood             =  1153.014          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     tlr(-1) |    .890049   .0195515    45.52   0.000     .8517287    .9283693 
       gdpcr |   .0125534   .0082918     1.51   0.130    -.0036983     .028805 
     agrgdpr |  -.0039633   .0121021    -0.33   0.743     -.027683    .0197563 
    depositr |     .00372    .006771     0.55   0.583    -.0095509    .0169909 
      resecr |   .0298552   .0179924     1.66   0.097    -.0054092    .0651196 
      indecr |  -.0118236   .0110382    -1.07   0.284     -.033458    .0098109 
        depr |   .0841744   .0231024     3.64   0.000     .0388945    .1294543 
         pie |   5.66e-06   7.06e-06     0.80   0.423    -8.19e-06    .0000195 
        trrr |  -.0001663   .0001575    -1.06   0.291    -.0004749    .0001423 
      trpgdp |  -.0035325   .0018323    -1.93   0.054    -.0071237    .0000588 
        pnps |   2.705243   1.553134     1.74   0.082    -.3388436     5.74933 
         tur |    .080657   .0260676     3.09   0.002     .0295654    .1317486 
       lwlps |    .062956   .0741178     0.85   0.396    -.0823122    .2082242 
       dumjp |   .0020145   .0031658     0.64   0.525    -.0041904    .0082193 
       dum95 |   .0228109   .0036094     6.32   0.000     .0157367    .0298851 
       dum96 |   .0177865   .0034169     5.21   0.000     .0110895    .0244836 
       dum97 |   .0173828   .0034448     5.05   0.000     .0106311    .0241345 
       dum98 |   .0133355   .0033918     3.93   0.000     .0066878    .0199832 
       dum99 |   .0175989   .0034417     5.11   0.000     .0108534    .0243444 
       dum00 |   .0110181   .0033651     3.27   0.001     .0044228    .0176135 
       _cons |  -.0085733   .0184153    -0.47   0.642    -.0446667    .0275201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.8 Stata Output for Arellano-Bond GMM Regression using Whole Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation     Number of obs      =       433 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
                                                Wald chi2(18)      =     52.88 
 
Time variable (t): year                         Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =  5.345679 
                                                               max =         6 
 
One-step output 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
D.tlr        |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
tlr          | 
          LD |    .433887   .1237757     3.51   0.000      .191291     .676483 
gdpcr        | 
          D1 |   -.033203   .0842334    -0.39   0.693    -.1982975    .1318914 
agrgdpr      | 
          D1 |   .0951211   .0510632     1.86   0.062    -.0049609    .1952032 
depositr     | 
          D1 |  -.0169291   .0574644    -0.29   0.768    -.1295573    .0956991 
resecr       | 
          D1 |   .0824756   .0697312     1.18   0.237     -.054195    .2191462 
indecr       | 
          D1 |   .0990289   .0460052     2.15   0.031     .0088604    .1891974 
depr         | 
          D1 |  -.1622541   .0588843    -2.76   0.006    -.2776652    -.046843 
pie          | 
          D1 |   .0000162   .0000366     0.44   0.658    -.0000555    .0000879 
trrr         | 
          D1 |   .0006636   .0005142     1.29   0.197    -.0003443    .0016715 
trpgdp       | 
          D1 |  -.0195914   .0134694    -1.45   0.146    -.0459908    .0068081 
pnps         | 
          D1 |  -5.838979   11.25063    -0.52   0.604    -27.88981    16.21185 
tur          | 
          D1 |   .1319672   .0805512     1.64   0.101    -.0259102    .2898447 
lwlps        | 
          D1 |  -.0416787   .2447378    -0.17   0.865     -.521356    .4379985 
dumjp        | 
          D1 |  (dropped) 
dum96        | 
          D1 |   .0015861   .0057223     0.28   0.782    -.0096294    .0128016 
dum97        | 
          D1 |   .0022783   .0057178     0.40   0.690    -.0089282    .0134849 
dum98        | 
          D1 |  -.0027916   .0060249    -0.46   0.643    -.0146003     .009017 
dum99        | 
          D1 |    .009987   .0075035     1.33   0.183    -.0047196    .0246937 
dum00        | 
          D1 |   .0078785   .0049375     1.60   0.111    -.0017988    .0175557 
_cons        |  -.0006519   .0015913    -0.41   0.682    -.0037707     .002467 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(20) =    32.45      Prob > chi2 = 0.0387 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -4.89   Pr > z = 0.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -0.44   Pr > z = 0.6577 
 
 
 
 
 109
Table C.9 Stata Output for Between Estimator Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0014                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5608                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.3760                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(13,50)           =      4.91 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .0334992                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0402154   .0434599    -0.93   0.359    -.1275072    .0470763 
     agrgdpr |  -.1363742   .0672764    -2.03   0.048    -.2715028   -.0012456 
    depositr |  -.0003548   .0354234    -0.01   0.992    -.0715049    .0707952 
      resecr |   .1989475   .0902508     2.20   0.032     .0176734    .3802215 
      indecr |  -.0650319   .0576232    -1.13   0.264    -.1807715    .0507077 
        depr |   .4021144   .1926682     2.09   0.042      .015129    .7890998 
         pie |   .0000489   .0000805     0.61   0.547    -.0001128    .0002105 
        trrr |  -.0003834   .0007128    -0.54   0.593    -.0018152    .0010484 
      trpgdp |   .0101663   .0115332     0.88   0.382    -.0129988    .0333313 
        pnps |   1.789006   7.507274     0.24   0.813     -13.2898    16.86781 
         tur |   .1701667   .1496474     1.14   0.261    -.1304089    .4707423 
       lwlps |   .1469642   .4275792     0.34   0.733    -.7118539    1.005782 
       dumjp |     .00024   .0127977     0.02   0.985    -.0254649     .025945 
       _cons |   .1503157   .0953741     1.58   0.121    -.0412489    .3418803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.10 Stata Output for Fixed Effects Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1498                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.1843                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.1710                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(19,401)          =      3.72 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1822                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0499346   .0437947    -1.14   0.255    -.1360305    .0361613 
     agrgdpr |   .0808617   .0328658     2.46   0.014      .016251    .1454724 
    depositr |   .0422404   .0245232     1.72   0.086    -.0059697    .0904505 
      resecr |   .1146262   .0432721     2.65   0.008     .0295577    .1996946 
      indecr |   .0254586   .0271907     0.94   0.350    -.0279955    .0789126 
        depr |   .0121152   .0531319     0.23   0.820    -.0923367    .1165671 
         pie |  -2.89e-06   .0000162    -0.18   0.859    -.0000347    .0000289 
        trrr |  -.0006159   .0002638    -2.33   0.020    -.0011345   -.0000972 
      trpgdp |   .0037899   .0099549     0.38   0.704    -.0157805    .0233603 
        pnps |   7.368626   7.696466     0.96   0.339    -7.761837    22.49909 
         tur |  -.0923251   .0477042    -1.94   0.054    -.1861066    .0014564 
       lwlps |   .2314921   .1442412     1.60   0.109    -.0520713    .5150554 
       dum94 |  -.0176181   .0078326    -2.25   0.025    -.0330162     -.00222 
       dum95 |  -.0059308   .0066368    -0.89   0.372    -.0189782    .0071165 
       dum96 |   .0038985   .0058761     0.66   0.507    -.0076533    .0154503 
       dum97 |   .0097104   .0055274     1.76   0.080    -.0011558    .0205767 
       dum98 |   .0101939   .0052662     1.94   0.054    -.0001588    .0205467 
       dum99 |   .0065298    .005329     1.23   0.221    -.0039465    .0170062 
       dum00 |   .0134796   .0045089     2.99   0.003     .0046154    .0223437 
       _cons |   .1274613   .0399658     3.19   0.002     .0488926      .20603 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .04153266 
     sigma_e |  .02408075 
         rho |  .74840711   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 401) =    13.66             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111
Table C.11 Stata Output for Random Effects Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1354                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.3772                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.3256                                        max =         8 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(20)      =    100.03 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   -.024279   .0259003    -0.94   0.349    -.0750427    .0264847 
     agrgdpr |   .0293177   .0281594     1.04   0.298    -.0258738    .0845091 
    depositr |   .0398175   .0195341     2.04   0.042     .0015313    .0781037 
      resecr |   .1496214   .0381737     3.92   0.000     .0748024    .2244405 
      indecr |    .024302   .0230245     1.06   0.291    -.0208253    .0694293 
        depr |   .0587302    .050503     1.16   0.245    -.0402539    .1577143 
         pie |  -1.59e-06   .0000156    -0.10   0.919    -.0000322     .000029 
        trrr |  -.0006488   .0002464    -2.63   0.008    -.0011317   -.0001658 
      trpgdp |   .0177039   .0067503     2.62   0.009     .0044736    .0309342 
        pnps |   7.334958    4.78567     1.53   0.125    -2.044783     16.7147 
         tur |  -.0634083   .0453403    -1.40   0.162    -.1522736     .025457 
       lwlps |   .2345223   .1350277     1.74   0.082    -.0301272    .4991718 
       dumjp |  -.0044127   .0110243    -0.40   0.689      -.02602    .0171946 
       dum94 |  -.0184152   .0062167    -2.96   0.003    -.0305997   -.0062306 
       dum95 |  -.0058614   .0055872    -1.05   0.294    -.0168122    .0050893 
       dum96 |   .0024119   .0053033     0.45   0.649    -.0079823    .0128062 
       dum97 |   .0086081   .0050708     1.70   0.090    -.0013304    .0185466 
       dum98 |   .0093652   .0049877     1.88   0.060    -.0004106    .0191409 
       dum99 |   .0054081   .0050188     1.08   0.281    -.0044286    .0152448 
       dum00 |   .0132796   .0044905     2.96   0.003     .0044784    .0220808 
       _cons |   .1144316   .0358174     3.19   0.001     .0442308    .1846325 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .03409396 
     sigma_e |  .02408075 
         rho |  .66717042   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.12 Stata Output for FGLS Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.7648) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        64          Number of obs      =       484 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        64 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =    7.5625 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =    141.75 
Log likelihood             =  1126.578          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0367401   .0215028    -1.71   0.088    -.0788847    .0054046 
     agrgdpr |   .0523268   .0242635     2.16   0.031     .0047713    .0998823 
    depositr |   .0319992    .018254     1.75   0.080    -.0037779    .0677764 
      resecr |   .1256433   .0269007     4.67   0.000      .072919    .1783676 
      indecr |   .0030328   .0179105     0.17   0.866    -.0320711    .0381366 
        depr |   .1082943   .0506759     2.14   0.033     .0089713    .2076172 
         pie |   .0000133   .0000121     1.10   0.273    -.0000105     .000037 
        trrr |  -.0002993   .0002729    -1.10   0.273    -.0008341    .0002356 
      trpgdp |   .0168621   .0049777     3.39   0.001     .0071059    .0266183 
        pnps |   3.022367   3.994349     0.76   0.449    -4.806412    10.85115 
         tur |   .0142176   .0369606     0.38   0.700    -.0582238    .0866591 
       lwlps |   .2913812   .1059645     2.75   0.006     .0836946    .4990677 
       dumjp |   .0003327   .0091894     0.04   0.971    -.0176781    .0183435 
       dum94 |   -.009429   .0065189    -1.45   0.148    -.0222057    .0033477 
       dum95 |   .0024573   .0059652     0.41   0.680    -.0092342    .0141487 
       dum96 |   .0084553    .005615     1.51   0.132    -.0025499    .0194605 
       dum97 |   .0088307   .0052169     1.69   0.091    -.0013943    .0190557 
       dum98 |   .0116938    .004832     2.42   0.016     .0022234    .0211643 
       dum99 |   .0098717   .0045245     2.18   0.029     .0010038    .0187397 
       dum00 |    .013081   .0030608     4.27   0.000     .0070819    .0190801 
       _cons |   .0892315   .0323381     2.76   0.006       .02585     .152613 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.13 Stata Output for FGLS Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable using 
Shrunk Sample (TLR) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (-0.0371) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        64          Number of obs      =       420 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        64 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =    6.5625 
                                                               max =         7 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =   2816.91 
Log likelihood             =  1003.952          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tlr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     tlr(-1) |   .8159952   .0287937    28.34   0.000     .7595606    .8724297 
       gdpcr |   .0007409   .0087951     0.08   0.933    -.0164973     .017979 
     agrgdpr |  -.0197917   .0132728    -1.49   0.136    -.0458059    .0062225 
    depositr |   .0031393   .0066665     0.47   0.638    -.0099268    .0162055 
      resecr |   .0582811   .0192927     3.02   0.003     .0204682     .096094 
      indecr |   .0036293   .0108463     0.33   0.738     -.017629    .0248876 
        depr |   .0270393   .0288371     0.94   0.348    -.0294803    .0835589 
         pie |   3.85e-06   7.66e-06     0.50   0.615    -.0000112    .0000189 
        trrr |  -.0002506   .0001689    -1.48   0.138    -.0005816    .0000804 
      trpgdp |   .0035191   .0020509     1.72   0.086    -.0005006    .0075388 
        pnps |   2.878332   1.604847     1.79   0.073    -.2671102    6.023775 
         tur |   .0487445   .0257326     1.89   0.058    -.0016905    .0991796 
       lwlps |   .1867736   .0754261     2.48   0.013     .0389413     .334606 
       dumjp |   .0020989   .0030428     0.69   0.490    -.0038648    .0080626 
       dum95 |    .018653   .0038218     4.88   0.000     .0111624    .0261435 
       dum96 |   .0150327   .0036594     4.11   0.000     .0078604    .0222051 
       dum97 |   .0151165   .0036737     4.11   0.000     .0079162    .0223168 
       dum98 |   .0159071   .0036107     4.41   0.000     .0088303     .022984 
       dum99 |   .0141564   .0036506     3.88   0.000     .0070014    .0213114 
       dum00 |   .0141584   .0035395     4.00   0.000     .0072212    .0210957 
       _cons |   .0013965   .0195646     0.07   0.943    -.0369495    .0397424 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.14 Stata Output for Arellano-Bond GMM Regression using Shrunk Sample 
(TLR) 
 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation     Number of obs      =       348 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
                                                Wald chi2(18)      =     34.50 
 
Time variable (t): year                         Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =    5.4375 
                                                               max =         6 
 
One-step output 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
D.tlr        |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
tlr          | 
          LD |   .1861003    .096279     1.93   0.053     -.002603    .3748036 
gdpcr        | 
          D1 |  -.0798541   .0611973    -1.30   0.192    -.1997986    .0400903 
agrgdpr      | 
          D1 |   .1008002   .0468048     2.15   0.031     .0090644    .1925359 
depositr     | 
          D1 |  -.0185785   .0442555    -0.42   0.675    -.1053176    .0681606 
resecr       | 
          D1 |   .0425717    .056007     0.76   0.447    -.0671999    .1523434 
indecr       | 
          D1 |   .0917527   .0371958     2.47   0.014     .0188503     .164655 
depr         | 
          D1 |   .0118617   .0666007     0.18   0.859    -.1186734    .1423967 
pie          | 
          D1 |  -8.36e-06   .0000261    -0.32   0.748    -.0000594    .0000427 
trrr         | 
          D1 |  -.0004049   .0003843    -1.05   0.292    -.0011581    .0003482 
trpgdp       | 
          D1 |  -.0139973    .012704    -1.10   0.271    -.0388966     .010902 
pnps         | 
          D1 |   .3231491   12.27912     0.03   0.979    -23.74349    24.38979 
tur          | 
          D1 |   .0060577   .0664276     0.09   0.927    -.1241379    .1362533 
lwlps        | 
          D1 |  -.0103021   .1854514    -0.06   0.956    -.3737801     .353176 
dumjp        | 
          D1 |  (dropped) 
dum96        | 
          D1 |   .0070296   .0043741     1.61   0.108    -.0015435    .0156027 
dum97        | 
          D1 |   .0104594   .0044222     2.37   0.018      .001792    .0191267 
dum98        | 
          D1 |   .0090182   .0047503     1.90   0.058    -.0002921    .0183286 
dum99        | 
          D1 |   .0138341   .0061552     2.25   0.025     .0017702     .025898 
dum00        | 
          D1 |   .0109714    .003968     2.76   0.006     .0031944    .0187485 
_cons        |   .0006874   .0015785     0.44   0.663    -.0024065    .0037812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(20) =    32.26      Prob > chi2 = 0.0407 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -5.39   Pr > z = 0.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -1.49   Pr > z = 0.1353 
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Table C.15 Stata Output for Between Estimator Regression using Whole Sample 
(TLPC) 
 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1683                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.8371                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.7043                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(13,67)           =     26.48 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .0766436                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .0271015    .081928     0.33   0.742    -.1364275    .1906305 
     agrgdpr |   -.272967   .1186724    -2.30   0.025    -.5098382   -.0360958 
    depositr |   -.017643   .0696441    -0.25   0.801    -.1566533    .1213673 
      resecr |   -.554922   .1564571    -3.55   0.001    -.8672116   -.2426323 
      indecr |  -.4990058   .1022776    -4.88   0.000    -.7031528   -.2948588 
        depr |   .7188133   .1382072     5.20   0.000     .4429505     .994676 
         pie |   .0000862    .000145     0.59   0.554    -.0002031    .0003756 
        trrr |  -.0004467   .0014774    -0.30   0.763    -.0033956    .0025022 
      trpgdp |   -.002365   .0136328    -0.17   0.863    -.0295761    .0248461 
        pnps |  -34.13071   12.24512    -2.79   0.007    -58.57206   -9.689351 
         tur |   1.488748   .2591355     5.75   0.000     .9715114    2.005985 
       lwlps |  -.3180878   .7689236    -0.41   0.680    -1.852866     1.21669 
       dumjp |   -.004084    .026551    -0.15   0.878    -.0570799     .048912 
       _cons |   .4688371   .1703286     2.75   0.008     .1288597    .8088145 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.16 Stata Output for Fixed Effects Regression using Whole Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3457                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.4649                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.4025                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(19,505)          =     14.04 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2443                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .0637958   .1140903     0.56   0.576    -.1603544    .2879459 
     agrgdpr |  -.0439652   .0681184    -0.65   0.519    -.1777955    .0898652 
    depositr |   .0349656   .0649133     0.54   0.590    -.0925678    .1624991 
      resecr |  -.2351275   .0999977    -2.35   0.019    -.4315901   -.0386648 
      indecr |  -.0965733   .0591948    -1.63   0.103    -.2128717    .0197251 
        depr |   .2048026   .0914487     2.24   0.026     .0251358    .3844694 
         pie |   -.000031   .0000429    -0.72   0.470    -.0001154    .0000533 
        trrr |  -.0002623    .000676    -0.39   0.698    -.0015903    .0010657 
      trpgdp |   .0413643    .021201     1.95   0.052    -.0002886    .0830173 
        pnps |  -21.80843   11.25981    -1.94   0.053    -43.93027    .3134072 
         tur |   .4600426   .1087167     4.23   0.000       .24645    .6736352 
       lwlps |  -.2713023   .3579237    -0.76   0.449    -.9745052    .4319005 
       dum94 |  -.0844262   .0152064    -5.55   0.000    -.1143019   -.0545506 
       dum95 |    -.06766   .0139213    -4.86   0.000    -.0950107   -.0403092 
       dum96 |  -.0468981   .0130054    -3.61   0.000    -.0724493   -.0213468 
       dum97 |  -.0313832   .0125448    -2.50   0.013    -.0560296   -.0067367 
       dum98 |  -.0207741   .0123901    -1.68   0.094    -.0451166    .0035684 
       dum99 |   .0002273   .0129404     0.02   0.986    -.0251964    .0256509 
       dum00 |   .0151956   .0108032     1.41   0.160    -.0060292    .0364204 
       _cons |   .2911434   .0946619     3.08   0.002     .1051637    .4771231 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .1332343 
     sigma_e |  .06656079 
         rho |  .80027071   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(80, 505) =    10.13             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table C.17 Stata Output for Random Effects Regression using Whole Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       605 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        81 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3169                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.7887                                        avg =       7.5 
       overall = 0.6908                                        max =         8 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(20)      =    485.23 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |  -.0120511   .0595934    -0.20   0.840     -.128852    .1047499 
     agrgdpr |  -.1021191    .057747    -1.77   0.077     -.215301    .0110629 
    depositr |  -.0130805   .0474541    -0.28   0.783    -.1060888    .0799278 
      resecr |  -.3535806   .0852746    -4.15   0.000    -.5207158   -.1864454 
      indecr |  -.2211386   .0502268    -4.40   0.000    -.3195814   -.1226958 
        depr |   .5752738   .0739633     7.78   0.000     .4303083    .7202393 
         pie |   -.000029   .0000421    -0.69   0.491    -.0001115    .0000535 
        trrr |  -.0001762   .0006351    -0.28   0.781    -.0014209    .0010685 
      trpgdp |   .0297054   .0105124     2.83   0.005     .0091014    .0503093 
        pnps |   -15.9455   7.726675    -2.06   0.039    -31.08951   -.8014971 
         tur |   .7189742   .1027008     7.00   0.000     .5176843    .9202641 
       lwlps |  -.3329237   .3332969    -1.00   0.318    -.9861737    .3203263 
       dumjp |   -.009173   .0250132    -0.37   0.714    -.0581979    .0398519 
       dum94 |  -.0727732   .0140192    -5.19   0.000    -.1002504    -.045296 
       dum95 |  -.0549761   .0131975    -4.17   0.000    -.0808427   -.0291095 
       dum96 |  -.0330437   .0127162    -2.60   0.009     -.057967   -.0081205 
       dum97 |  -.0218976   .0124698    -1.76   0.079    -.0463378    .0025427 
       dum98 |  -.0110441    .012293    -0.90   0.369    -.0351379    .0130498 
       dum99 |   .0169498   .0121938     1.39   0.165    -.0069496    .0408491 
       dum00 |   .0150157   .0112244     1.34   0.181    -.0069838    .0370151 
       _cons |   .3396484   .0823252     4.13   0.000     .1782939    .5010029 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .07338201 
     sigma_e |  .06656079 
         rho |  .54862741   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.18 Stata Output for FGLS Regression using Whole Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.6547) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        81          Number of obs      =       605 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        81 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  7.469136 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =    433.90 
Log likelihood             =  1116.343          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .1266407   .0287089     4.41   0.000     .0703723    .1829091 
     agrgdpr |   .0232239   .0284279     0.82   0.414    -.0324937    .0789415 
    depositr |    .025442   .0244141     1.04   0.297    -.0224088    .0732929 
      resecr |  -.0711927   .0409286    -1.74   0.082    -.1514112    .0090258 
      indecr |  -.0566953   .0256701    -2.21   0.027    -.1070078   -.0063829 
        depr |   .6228376   .0639868     9.73   0.000     .4974257    .7482494 
         pie |   .0000226   .0000138     1.63   0.103    -4.55e-06    .0000497 
        trrr |   .0002712    .000358     0.76   0.449    -.0004304    .0009728 
      trpgdp |   .0282307   .0091835     3.07   0.002     .0102314    .0462301 
        pnps |  -10.31121   4.178458    -2.47   0.014    -18.50083   -2.121581 
         tur |   .5107809   .0690807     7.39   0.000     .3753853    .6461765 
       lwlps |   .1910241   .1606473     1.19   0.234    -.1238389     .505887 
       dumjp |  -.0112975   .0103429    -1.09   0.275    -.0315693    .0089742 
       dum94 |  -.0381166   .0082122    -4.64   0.000    -.0542123    -.022021 
       dum95 |  -.0245709     .00756    -3.25   0.001    -.0393882   -.0097536 
       dum96 |  -.0167738   .0071273    -2.35   0.019    -.0307431   -.0028045 
       dum97 |  -.0047881   .0068529    -0.70   0.485    -.0182195    .0086433 
       dum98 |   .0036605   .0064275     0.57   0.569    -.0089372    .0162582 
       dum99 |    .011403   .0059858     1.90   0.057     -.000329     .023135 
       dum00 |   .0144935   .0041939     3.46   0.001     .0062736    .0227133 
       _cons |   .0298494   .0426828     0.70   0.484    -.0538073    .1135062 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.19 Stata Output for FGLS Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable using 
Whole Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (-0.0330) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        80          Number of obs      =       526 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        80 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =     6.575 
                                                               max =         7 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =   5336.48 
Log likelihood             =  1073.946          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    tlpc(-1) |   .9236485   .0217225    42.52   0.000     .8810731    .9662239 
       gdpcr |   .0315414   .0120282     2.62   0.009     .0079665    .0551162 
     agrgdpr |  -.0072518   .0130411    -0.56   0.578     -.032812    .0183083 
    depositr |  -.0051003   .0086318    -0.59   0.555    -.0220183    .0118176 
      resecr |  -.0036418   .0199343    -0.18   0.855    -.0427122    .0354287 
      indecr |  -.0293987   .0133036    -2.21   0.027    -.0554733   -.0033242 
        depr |   .0984841   .0259482     3.80   0.000     .0476266    .1493416 
         pie |   4.45e-06   .0000105     0.42   0.672    -.0000161     .000025 
        trrr |   -.000249   .0002146    -1.16   0.246    -.0006695    .0001715 
      trpgdp |   .0019496    .003341     0.58   0.560    -.0045986    .0084979 
        pnps |  -.5075931   1.692222    -0.30   0.764    -3.824288    2.809102 
         tur |   .1807635   .0377951     4.78   0.000     .1066864    .2548406 
       lwlps |    .020186   .0934558     0.22   0.829     -.162984     .203356 
       dumjp |  -.0028619   .0035085    -0.82   0.415    -.0097383    .0040146 
       dum95 |   .0295084     .00428     6.89   0.000     .0211199     .037897 
       dum96 |   .0299929   .0040921     7.33   0.000     .0219725    .0380133 
       dum97 |   .0343652   .0041011     8.38   0.000     .0263273    .0424031 
       dum98 |   .0285297    .004032     7.08   0.000     .0206271    .0364322 
       dum99 |   .0326568   .0040294     8.10   0.000     .0247593    .0405542 
       dum00 |   .0198069    .003839     5.16   0.000     .0122827    .0273311 
       _cons |  -.0061899   .0229404    -0.27   0.787    -.0511523    .0387726 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.20 Stata Output for Arellano-Bond GMM Regression using Whole Sample 
(TLPC) 
 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation     Number of obs      =       436 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        80 
 
                                                Wald chi2(18)      =    201.02 
 
Time variable (t): year                         Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =      5.45 
                                                               max =         6 
 
One-step output 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
D.tlpc       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
tlpc         | 
          LD |   .8735832   .0758336    11.52   0.000     .7249521    1.022214 
gdpcr        | 
          D1 |   .3022593   .1420789     2.13   0.033     .0237898    .5807289 
agrgdpr      | 
          D1 |  -.0037424   .0814149    -0.05   0.963    -.1633126    .1558279 
depositr     | 
          D1 |  -.0113351   .0973225    -0.12   0.907    -.2020837    .1794135 
resecr       | 
          D1 |   .1677216   .1193111     1.41   0.160    -.0661238     .401567 
indecr       | 
          D1 |   .1318141   .0783161     1.68   0.092    -.0216826    .2853107 
depr         | 
          D1 |  -.1367822   .1071633    -1.28   0.202    -.3468184    .0732541 
pie          | 
          D1 |   .0000253   .0000617     0.41   0.681    -.0000955    .0001462 
trrr         | 
          D1 |   .0018861    .000899     2.10   0.036     .0001242     .003648 
trpgdp       | 
          D1 |  -.0433499   .0228562    -1.90   0.058    -.0881473    .0014474 
pnps         | 
          D1 |   15.28875   18.73889     0.82   0.415     -21.4388     52.0163 
tur          | 
          D1 |   .5262737   .1339964     3.93   0.000     .2636455    .7889019 
lwlps        | 
          D1 |   .4819502   .4163793     1.16   0.247    -.3341381    1.298039 
dumjp        | 
          D1 |  (dropped) 
dum96        | 
          D1 |  -.0000509   .0094342    -0.01   0.996    -.0185416    .0184397 
dum97        | 
          D1 |   .0060377   .0092856     0.65   0.516    -.0121618    .0242372 
dum98        | 
          D1 |  -.0020405   .0099331    -0.21   0.837     -.021509     .017428 
dum99        | 
          D1 |   .0106447   .0125876     0.85   0.398    -.0140265    .0353159 
dum00        | 
          D1 |   .0162371   .0082372     1.97   0.049     .0000924    .0323818 
_cons        |  -.0007476   .0028575    -0.26   0.794    -.0063483    .0048531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(20) =    93.59      Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -6.86   Pr > z = 0.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.40   Pr > z = 0.0165 
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Table C.21 Stata Output for Between Estimator Regression using Shrunk Sample 
(TLPC) 
 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0469                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.6969                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.4878                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(13,50)           =      8.84 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .0396971                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .1177797   .0515008     2.29   0.026     .0143374    .2212221 
     agrgdpr |  -.0871704   .0797238    -1.09   0.279    -.2473003    .0729596 
    depositr |   .0694866   .0419774     1.66   0.104    -.0148276    .1538007 
      resecr |  -.1022352   .1069489    -0.96   0.344    -.3170483     .112578 
      indecr |  -.1227936   .0682846    -1.80   0.078    -.2599472      .01436 
        depr |   .1320988   .2283154     0.58   0.565    -.3264863    .5906838 
         pie |   .0001282   .0000954     1.34   0.185    -.0000634    .0003198 
        trrr |  -.0005366   .0008447    -0.64   0.528    -.0022333    .0011601 
      trpgdp |   .0096265    .013667     0.70   0.484    -.0178245    .0370775 
        pnps |  -9.899016   8.896261    -1.11   0.271    -27.76768    7.969651 
         tur |   .7035815    .177335     3.97   0.000     .3473937    1.059769 
       lwlps |  -.0157607   .5066894    -0.03   0.975    -1.033476    1.001955 
       dumjp |   .0045663   .0151655     0.30   0.765    -.0258945    .0350271 
       _cons |   .1374662   .1130202     1.22   0.230    -.0895415    .3644738 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.22 Stata Output for Fixed Effects Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4224                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.4806                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.4754                                        max =         8 
 
                                                F(19,401)          =     15.43 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0315                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .1422072   .0616401     2.31   0.022     .0210291    .2633852 
     agrgdpr |   .0324571   .0462578     0.70   0.483     -.058481    .1233952 
    depositr |   .1006241   .0345158     2.92   0.004     .0327696    .1684787 
      resecr |   .0151417   .0609044     0.25   0.804    -.1045902    .1348735 
      indecr |   .0211775   .0382702     0.55   0.580    -.0540578    .0964128 
        depr |   .0493453   .0747819     0.66   0.510    -.0976683    .1963589 
         pie |   .0000205   .0000228     0.90   0.368    -.0000242    .0000653 
        trrr |  -.0007627   .0003713    -2.05   0.041    -.0014927   -.0000327 
      trpgdp |   .0345701   .0140114     2.47   0.014     .0070252    .0621149 
        pnps |  -3.405236    10.8326    -0.31   0.753    -24.70101    17.89054 
         tur |   .0037853   .0671425     0.06   0.955      -.12821    .1357806 
       lwlps |   .2617174   .2030161     1.29   0.198    -.1373914    .6608262 
       dum94 |  -.0552083   .0110242    -5.01   0.000    -.0768808   -.0335358 
       dum95 |  -.0401399   .0093412    -4.30   0.000    -.0585037   -.0217761 
       dum96 |  -.0212657   .0082705    -2.57   0.010    -.0375246   -.0050067 
       dum97 |  -.0048199   .0077797    -0.62   0.536    -.0201139    .0104741 
       dum98 |   .0036008    .007412     0.49   0.627    -.0109705    .0181721 
       dum99 |  -.0056497   .0075005    -0.75   0.452    -.0203949    .0090955 
       dum00 |   .0239725   .0063462     3.78   0.000     .0114964    .0364485 
       _cons |   .1005231    .056251     1.79   0.075    -.0100606    .2111067 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .04631023 
     sigma_e |  .03389309 
         rho |  .65119657   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 401) =     9.76             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123
 
 
 
Table C.23 Stata Output for Random Effects Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       484 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4154                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5746                                        avg =       7.6 
       overall = 0.5423                                        max =         8 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(20)      =    374.82 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .1422418    .032076     4.43   0.000     .0793739    .2051096 
     agrgdpr |  -.0152922   .0374261    -0.41   0.683    -.0886459    .0580615 
    depositr |   .0920727    .025098     3.67   0.000     .0428816    .1412639 
      resecr |  -.0060736   .0507295    -0.12   0.905    -.1055016    .0933545 
      indecr |   .0262768   .0304833     0.86   0.389    -.0334693    .0860229 
        depr |   .0688348   .0697575     0.99   0.324    -.0678873    .2055569 
         pie |   .0000265   .0000218     1.22   0.224    -.0000162    .0000691 
        trrr |  -.0006238   .0003375    -1.85   0.065    -.0012853    .0000377 
      trpgdp |   .0280569   .0083948     3.34   0.001     .0116034    .0445104 
        pnps |  -4.851743   5.918103    -0.82   0.412    -16.45101    6.747526 
         tur |    .105884   .0622929     1.70   0.089    -.0162078    .2279759 
       lwlps |    .236265   .1843113     1.28   0.200    -.1249784    .5975085 
       dumjp |   .0089758   .0124462     0.72   0.471    -.0154184      .03337 
       dum94 |   -.054703    .008361    -6.54   0.000    -.0710903   -.0383157 
       dum95 |  -.0398484   .0076123    -5.23   0.000    -.0547682   -.0249286 
       dum96 |  -.0226652    .007307    -3.10   0.002    -.0369867   -.0083437 
       dum97 |  -.0070371    .007021    -1.00   0.316    -.0207979    .0067238 
       dum98 |   .0020317   .0069509     0.29   0.770    -.0115918    .0156551 
       dum99 |  -.0053145    .007002    -0.76   0.448    -.0190381    .0084091 
       dum00 |   .0223229   .0063313     3.53   0.000     .0099137     .034732 
       _cons |   .0951432   .0483351     1.97   0.049      .000408    .1898783 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .03686009 
     sigma_e |  .03389309 
         rho |  .54186077   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.24 Stata Output for FGLS Regression using Shrunk Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5815) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        64          Number of obs      =       484 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        64 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =    7.5625 
                                                               max =         8 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =    578.53 
Log likelihood             =  1058.015          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gdpcr |   .2029196   .0217925     9.31   0.000     .1602071    .2456321 
     agrgdpr |    .012632   .0227197     0.56   0.578    -.0318978    .0571618 
    depositr |     .07303   .0159707     4.57   0.000      .041728     .104332 
      resecr |   .0111455    .026884     0.41   0.678    -.0415462    .0638372 
      indecr |    .014498    .017973     0.81   0.420    -.0207284    .0497245 
        depr |   .1019846   .0562948     1.81   0.070    -.0083512    .2123204 
         pie |   .0000285   .0000138     2.07   0.038     1.52e-06    .0000554 
        trrr |   .0000539   .0002879     0.19   0.852    -.0005105    .0006183 
      trpgdp |   .0211592   .0059565     3.55   0.000     .0094847    .0328337 
        pnps |  -4.189259   2.921544    -1.43   0.152    -9.915381    1.536862 
         tur |   .2033059   .0461524     4.41   0.000     .1128488     .293763 
       lwlps |   .3607687   .1171653     3.08   0.002      .131129    .5904085 
       dumjp |  -.0033362   .0082452    -0.40   0.686    -.0194966    .0128242 
       dum94 |   -.039253   .0057827    -6.79   0.000    -.0505869   -.0279191 
       dum95 |  -.0268232   .0053548    -5.01   0.000    -.0373183    -.016328 
       dum96 |  -.0194966   .0051571    -3.78   0.000    -.0296042   -.0093889 
       dum97 |  -.0053828   .0050094    -1.07   0.283     -.015201    .0044354 
       dum98 |   .0029109   .0048641     0.60   0.550    -.0066225    .0124443 
       dum99 |  -5.90e-06   .0045652    -0.00   0.999    -.0089535    .0089417 
       dum00 |   .0189444   .0033208     5.70   0.000     .0124357    .0254531 
       _cons |  -.0095274   .0329146    -0.29   0.772    -.0740388    .0549841 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.25 Stata Output for FGLS Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable using 
Shrunk Sample (TLPC) 
 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (-0.0238) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        63          Number of obs      =       419 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        63 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =  6.650794 
                                                               max =         7 
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =   2764.18 
Log likelihood             =  949.7804          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        tlpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    tlpc(-1) |   .7686603   .0313098    24.55   0.000     .7072943    .8300263 
       gdpcr |   .0583314   .0133044     4.38   0.000     .0322553    .0844074 
     agrgdpr |  -.0086572   .0140335    -0.62   0.537    -.0361624     .018848 
    depositr |   .0155727   .0086413     1.80   0.072    -.0013639    .0325093 
      resecr |   .0081965     .02041     0.40   0.688    -.0318064    .0481993 
      indecr |  -.0079368   .0124721    -0.64   0.525    -.0323818    .0165081 
        depr |   .0198814   .0346071     0.57   0.566    -.0479473      .08771 
         pie |   .0000106   .0000103     1.03   0.305    -9.66e-06    .0000309 
        trrr |  -.0002521   .0002144    -1.18   0.240    -.0006723     .000168 
      trpgdp |   .0084765   .0032935     2.57   0.010     .0020214    .0149317 
        pnps |   .2320457   1.615867     0.14   0.886    -2.934995    3.399086 
         tur |   .1622557   .0347839     4.66   0.000     .0940806    .2304308 
       lwlps |   .1846872   .0907641     2.03   0.042     .0067927    .3625816 
       dumjp |   -.003284   .0035708    -0.92   0.358    -.0102826    .0037147 
       dum95 |    .017929   .0044516     4.03   0.000     .0092041     .026654 
       dum96 |   .0192766   .0042974     4.49   0.000     .0108538    .0276995 
       dum97 |    .023643   .0042132     5.61   0.000     .0153852    .0319008 
       dum98 |   .0253937   .0041418     6.13   0.000     .0172759    .0335115 
       dum99 |   .0209226   .0041121     5.09   0.000      .012863    .0289823 
       dum00 |   .0207628     .00389     5.34   0.000     .0131385     .028387 
       _cons |  -.0129047   .0235416    -0.55   0.584    -.0590453    .0332359 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table C.26 Stata Output for Arellano-Bond GMM Regression using Shrunk Sample 
(TLPC) 
 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation     Number of obs      =       349 
Group variable (i): province                    Number of groups   =        63 
 
                                                Wald chi2(18)      =     68.09 
 
Time variable (t): year                         Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  5.539683 
                                                               max =         6 
 
One-step output 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
D.tlpc       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
tlpc         | 
          LD |   .0394391   .0933916     0.42   0.673     -.143605    .2224832 
gdpcr        | 
          D1 |   .1572206   .0894811     1.76   0.079    -.0181592    .3326003 
agrgdpr      | 
          D1 |   .1661411   .0674543     2.46   0.014     .0339331    .2983492 
depositr     | 
          D1 |   .0929191   .0527764     1.76   0.078    -.0105207    .1963589 
resecr       | 
          D1 |  -.0425819   .0794643    -0.54   0.592     -.198329    .1131652 
indecr       | 
          D1 |   .0621281   .0528476     1.18   0.240    -.0414512    .1657074 
depr         | 
          D1 |   .0470015   .0953725     0.49   0.622    -.1399253    .2339282 
pie          | 
          D1 |   1.74e-06   .0000373     0.05   0.963    -.0000713    .0000748 
trrr         | 
          D1 |   .0001345   .0005853     0.23   0.818    -.0010127    .0012818 
trpgdp       | 
          D1 |   .0228261   .0184492     1.24   0.216    -.0133336    .0589858 
pnps         | 
          D1 |  -14.37335   17.43101    -0.82   0.410    -48.53751     19.7908 
tur          | 
          D1 |   .2244426   .0942198     2.38   0.017     .0397752    .4091101 
lwlps        | 
          D1 |   .1720709   .2671249     0.64   0.519    -.3514842     .695626 
dumjp        | 
          D1 |  (dropped) 
dum96        | 
          D1 |   .0067784   .0062328     1.09   0.277    -.0054376    .0189944 
dum97        | 
          D1 |   .0150739   .0063438     2.38   0.017     .0026403    .0275075 
dum98        | 
          D1 |   .0133368   .0070331     1.90   0.058    -.0004477    .0271214 
dum99        | 
          D1 |   .0042807   .0084487     0.51   0.612    -.0122785    .0208399 
dum00        | 
          D1 |   .0245845   .0056779     4.33   0.000     .0134562    .0357129 
_cons        |   .0061451   .0024949     2.46   0.014     .0012552     .011035 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(20) =    48.37      Prob > chi2 = 0.0004 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -5.48   Pr > z = 0.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.87   Pr > z = 0.0041 
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